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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to identify which factors that explain why ethnic groups raise separatist 
demands and what factors that are associated with a radicalization or de-radicalization of 
these demands over time. The topic is important in many respects. Separatist movements have 
the double potential of making a new state at the expense of breaking an old one and, in the 
worst case, being the cause of violent conflicts. 
The dynamic character of the phenomenon implies that one treats separatist demands 
as a broad theoretical concept operating along a spectre ranging from moderate to radical 
demands. I argue that a coherent and broad theoretical framework is needed. First, variables 
associated with the groups, such as ethnic distinctiveness, size, geographic concentration, 
political, economic and cultural discrimination, and external sources of power must be 
assessed. Second, contextual variables associated with the host states, such as institutional 
power sharing arrangements, regime type, regime durability, and state reputation must also be 
taken into consideration.  
The theoretical framework is comprised of two levels of actors, as the groups 
constitute sub-units within their host states. I have therefore used a multilevel growth curve 
regression model to test the theoretical hypotheses. This method of analysis is especially 
suited for handling a phenomenon that involves a nested data structure. The quantitative 
analysis was performed on data mainly from the Minorities at Risk and Quality of 
Government datasets, supplemented by data from Barbara F. Walter and Philip G. Roeder.  
 The analysis supports the adoption of a two-level theoretical framework: Both factors 
related to the groups and the states are important for explaining separatist demands. Among 
the group-level characteristics, I found that political and cultural restrictions influence the 
likelihood of separatist demands, both positively and negatively. Also, if a group is 
concentrated geographically, the likelihood of the group becoming separatist is increased. 
Lastly, if a group has separatist or politically dominant ethnic brethren in neighbouring 
countries, this influences the likelihood of a group being separatist.  
Among the state-level variables, federal systems and autonomy regimes influences the 
likelihood of separatism. Regime durability also proved to be important, the longer a regime 
has survived, the more groups relax their demands over time. Finally, presidential systems are 
associated with a radicalization of separatist demands. What is most striking, both for group- 
and state-level predictors is that theoretically related variables’ effects differ both in positive 
and negative directions, and with respect to explaining demands at the onset of the analysis as 
opposed to explaining change in these demands over time.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research question and motivation: Why study separatism? 
This thesis aims to explore the origins and causal dynamics behind separatist claims. The 
research question is the following:  
 
Which factors make separatist demands among ethnic minorities more likely, and which 
factors are associated with either a moderation or radicalization of separatist demands over 
time? 
 
The relevance of such a research question is apparent. One need only mention recent 
events like the international recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, after prolonged 
conflicts between the separatist Kosovars and the Serbs, the outbreak of armed violence in 
South-Ossetia between the Ossetian separatists and the Georgian armed forces during the 
summer of 2008, and the very recent escalation of armed violence in Sri Lanka between the 
separatist Tamil Tigers and the Sinhalese government armed forces, which earlier this year 
forced some 200.000 refugees out of the war zones (Ramesh 2009). Furthermore, the potential 
consequences of separatist activism are immense.  
First, separatism influences the stability of state structures. Ethnic and indigenous 
groups’ claims for self-determination, whether they are aimed at limited autonomy or the 
creation of a new sovereign state, have reshaped and continue to reshape state structures 
(Marshall and Gurr 2005).  
Secondly (and interrelated), separatist movements often influence the well-being of 
people. Because of the often violent nature of separatist movements, it produces humanitarian 
challenges both for the ethnic separatist groups themselves, as well as the larger population.  
 Thirdly, separatism can (though not always do) result in war. In relative numbers most 
of the contemporary conflicts in the world are of an intrastate character. Moreover, of a total 
of twenty-five ongoing armed conflicts in 2008, eighteen of these conflicts were fought over 
issues concerning territory and self-determination (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008: 
215). In another words they were separatist wars.1 Additionally, internal instability due to 
                                                 
1
 A whole of seventy-one ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or independence at any time 
since the 1950s. The long-term trend shows an increase in armed conflicts for self-determinations from eight in 
the late 1950s to a peak of 40 in the late 1980s. The developmental pattern since then has been a gradual 
decrease to 25 conflicts in the early 2000s (Marshall and Gurr 2005: 21, 25). 
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separatist activism in one state quickly spills over the borders, thus causing a larger regional 
instability.  
 However, the potential consequences of separatist activism depend on the intensity of 
the demands, and there are clear differences with respect to separatist groups’ end goals. 
These differences is evident both between ethnic groups residing within the same state and 
between ethnic groups across states. Whereas some ethnic groups raise radical demands for 
full political independence or an irredentist reunification with a neighbouring ethnic kin 
“homeland”, other groups raise more moderate demands for regional autonomy. Still other 
groups raise no separatist demands at all. For instance, what makes countries like Russia or 
Burma particularly disposed to ethnic separatism? Furthermore, using Russia as an example, 
why have the Chechens fought a lengthy separatist war against Moscow, while the 
neighbouring and kindred Avars have not?2  
Additionally, there is a dynamic element involved in ethnic separatism. While some 
groups radicalize their demands over time, other groups moderate their demands. Why has for 
instance the Kurds in Turkey relaxed their demands for full political independence to more 
limited demands for greater political rights throughout the late 1990s, while the Nuba in 
Sudan have followed a path from no demands to demands for regional autonomy?3  
These two forms of variations, the different degrees of separatist demands and the 
temporal change in these demands, are therefore the primary concern of this thesis, and the 
motivating “puzzle” behind my research question.  
 
1.2 Scientific contribution  
There is by now an extensive literature on separatism. The so-called “ethnic revival” among 
ethnic groups such as the Scots, the Quebecois, the Basques and Catalans, and the Flemish in 
Western Europe and North-America inspired a wave of scholarly work on ethnonationalist 
theories in the early 1980s (Gourevitch 1979; Keating 2001; Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985; 
Williams 1982). Case studies and comparative analyses of secessionist movements have since 
been made in a variety of geographical locations, including the Middle East, Asia and Africa. 
The breakdown of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe spurred yet 
another upsurge of both qualitative and quantitative assessments of separatist movements 
                                                 
2
 For assessments of these groups see the Minorities at Risk project website (MAR 2008).  
3
 Also here, see MAR website.  
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there (Emizet and Hesli 1995; Gorenburg 1999; Hale 2000; Ishiyama 2000; Motyl 1992; 
Roeder 1991; Slezkine 1994; Treisman 1997).  
Large-N analyses of ethnic conflicts in general has largely been made possible 
throughout the 1990s by the work of American scholars like Ted Robert Gurr and Monty 
Marshall and their colleagues (Kaufmann and Conversi 2007: 17-18). Their effort in 
collecting data on ethnic groups worldwide in the Minorities at Risk dataset has triggered an 
increasing amount of quantitative studies on ethnic groups, which has proved to be a valuable 
complementary resource to qualitative and particularistic approaches. However, most 
quantitative studies on ethnic nationalism have been concerned with explaining only the most 
radical forms of mobilization, especially which factors that are associated with secessionist 
movements, ethnic conflicts, and civil wars (Ayres and Saideman 2000a; Lustick, 
Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Walter 2006b; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Some of these studies have been undertaken either on 
a relatively limited geographic setting, such as for instance within the Soviet Union, Russia or 
in Eastern Europe (Emizet and Hesli 1995; Hale 2000, 2008; Ishiyama 2000; Treisman 1997); 
or limited to secessionist movements in democratic countries (Brancati 2006; Sorens 2005).  
Furthermore, the various contributions offered in the literature often focuses on a 
narrow set of explanatory variables, either predictors related to group characteristics, 
grievances or strategic behaviour. Other studies have discussed the impact of states’ 
institutional frameworks on ethnic mobilization more in general. Although some studies have 
tested a broad set of theories, this has been done on a limited number of cases, therefore 
providing the findings with limited external validity (Hale 2000). Based on these 
observations, I argue that my thesis is a valuable contribution to the existing literature for at 
least three reasons.  
Firstly, I argue that there is a need to study separatism as a broader category of 
nationalist claims on a large sample of cases, rather than focusing solely on the most radical 
forms of ethnic mobilization and secessionist demands. In the literature on separatism there 
has been a tendency to interpret the term as an all-or-nothing ideology, independent political 
statehood being the one and only goal, thus juxtaposing separatism with secessionism. I argue 
that this is wrong for different reasons. Putting the study of separatism on the same footing as 
that of secessions would firstly restrict the scope of the study, as successful secessions are 
quite rare. In fact, more often, separatist groups never reach their goals, which make it 
interesting to explore why groups, faced with low odds at succeeding in their campaign, 
nevertheless choose to challenge their central state counterparts. Therefore I consider it 
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equally important to investigate the conditions that facilitate the separatist demands, as it is to 
explain why groups succeed or not in seceding.4  
Furthermore, I agree with those scholars advocating an inclusive definition of 
separatism and argue that the term separatism covers a subset of alternative demands, ranging 
from demands for limited autonomy all the way up to secessionist demands. A narrow 
definition of separatism would also ignore the fact that separatist demands are dynamic and 
may change in a more radical as well as a moderate direction.  
Secondly, instead of focusing on a limited set of explanatory variables either 
describing characteristics of the groups, or their motivations, grievances or capacities, as 
opposed to variables describing the institutional context of the states, there is a need to 
reconcile and test both group-level theories and state-level theories in a coherent framework. 
This is based on the following argument: Ethnic groups raise separatist demands, but they are 
not doing it in a vacuum. The demands are raised in opposition to a host state, which in turn 
can employ countermeasures. Treisman (1997: 215), referring to separatist movements in 
Russia, has pointed out that: “ethnicity enters politics via the interaction of local and central 
leaders”, and continues:  
 
Their [the regional leaders’] choices can be explained through analysis of the “nested” or “two-level” 
games in which they play a part, negotiating with central counterparts under constraints and payoffs 
determined by characteristics of regional populations.  
 
I agree with this argument. But I will extend it to also incorporate the constraints and 
payoffs on separatist activity determined by the characteristics of the host states.5 
Consequently, we are dealing with a phenomenon that is taking place in the space between 
two levels of actors, the separatist groups and the states. This observation implies that factors 
at both the group-level and the state-level must be assessed in order to explain why some 
groups seek greater self-determination while others do not. In fact, the great variety in the 
occurrence of separatism both across and within states suggests that contextual, as well as 
group-specific variables matter for explaining separatist demands.  
Separatist movements provide according to Smith (1982: 17) “the classical paradigm 
of nationalism.” As a consequence, the study of separatism has drawn much of its theoretical 
                                                 
4
 Earlier studies have also focused on demands (Ishiyama 2000; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007), but I argue 
(see chapter three, section 3.4.1) that the new operationalization of separatist demands used in this thesis offers a 
vital contribution because it is a more finely graded measure than those used in earlier studies. Therefore it is 
more suited for tracking a radicalization or de-radicalization of separatist demands.  
5
 The term “host state” I have adopted from Jenne (2004).  
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substance from studies on nationalism in general. On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
nationalism, and therefore implicitly ethnic separatism, is a form of contentious politics just 
the way social movements, rebellions and revolutions are, and therefore is attributed to the 
same causal mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 4).6 
The study of ethnic mobilization has, however, tended to rely on ethnic politics 
theories rather than on contentious politics theories. As Reny (2009) points out, whereas the 
literature on contentious politics has emphasized the need for a dialogue between structural, 
rational and cultural approaches, a similar debate on the usefulness of reconciling the different 
approaches has been less salient among ethnic mobilization students. There is therefore a need 
to assess “the interaction between political institutions and processes, sociopolitical actors, 
and framing processes (symbols, norms, values and discourses)” (Reny 2009: 497). My 
contribution in this respect will be to reconcile both theories that provide information on the 
ethnic groups, the states and the interaction between these two levels of actors.  
Thirdly and directly related to the preceding argument, the two-level character of the 
phenomenon and the theories developed to explain it suggests that there are good 
methodological reasons for conducting a new analysis of separatism as well. Despite the fact 
that most previous studies of separatism have employed variables measured either at the 
group-level or the state-level, there has not yet been undertaken a comprehensive test of these 
theories in a multilevel analysis on a broad selection of cases. As Luke (2004: 4) puts it: 
“Because so much of what we study is multilevel in nature, we should use theories and 
analytic techniques that are also multilevel. If we do not do this, we can run into serious 
problems.”  
Multilevel statistical methods are by definition especially suited for explaining a 
phenomenon that is affected by factors at different levels, which is clearly the case with 
separatism. By employing this sophisticated method of analysis I will be able to evaluate a 
broad theoretical model combining information on ethnic groups with contextual information 
without running the risk of fallacies that often are associated with aggregated or disaggregated 
data structures (Luke 2004). To take account for variation in separatist claims over time, this 
analysis will rest on a three-level data-structure employing a growth curve model, with time-
points (level-1) nested within ethnic groups (level-2) nested within host states (level-3).  
 
                                                 
6
 Contentious politics is defined as: “episodic, public, collective inter action among makers of claims and their 
objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdam et al. 2001: 5).  
 
 6 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. The chapter starts out with a 
discussion and definition of separatism and who the separatists are. Then I proceed by 
presenting the different theoretical explanations of separatism that is available in the 
literature. First, the group-level theories are presented. These theories cover group traits, 
group motivations and grievances, and group capacities and strategic power. This is followed 
by a presentation of the state-level theories, which cover power sharing arrangements, regime 
type and regime durability, as well as state reputation building.  
In chapter three I will introduce the quantitative method of analysis, a multilevel 
growth curve analysis. This chapter will also provide information on descriptive statistics, the 
data used in the analysis, operationalization of the dependent and the independent variables, 
as well as a discussion on the validity and reliability of the variables.  
Chapter four presents the results from the empirical analysis. The findings are 
interpreted in light of the hypotheses presented in chapter three. Seven different explanatory 
models are tested with the aim of landing on a final model that includes the predictors at the 
group-level and state-level that combined offers the best explanatory leverage.  
Chapter five concludes the thesis by summarizing the main findings in light of the 
research question, and discusses the implications of my findings. The thesis is rounded off 
with some suggestions for further research.  
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2 EXPLAINING SEPARATIST DEMANDS IN A TWO-LEVEL 
FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I introduce the different theories that have been used to explain separatism, 
and based on this derive hypotheses to be tested in chapter four. I will present the theories in 
two different groups of variables and hypotheses, founded both on the theories’ level of 
analysis and theoretical focus. First, the group-level theories are introduced. These cover 
group characteristics, group motivations and grievances and group capacity and strategic 
bases of power. Second, there are the state-level explanations: Federal systems and autonomy 
regimes, regime type (democracy versus autocracy, and presidential systems versus 
parliamentary systems) and regime durability, and state reputation. However, before 
presenting the different explanations, I provide some definitions, respectively of what 
separatism is, and who the separatists are.  
 
2.1 Definitions and background 
2.1.1 Terminological confusion: How to define separatism? 
As with most other concepts in the social sciences, the term separatism is interpreted 
differently among scholars, creating a conceptual confusion. Certainly, much of this 
terminological inconsistency can be traced to the fact that theories on nationalism in general, 
and studies of separatism as a subcategory of this branch, are inter-disciplinary; both 
historians, political scientists, and more recently sociologists are concerned with the field of 
nationalism (Kaufmann and Conversi 2007: 6). Hence, separatism is often used 
interchangeably with other theoretical concepts such as secessionism, irredentism and 
regional autonomism. Put shortly, secessionism refers to the demand for full political 
independence; irredentism is the claim for unification with a neighbouring ethnic kin 
“homeland”; while regional autonomism refers to some form of self-determination 
arrangement within an existing state that falls short of independence.  
Whilst some scholars rely on a narrow definition of separatism, emphasizing one of 
the distinctive forms of separatist ideologies, others employ broader and more encompassing 
definitions covering all the abovementioned concepts. Both for theoretical and empirical 
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reasons that will be elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs, I argue in favour of a broad 
conceptual approach when studying ethnic separatism.  
According to Pearson (1997: 18), separatism may be defined as: “The demand for 
sovereign independence for an ethnically-defined homeland in defiance of resident state 
authority.” This definition clearly is an example of a narrow definition, postulating sovereign 
independence as the central and single aim. Further, Pearson (1997: 18) argues that although 
there have been some attempts among scholars to distinguish between a broad concept of 
political separatism and the narrower form of constitutional secessionism, the absolute nature 
of separatist ideology has never been questioned among nationalists themselves. Following 
this line of argument there are no degrees of separatism. Rather it is a question of all or 
nothing. The definition thus strictly links separatism with a complete withdrawal from the 
host state. Some would argue, me included, that this definition covers but one aspect of a 
political phenomenon that consists of a set of alternative ideologies that are internally related, 
both theoretically and empirically.  
Rather than treating separatism and secessionism as equivalents, other scholars on the 
other hand distinguish between the two concepts. Lyon (1975) adopts the following definition 
of the two terms:  
 
separatism; meaning a movement seeking to resist further incorporation, subordination within the larger 
political authority of which it is already a member, and secession, meaning a movement seeking to 
break away decisively from the existing principal political authority (in Navaratna-Bandara 1995: 4).  
 
A similar understanding is adopted by Wood (1981). In an effort to build a theoretical 
framework for analyzing secessionism, he defines separatism as the somewhat vague and 
encompassing terms that covers all acts of political alienation and desires for a reduction of 
central authority. Separatism thus may take the form of demands for provincial rights or local 
or regional autonomy. Secessionism on the other hand is the much narrower ideology of 
ultimate alienation, referring to the formal withdrawal from a central political authority on the 
basis of a claim to independent sovereign status (Wood 1981: 110).  
Hechter (1992: 267) argues that  this understanding of the term serves to differentiate 
secessionism from separatism, as the latter concept according to him does not aim at such a 
withdrawal. Thus, rather than viewing secessionism as a subcategory of a broader separatism 
concept, some theorists draw sharp distinctions between secessionism and separatism in 
general, treating it as something qualitatively different. Zariski (1989: 256) also employs a 
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narrow definition of separatist activists as movements that has “has a clearly articulated 
ultimate goal of independence and sovereignty.” As he points out his study is merely 
concerned with what he terms ethnic extremism, which is deemed to justify the restricted 
focus.  
However, is such a narrow focus theoretically and empirically plausible? In 
accordance with another group of scholars I will argue in favour of a more liberal 
understanding of the term separatism. According to Keating (1992: 45), questions of 
territorial autonomy traditionally has been posed either as a bid for separatism from the state 
or devolution of power within the state. Despite that the demands are put together in an 
autonomist rather than a separatist terminology, this definition nonetheless acknowledges that 
the different demands are related and alternative options, rather than different phenomena.  In 
the Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Calhoun 2002), separatism is defined either as group 
resistance to integration within a society or culture, or as secession from a state and 
subsequent establishment of an independent country. In other cases the goal is reunification 
with ethnic “kin states”.   
The underlying desire for some sort of separation is the uniting aspect that links the 
different alternatives together. Nagel (1978: 3-4) offers a similar approach in her definition of 
ethnic separatism when she includes both attempts to obtain group autonomy, ranging from 
increased local decisional rights up to confederation short of independence, as well as 
attempts to gain full political independence. For, group aims tend to escalate. When the initial 
goal is reached the next goal is independence.  
Horowitz (1981) further argues that the tactical nature of separatist demands, and their 
elasticity favours an inclusive understanding of separatism. Occasionally movements settle for 
less than they claim or to the contrary intensify their demands when the more radical goals are 
perceived to be obtainable.  Smith (1982) also warns of making too sharp distinctions between 
different subtypes of ethnic nationalism, including distinctions between secessionist 
movements and groups that mobilize for limited autonomy. Groups that seek independence 
may, faced with strong opposition, moderate their claims to an autonomist compromise.  
An even more formalized understanding of the different nationalist ideologies 
available for ethnic groups is offered by Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 141) in a so-called 
“pyramid of peripheral aims”. Here available group ideologies are ranked according to degree 
of resistance towards the central authority from least radical to most radical. Starting at one 
end of the scale with  full integration, the aims radicalizes through peripheral protest, 
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regionalism, regional autonomy, federalism, confederalism, separatism/irredentism to full 
independence at the other end of the scale.  
I contend that an inclusive understanding of separatist claims has major strengths 
compared to narrower alternatives. In fact it is superior if one is to get a grasp of the dynamic 
nature of these claims. Both for theoretical as well empirical reasons I therefore consistently 
refer to all types of ethnic political alienation discussed above as varying degrees of 
separatism.  
 
2.1.2 Who are the separatists?  
Smith (1982: 19) makes a case for distinguishing between ethnic and territorial separatism. 
The former refers to demands for autonomy based on cultural distinctiveness, while the latter 
refers to demands for autonomy based on geographical unity.7 However, this thesis is 
concerned with both an ethnic and a territorial aspect of separatism. The units of analysis are 
ethnic groups, whereas the dependent variable measures whether these groups claim some 
sort of territorial separation from the host state, whether of a limited or encompassing type. 
With respect to Smith’s (1982) distinction I am clearly interested in what he targets as ethnic 
separatism, that is, separatist activity based on the basis of a shared ethnic identity. There are 
naturally a variety of different definitions on concepts such as ethnicity, ethnic identity and 
ethnic group. This is not the right time or place to enter into a somewhat contested and 
interdisciplinary debate of what constitute an ethnic identity, and the origins or creation of 
ethnic boundaries.8 Nonetheless, it is useful to look at some of the main perspectives.    
In studies of ethnonationalism there is a rough distinction to be made between 
primordialist and instrumentalist perceptions of ethnic identity. The primordial perspective 
treats ethnic identities as more essential and enduring than other bases of identity (Gurr 
2000b: 4). In this perspective ethnic nationalism is thus understood as a manifestation of an 
enduring cultural tradition that is based on the groups’ primordial ethnic identity (Gurr 1993: 
167). “Given” and “natural” emotions and instincts are in themselves therefore treated as 
ultimate explanations of nationalism (Kaufmann and Conversi 2007: 7).9  
                                                 
7
 Examples of the latter are Iceland’s separatist bid from Norway; as well as the erosion of ties between Great 
Britain and the British dominions of New Zealand, Australia and Canada as a result of the geographical 
remoteness (Smith 1982: 19). 
8
 For a thorough review of existing scholarly debates on ethnicity see Yinger (1985).  
9
 For an elaboration of the primordialist perspective see Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963).   
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The strictly primordial understanding of ethnicity as a “natural given” has largely been 
discredited among contemporary scholars in favour of an understanding of ethnicity as a 
social and political construct (Hechter and Okamoto 2001: 193). This instrumentalist 
perspective on the other hand treats ethnicity as a dependent variable, meaning that ethnic 
identities are produced and maintained for the purpose of achieving other strategic goals 
(Kaufmann and Conversi 2007: 7). Communal or separatist movements are thus seen as an 
instrumental response to differential treatment (Gurr 1993: 167).10  
However, according to some scholars, that does not necessarily imply that the cultural 
dimensions of ethnic identities can be disclaimed altogether. According to Conversi (in 
Hechter and Okamoto 2001: 193) the construction of ethnic identities is based on the 
“preexisting diffusion of shared symbols and cultural elements as well as on memories of a 
shared past and myths of a common destiny.” Furthermore Smith (1992: 47) argues that a 
central problem in the scholarly discussions around ethnic nationalism: “is their failure to take 
sufficiently seriously the formative role of premodern ethnic ties, and the ways in which 
preexisting ethnic identities help to shape the forms, trajectories, and characters of modern 
nations and modern polyethnic states.” In Ireland, Wales, Brittany, Corsica, Catalonia and the 
Basque country for instance, despite periods of acculturation and assimilation that threatened 
these groups’ culture and language, ethnic identity has survived. This very identity has indeed 
formed the basis for the ethnic revival and mobilization for ethnic autonomy that has 
challenged the unity of many western states (Smith 1992: 49).  
Hechter and Okamoto (2001: 194) encloses the discussion on ethnic identity by stating 
that: “Perhaps the most judicious conclusion is that national identity is a (relatively) modern 
construction that is sometimes built on prior cultural foundations.” A third perspective on 
ethnicity can thus be referred to as constructivist, which offers a middle-position. Ethnic 
identities are considered to be enduring social constructions, yet the content and importance 
of these identities can change. Based on this understanding, ethnic identities are not viewed as 
primordial in the sense that they are natural givens, but they are still based on “common 
values, beliefs, and experiences” (Gurr 2000b: 5). Also, the identities are not instrumental, but 
they are “usually capable of being invoked by leaders and used to sustain social movements 
that are likely to be more resilient and persistent than movements based solely on material or 
political interests” (Gurr 2000b: 5).  
                                                 
10
 For instrumentalist perspectives see Hechter (1975); Horowitz (2000); and Gellner (1983).  
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Acknowledging that the roots of ethnic identity can be both of an enduring character 
as well as they can change and be “invented” or perhaps “reinvented” by leaders, how is one 
to define an ethnic group? A common definition of ethnic groups is to treat them as composed 
of “those who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real 
or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others” (Shibutani and Kwan (1965) in Connor 1994: 
115). More precisely ethnic groups consist of individuals who:   
 
Share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on common descent, shared experiences, and 
cultural traits. They may define themselves, and be defined by others, in terms of any or all of a bundle 
of traits: customary behaviour and dress, religious belief, language, physical appearance, (“race”), 
region of residence, traditional occupations, and a history of conquest and repression by culturally 
different peoples (Gurr 2000b: 4). 
 
I have now defined both the content of separatism, as well as identified the separatists, 
and now turn to the theoretical framework that is applied to explain separatist demands.  My 
point of departure is that separatist claims involve two leves of actors, the separatists (which I 
recently identified as ethnic groups) and the states. FIGURE 2.1 provide an illustration of this.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 The hierarchical relationship between ethnic groups and states.  
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Based on the premise that there are two levels of actors, I therefore build an 
explanatory framework that incorporates both theories focusing on the features associated 
with the ethnic groups, as well as the features associated with their host states. FIGURE 2.2 
provide an illustration of how this coherent theoretical framework is built.  
 
FIGURE 2.2 The coherent theoretical framework of both group-level theories and state-level theories. 
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access to land, is supposed to have on separatist demands. Lastly, among the group-level 
theories, I discuss those that focus on group capacities and strategic power bases. The 
existence of external lobby-actors is assumed to influence separatist demands.  
 
2.2.1 Group traits and characteristics  
Ethnic distinctiveness: Separating “us” from “them” 
Theories that hypothesize that ethnic distinctiveness are a precondition for separatism is often 
referred to as primordialist (Jenne 2004; Premdas 1990; Treisman 1997). This perspective is 
associated with the work of Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963).11 Geertz (1963: 109) defined a 
primordial attachment as one that stems from the “givens” or the assumed “givens” of social 
existence: That is, immediate contiguity and kin connection, but also “the givenness that 
stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, 
or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices” (Geertz 1963: 109). 
These attachments are seen to have an important value, not just as a result of “personal 
affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part 
by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself” (Geertz 
1963: 109). 
Whereas ties based on class, party, business, union or profession rarely are considered 
to be a sufficient base for nationhood, primordial ties such as assumed blood ties, race, 
language, region, religion or customs, on the other hand potentially can threaten a nation with 
secessionism or irredentism (Geertz 1963: 110-112). Furthermore, according to Williams 
(1980: 50) “culture separateness reinforces the sense of unique descent and destinable 
history.” Primordial factors represent cleavages in society that are deep, and which serve to 
define the identity of a particular group (Premdas 1990: 22). However, the primordial factors 
are most of the time a combination of both fact and myth. Whether or not the primordial 
attachments in fact are “real” or “constructed” is therefore not necessarily the crucial 
distinction to be made, as long as they can serve as a basis for an ethnic identity.12 The crucial 
task to be made by a separatist group is rather to differentiate itself from the “others”. The 
                                                 
11
 In his studies of family and kinship, Shils (1957: 141-142) discovered that the strengths and tensions in family 
attachments was not merely an attachment to the other family member as a person, but as a possessor of certain 
primordial qualities. As Shils (1957: 142) put it: “The attachment to another member of one’s kinship group is 
not just a function of interaction….It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood.” 
12
 A famous theoretical account of the constructed nature of nations and nationalism is offered by Benedict 
Anderson (2006), who argue that nations are imagined political communities.     
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dichotomy between “us” and “them” thus forms an essential platform for ethnic mobilization 
(Premdas 1990: 13).  
Nevitte (1985) compares the different historical records of nationalism in Quebec, 
Wales and Scotland, and argues that religious ties has played a decisive role in the 
maintenance of these groups’ national identity and nationalist struggle. The religious factor is 
seen to be particularly important in occasions “where the national minority is distinguished by 
religion from the dominant culture of the state” (Nevitte 1985: 344). Moreover, the impact of 
religion in contemporary politics has become increasingly salient. This is evidenced by 
developments such as 9/11, the upsurge of religious fundamentalism, and ethno-religious 
conflicts in Chechnya, East Timor, Tibet, Sudan and Sri Lanka (Fox 2004: 717).13 
Furthermore, religious nationalism and religious fundamentalism often have the common 
goals of preserving the religious values of the nation. This can be achieved either by seizing 
control of government when the incumbents represents more secular fractions of their 
religion, or by demanding autonomy when state leaders are ethnically different from 
themselves (Fox 2004: 718). In Southern Thailand, the Malay Muslims’ separatist activism 
are motivated by both a “religious right and duty to ‘withdraw’ from any form of persecution 
that is serving to place their survival in jeopardy” (Chalk 2001: 243).  
Similar bases for separatist activity are seen among the Muslim minorities of the 
Moros in the Philippines and the Acehnese in Indonesia. These groups are also assumed to 
cultivate ties with other Islamic separatist and fundamentalist groups in the South Asian 
region as well as in the Middle East (Chalk 2001). Similarly, in East Timor and in Irian Jaya, 
the fact that these peoples are Christian, has played an important role in “their sense of 
separate national identities and the rejection of the Javanese Muslim/abangan central 
Indonesian government” (Tan 2000: 270). Religious ties and identities may therefore be 
powerful bases for political and violent action.14 
Differences in social customs also has the potential to be a disintegrative force, 
especially when a relatively sophisticated group comprehends itself as “the bearer of a 
‘civilization’ amid a largely barbarian population” (Geertz 1963: 113). Customs also operates 
                                                 
13
 Although an Islamic heritage may be important in Chechnya and Tatarstan, Treisman (1997: 248) has found 
demands for autonomy to be the result of strategic evaluations of the potential costs and benefits of separatist 
activism, instead of a manifestation of primordial attachments. Wilhelmsen (2005: 40) similarly argues that 
although the balance of the Chechen separatist movement gradually has tilted in favour of radical Islam, this is 
just as much attributable to instrumentalist considerations of the benefits of material and political support from 
Islamic organizations in Asia or the Middle East, as it is a part of a primordial identity.  
14
 Religion, as a predictor of separatism, has been questioned because religious denominational distinctiveness 
rarely coincides with the boundaries of ethnic communities, at least in the European context (Coakley 1997: 62). 
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as group boundaries, as they serve the twofold task of excluding outsiders, as well as they 
help sustaining routines and procedures.  
Language, as the means of communication, serves to preserve common experiences 
and functions as an instrument for cultural division (Williams 1980: 50). A statistical analysis 
of secessionism in democracies showed that among other factors, regions with a distinct 
language have a higher probability of supporting secessionist political parties (Sorens 2005: 
318-319). Moreover, because of its importance for social interaction, language often provides 
a decisive barrier to assimilation (Williams 1982: 50). In Europe, Orridge (1982: 49-50) 
states, language has proved to be an important basis for autonomist nationalism because: “it 
[the language] is a unique possession of the potential autonomist nationality and is a 
possession of ‘the people’ as a whole.” In that way the perception of possessing something 
unique, may provide both a motive and justification for wanting independence.15 Kearney 
(1978: 524) argues forcefully that in Sri Lanka language has been the most important symbol 
for ethnic identity and separatism. Controversies over language between the Sinhala-speaking 
majority and the Tamil-speaking minority, as a part of a more complex set of problems, has 
done much to fuel the separatist sentiment among the latter group (Kearney 1978). Moreover, 
Tamil separatism is driven by a cultural pride in general, and the widespread responsibility 
felt among Tamils to protect this pride (Pfaffenberger 1981: 1146).  
Connor (1994: 104) has raised doubts about the separable nature of the different 
primordial attachments when denoting ethnic nationalism as either of a linguistic, religious or 
regional character, as groups may lose either of these cultural markers but still possess a 
national identity. Instead, primordialism should be understood as one concept covering all 
attachments. In that way the various cultural markers may have a cumulative effect: The more 
cultural markers that separate a group from other groups, the more likely it will view itself as 
a nation and the more likely it will preserve its identity through seeking self-determination. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more ethnically distinct a group is the more likely it will be separatist.  
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 Critical accounts argue that linguistic distinctiveness has not proven to be decisive for the Basque, the Welsh 
or the Scottish nationalist movements, as many of the nationalist activists in these regions speak the metropolitan 
language rather than their native one (Coakley 1997: 58). Others have found the impact of language on political 
conflicts to depend on to what degree social mobility is either blocked or facilitated by belonging to a certain 
language group (Inglehart and Woodward 1967: 28). 
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Group relative size and geographic concentration 
Besides ethnicity, there are also a range of other traits and characteristics that serve to define 
ethnic groups and distinguish them from each other. Group population size can be expected to 
have an influence on separatist activism (Gurr 1993; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Wood 1981). 
The relatively smaller groups face the twofold obstacles of lower chances of winning violent 
conflicts, as well as they are more easily repressed by central governments (Saideman and 
Ayres 2000: 1128). The winning chances naturally stems from the fact that small groups by 
virtue have a limited pool from which to draw military recruits.  
Furthermore, a weak military potential serve to make separatist demands less credible 
as small groups does not have the strength to put sufficient power behind their threats. These 
arguments is supported by Fearon and Laitin (1999: 44), who have shown that among other 
factors, size matters: Larger groups were more disposed to be involved in separatist wars. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Relatively larger groups are more likely to be separatist.  
 
When theorizing about secessionist movements, Wood (1981: 112) argues that a 
necessary geographical precondition for such movements is the existence of separable 
territory “which contains the bulk of the potentially secessionist population.” Orridge (1982: 
46) also identifies the existence of a core territory, in which an ethnic group is concentrated, 
to be the most important base for raising separatist claims on a national homeland. In Sri 
Lanka for instance, the Tamils has been concentrated in the Jaffna district in Sri Lanka and 
additionally constitutes the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants in this area. These 
factors, combined with a claim to the ”traditional homeland” of the Tamils have been an ideal 
breeding ground for Tamil separatism (de Silva 1990: 32-33). Likewise, Gurr (1993: 175) 
contends that groups that are concentrated in one region are more likely to engage in 
contentious forms of political mobilization like for instance rebellion, than groups that are 
relatively more dispersed geographically.  
According to Toft (2002: 86) the occurrence of ethnic violence depends on how the 
opposing actors view the disputed territory. The credibility of separatist claims is tied to 
whether a group is a majority or minority in its region of residence and where the group 
resides. By contrasting the different experiences of separatist activism in Tatarstan and 
Chechnya, the former demanding greater autonomy and the latter demanding outright 
independence, Toft (2002: 85) argues that the differing intensity of these demands can be 
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attributed to the dispersed settlement of the Tatars in contrast to the highly concentrated 
Chechens. A group’s capability of successfully pursuing a separatist agenda and the 
legitimacy of this cause is therefore highly contingent on its settlement patterns. Groups that 
are a concentrated majority in a region have high likelihood of demanding independence, 
while a concentrated minority has moderate likelihood. The Abkhazians in Georgia exemplify 
the latter type. Urban or dispersed groups on the other hand have low likelihood of demanding 
independence. An obvious example of such groups would be the widely scattered Roma 
people in Eastern Europe (Toft 2002: 89-92). 
That a group needs a territorial base in order to be mobilized for separatist territorial 
goals, may as Kaufmann and Conversi (2007: 18) points out, seem like a self-evident and 
trivial precondition. To control for this one could perhaps conduct an analysis restricted to 
ethnic groups that have a territorial base. However, the association is not deterministic, as 
regionally concentrated groups are not by definition destined to raise separatist demands. 
Therefore groups’ spatial distribution is included as an explanatory variable just as relevant as 
any else and the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Groups that are concentrated in one region are more likely to be separatist.   
 
Structural inequality 
Whereas modernization theorists have argued that economic and political development would 
lead to the decline of ethnically based conflicts in general, other scholars has argued for the 
opposite outcome, that modernization processes tend to exacerbate communal conflicts 
(Melson and Wolpe 1970). The resurgence of ethnic mobilization has thus been considered a 
consequence of rising levels of competition between ethnic groups during state modernization 
processes, rather than the outcome of primordialist identities (Nagel and Olzak 1982: 128). 
Some scholars have therefore focused on the structural preconditions for ethnic conflict, in 
terms of class relations and political economy arguments (Hechter 1975, 1992; Bates 1974; 
Horowitz 1981, 2000).  
However, there are diverging views with respect to which groups are the most likely 
separatists. Some argue that it is the relatively disadvantaged groups, whereas others argue 
that it is the advantaged and advanced groups. One of the most cited contributions within the 
so-called political economy arguments on nationalism is Hechter’s (1975) theory of internal 
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colonialism.16 The theory assumes that the modernization processes of state territory created 
both relatively advanced and backward groups, which led to unequal distribution of power 
and resources between these groups. The powerful core naturally aims to maintain their 
advantaged position by reserving the prestigious roles and positions for their members, and 
denying the members of the peripheral group access to these positions. This creates a system 
of political, economic and cultural stratification. It also creates a division of labour between 
an industrialized modern core and an agriculturally or primary commodity-producing, export-
oriented periphery.  
Eventually the stratification is also accompanied by the development of ethnic 
identification within the respective groups. Ultimately, in a system where social disadvantage 
coincides with ethnic distinctiveness this may lead to a heightened sense of nationalism in 
opposition to the core, and peripheral claims of independence (Hechter 1975: 8-10). As 
peripheral groups already find themselves in a disadvantaged and oppressed position, it is 
reasonable to assume that these groups have less to lose from parting with the rest of the state 
in terms of economic losses, as they are more dependent on export to foreign markets. The 
more industrialized regions of the state on the other hand relies more on internal market for 
their manufactured goods. Hence they have more to lose from a partition and are not that 
likely to see the separatist option as a viable strategy.  
Horowitz (2000: 233) makes a similar distinction between advanced and backward 
groups. The former type have benefited from opportunities in education as well as 
employment outside the agricultural sector, whereas the latter type is associated with less 
education, lower per capita income and less access to prestigious jobs. He then categorizes the 
groups further according to whether they reside in a backward or advanced region. Backward 
groups in backward regions are assumed to be the most eager separatists. They fear the 
competition that is likely to develop with their neighbouring groups, and therefore concludes 
that they have little to gain from preserving the present state. This fear is driven both by 
numerical disadvantage vis-à-vis other groups and a perception of its own competitive 
weakness compared to more dynamic and sophisticated groups.17 
While backward groups in backward regions are early seceders, advanced groups in 
backward regions are late seceders. This is due to the fact that advanced groups in backward 
                                                 
16
 Inspired by the work of Andre Gunder Frank in Latin America and theories of “development of 
underdevelopment”, Hechter (1975: 31) attempted to explain the revival of ethnic mobilization in Western 
Europe by addressing centre-periphery relationships. 
17
 Examples of such groups are the Moros in the Philippines; the Nagas in India; the Karens in Burma; and the 
Southern Sudanese in Sudan (Horowitz 2000: 236-237). 
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regions mostly are population exporters, as there are limited potential in their regions of 
residence. The Lozi homeland of Barotseland in Zambia and the Sri Lankan Tamils’ 
homeland in the Jaffna Peninsula are regions with poor and unproductive soil, which has 
forced these groups to search for educational and professional opportunities outside their 
regions (Horowitz 2000: 243-245). In the 1960s, Sri Lankan Tamils made claims to about 40 
to 50 percent of the university places in science-based faculties, engineering and medicine 
(Samarasinghe 1990: 51). Because of this, the Tamils managed to get hold of a large 
proportion of the central bureaucratic and governmental positions, and hence became widely 
dispersed across Sri Lanka. Logically, these advanced groups have more to gain by 
maintaining the status quo of a unified state than to opt for a separate state, as the group’s 
advantaged status has come to rely on population export to other regions of the state 
(Horowitz 2000: 244). The costs of separation are simply higher than the potential rewards.  
However, this is only true if the groups are not faced with violence and discrimination. 
In other words when “the advantages of ‘one Nigeria’ or ‘one Sri Lanka’ can readily be called 
into question” (Horowitz 2000: 247), the chances are greater that these groups will migrate 
back to their home regions and see the separatist option as a realistic alternative. Thus, not 
rejecting the possibility that advanced groups can become separatist altogether, Horowitz 
(2000: 258) argues instead that these groups follow a separatist goal only insofar as the 
economic costs are lower than the potential costs of staying put. Hence, according to his 
framework backward groups are both earlier and more frequent separatists than advanced 
groups. From the preceding discussion the following hypothesis is therefore derived: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Separatism is more likely among economically disadvantaged groups.  
 
On the contrary, some scholars have argued that it is the most advantaged and rich 
groups that seek separation. Gourevitch (1979: 306) makes the argument that peripheral 
nationalism is explained by whether political leadership and economic dynamism is located in 
the same region or whether it is divided between two regions. The latter option is assumed to 
be a strong determinant of separatism when it is combined with what he terms “ethnic 
potential”, that is distinctive group characteristics. Examples of cases where there is a divide 
between the two functions combined with an ethnic potential are Scotland in the United 
Kingdom, Catalonia and the Basque Provinces in Spain, Quebec in Canada, Flanders in 
Belgium, and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia. Whereas Madrid is the administrative centre 
of Spain located in the region of Castille, the economic development has been led by the 
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manufacturing centres located in the Basque centre of Bilbao and the Catalonian centre of 
Barcelona. This has created nationalist tension between the different functional centres 
(Gourevitch 1979: 311).18 Often such tensions have centred on the deficit between the taxes 
paid to the central government by economically developed regions and the low share they 
receive in return from national budgets.  
Based on his study of the ethnically defined regions and republics in Russia, Treisman 
(1997: 222) argues that regional dependence on the centre for communications, trade, raw 
materials and subsidies makes regions less likely to pursue a separatist route. Regions that do 
not “suffer” from such a dependency on the centre on the other hand, will have more strategic 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the centre. Hence, they will be more daring when it comes to 
raising separatist demands. Additionally, the centre will be more cautious to launch 
countermeasures against economically strong regions.  
In their study of secessionist movements in the Soviet Union, Emizet and Hesli (1995: 
529) shows that economic well-being, rather than economic deprivation, is the stronger 
predictor of separatism. Whereas the advanced Baltic States were early seceders, the Central 
Asian republics with their rural areas and lack of sufficient infrastructural facilities faced 
more difficulties in launching nationalist movements. Hale (2000, 2002) has also documented 
that in the Soviet and the Russian setting it is the regions that possess the most wealth that 
tend to be the most eager secessionists. While disadvantaged groups rely on state subsidies 
and job opportunities provided for by advantaged groups, advantaged groups on the other 
hand, already possesses the wealth and goods associated with modernity. Therefore the 
former groups has the most to gain from remaining in the state, whereas the latter has the least 
to gain as they are likely to stay more developed also after having “left the building.” (Hale 
2002: 9) Although the different studies I have referred to in this section has focused on 
different units of analysis, some on ethnic groups, others on ethnic regions, they all point in 
the same causal direction:   
 
Hypothesis 4b: Separatism is more likely among economically advantaged groups. 
 
                                                 
18
 A Basque protest song put it quite clear that Spain is “a cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its 
udder in Madrid.” (Douglas and da Silva (1971) in Horowitz 2000: 250). 
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2.2.2 Group grievances and motivations 
Another group of scholars has emphasized the motivational aspects of ethnic mobilization, 
arguing that deliberate discrimination and grievances caused by this provide ethnic groups 
with a motive to mobilize for collective demands (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; 
Fox 2000; Gurr 1993; Moore and Jaggers 1990). Neglect, exploitation, domination, internal 
colonialism, repression, discrimination, and forced annexation serve as the triggering 
mechanisms of collective consciousness that is necessary for nationalist mobilization 
(Premdas 1990: 22). According to grievance theories, the motivations behind group claims are 
therefore not determined by structural inequality, but by relative deprivation and subjectively 
felt injustices that follow from differential treatment. Such theories have been applied for 
explaining different forms of conflict, including rebellions and protest (Fox 2000; Gurr 1993; 
Gurr and Moore 1997; Moore and Jaggers 1990) as well as in studies on civil war (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
In an effort to understand the driving forces behind communal political action Gurr 
(1993) developed a causal model that basically can be reduced to the following: 
Discrimination of ethnic minorities leads to group grievances and demands for extended 
economic or political rights. These grievances in turn serve as catalysts for minority 
mobilization for political action. Lastly, the higher the level of mobilization, the more likely 
the minority group will pursue its goals through radical political action such as protest or 
rebellion (Fox 2000; Gurr 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997).  
However, I am not concerned with explaining the acts of protests or rebellions as final 
outcomes. My focus is instead on explaining autonomy grievances, which is perceived to be 
intermediate variables in Gurr’s model. Despite different purposes, Gurr’s model offers some 
plausible explanations for the formation of group grievances.19  
Groups’ political and economic disadvantages and their identities are seen as the 
sources for group grievances (Gurr 1993: 173) and these grievances are likely to originate 
from economic and political discrimination. This refers to “patterned social behaviours by 
other groups (and the state) that systematically restrict group members’ access to desirable 
economic resources and opportunities, and to political rights and positions” (Gurr 1993: 173). 
With respect to the political and economic sphere, these restrictions may imply a lack of 
                                                 
19
 Furthermore, as was mentioned in chapter one, section 1.2, separatist activity can be treated as a subcategory 
of contentious politics, thus it can be expected that some of the factors associated with protests, rebellions and 
the like also have an impact on separatist demands. 
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access to jobs (civil service, official higher office, police, military, and business), freedom of 
speech or movement, and rights to vote or organize.  
A third set of group disadvantages is referred to as demographical stress factors and 
include high birth rates, poor public health conditions, migration and lastly land scarcity. 
Additionally, group grievance over a loss of historical autonomy is assumed to be a strong 
predictor of separatist demands (Gurr 1993: 174).  
Besides grievances over political and economic rights, some authors have also 
investigated the effects of restrictions on cultural rights. As was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the primordial sentiments that are treated as identity markers for ethnic groups are 
seen by some scholars to be an important prerequisite for separatist activism. A logical 
extension of this assumption would then be that threats to group identity will be a motivating 
force behind separatist mobilization. Cultural discrimination could thus be hypothesized to 
lead to the formation of group grievances in a similar manner as economic and political 
grievances (Fox 2000: 19).  
As religions has major importance as points of reference for people’s understanding of 
the world around them, a discriminatory challenge against the practice of religion will 
therefore be perceived as a threat to the religious adherents themselves. Additionally, the 
adherence to a specific religion often implies a set of behavioural customs and ways of living 
which also will be threatened by centrally directed discrimination (Fox 2000: 17-18).  
Whereas the linguistic interests of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang province in China have 
been fairly well accommodated by the central government, the accommodation of Islamic 
religious interests on the other hand has been relatively limited. As a consequence, 
discrimination on the basis of religion has led some religious groups to cultivate an anti-state 
discourse. A similar pattern has also been observed among the Sikhs in the Punjab region in 
India (Reny 2009: 515-516). It would thus be plausible to expect that perceived threats to 
ones identity, customs and way of life will lead to the desire for separation. Greater political 
freedom provides groups with more room to live their lives in a manner consistent with their 
culture. Therefore the following hypotheses will be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Groups faced with economic discrimination are more likely to be separatist.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Groups faced with cultural discrimination are more likely to be separatist. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Groups faced with political discrimination are more likely to be separatist.  
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Hypothesis 8: Severe problems with public health conditions are more likely to lead to 
separatism.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Groups that suffer from restricted access to land are more likely to be 
separatist. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Groups that have enjoyed historical autonomy are more likely to be 
separatist.    
 
2.2.3 Group capacity and strategic power 
Traditionally in the literature on ethnic conflict there has been a tendency to treat states as 
rational actors and ethnic groups as irrational primordially attached entities that do not 
calculate their capacities or potential gains (Toft 2002: 114). Furthermore, structuralist and 
institutionalist accounts of group claims often rely on predictors that are slow-moving for 
explaining a phenomenon that is dynamic and often changing. Grievance and motivational 
theories on the other hand tend to focus exclusively on defensive motivations. Hence, none of 
these approaches seem to grasp the possible cost and benefit calculations of ethnic claim-
making (Jenne 2004: 731-732).  
An alternative approach is therefore offered by authors that emphasize the rational 
behaviour of both ethnic groups and states and the wider strategic environment these actors 
operate within (Jenne 2004; Jenne et al. 2007; Walter 2006b; Cetinyan 2002). These ethnic 
bargaining theories perceive the interaction between ethnic groups and their host states as a 
bargaining process over state institutions, where group demands are motivated by a goal of 
extracting concessions from the state (Cetinyan 2002; Jenne et al. 2007).  
Faced with the central counter-response of either accommodation or repression, 
whether a group advances radical or moderate demands against the political centre depends on 
the groups’ calculations of its own strategic leverage. In other words, groups that possess the 
strength to withstand a potential military response from their host state, either because of 
internal or external bases of power or both, are more likely to pursue a radical agenda and 
vice versa (Jenne et al. 2007: 541). Essentially, this boils down to a matter of credibility.  
In order to launch a separatist threat against the political centre, an ethnic group should 
be able to portray itself as a worthy adversary. Group traits such as population size and 
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settlement concentration may serve as internal power-bases of strategic leverage that facilitate 
ethnic mobilization and radicalization (Jenne et al. 2007: 541-542; Toft 2002; Gurr 1993; 
Saideman and Ayres 2000; Wood 1981). However, external sources of strategic power are 
also assumed to have an impact. Both Cetinyan (2002), Jenne (2004) and Jenne et al. (2007) 
argue that outside lobby-actors, whether they are states, organizations or ethnic kin national 
homelands, have a crucial impact on the bargaining process between ethnic minorities and the 
political centres over group demands.  
This third-party influence can operate in different modes. Outside states or 
organizations may provide ethnic minorities with either political or military support. Another 
source of support may come from national homelands that can threaten to intervene on the 
minority’s behalf (Jenne et al. 2007: 542). A recent example of such a scenario is the Russian 
intervention in South Ossetia when the latter’s conflict with Georgia escalated during the 
summer of 2008.   
Groups receiving foreign military support are expected to raise more radical separatist 
demands as they have higher strategic leverage (Jenne et al. 2007). However, as Cetinyan 
(2002: 659) argue in a convincing way, to measure external support by assessing whether or 
not a group receives military support, raises some potential difficulties with explaining 
whether the chicken precipitates the egg. In other words: Is military support a precondition for 
separatism or does separatism generate this kind of support? According to Cetinyan (2002) 
material support from external actors often tends to be launched after a conflict in fact has 
broken out. Measures of this type of support thus may not be that qualified for explaining why 
groups raise demands in the first place. As my focus is on explaining separatist demands, I 
follow Cetinyan, in that it is theoretically more relevant to focus on the potential for external 
support, rather than the actual support, as a predictor of separatist demands.  
However, applying the bargaining model on the case of Hungarians residing in the 
Vojvodina province in the former Yugoslavia, Jenne (2004: 740, 744) concludes that this 
group radicalized its demands only when it found itself in a strategically favourable position 
to do so: when the Hungarian government officially stated its support for ethnic brethrens 
living abroad. This indicates that it is not only the potential support from outside actors that 
may influence separatist demands. The actual military or political support from external actors 
may serve as a catalyst for ethnic groups, making them more ambitious and self-assure to the 
degree that they challenge their host states.  
Third-party intervention or support is often motivated by so-called ethnic ties, 
meaning that external states will provide support for a separatist group with which they share 
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an ethnic kinship (Saideman 1997: 726).20  Kinship ties may exist between an ethnic group 
and its ethnic homeland where the kin is a dominant power or to ethnic groups of similar 
kinship, but where this group is not dominant. Ethnic kin dominance in a nearby state gives 
the group enhanced strategic power, because it signifies a potential for external political and 
military support.   
The number of segments of a particular group may vary. Some groups are mainly 
based in one state while other groups are fragmented across a number of states.21 This may 
have an impact on ethnic demands as it potentially provides the group both with more 
supporters and more contenders. Whether the ethnic kindred groups in neighbouring states are 
separatists as well can also be assumed to have an impact (Saideman and Ayres 2000; Ayres 
and Saideman 2000b). This discussion leads me to propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Groups that have kindred groups that are dominant in a nearby state are 
more likely to be separatist.  
 
Hypothesis 12: The higher the number of segments of ethnic kin groups in other countries the 
more likely a group will be separatist.   
 
Hypothesis 13: Separatism among ethnic kin groups in other countries increases the 
likelihood that a group will be separatist.  
  
2.2.4 Summary of the group-level theories and hypotheses 
In this section, I have presented a broad set of theories on ethnic separatism that is connected 
to the ethnic groups, and categorized them according to theoretical content. Among the group-
level explanations there are three categories of theories, the first focusing on characteristics of 
the groups, the second on grievances as a source of motivation, and the third on capacity and 
strategic power. Based on these theories fourteen hypotheses (counting 4a and 4b as two) 
were derived. TABLE 2.1 provides an overview of these different group-level theories and 
hypotheses to be tested in chapter four.  
                                                 
20
 Testing this theory against the “vulnerability theory” which postulates that a state’s own vulnerability to 
separatism serves as a constraint on its will to practice external support, Saideman (1997) finds overall support 
for the “ethnic ties” theory when it comes to explaining third-party intervention in the secessionist conflicts of 
Katanga, Biafra and Yugoslavia.  
21
 The geographically divided Kurds is an example of a group with segments in different countries.  
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TABLE 2.1: The group-level theories and hypotheses.  
 
Group-level theories Hypotheses 
1. The more ethnically distinct a group is the more likely it will be separatist.  
2. Relatively larger groups are more likely to be separatist.  
3. Groups that are concentrated in one region are more likely to be separatist. 
4a. Separatism is more likely among economically disadvantaged groups.  
Group traits and  
characteristics 
 
4b. Separatism is more likely among economically advantaged groups. 
5. Groups faced with economic discrimination are more likely to be separatist.  
6. Groups faced with cultural discrimination are more likely to be separatist. 
7. Groups faced with political discrimination are more likely to be separatist 
8. Severe problems with public health conditions are more likely to lead to 
separatism. 
9. Groups that suffer from restricted access to land are more likely to be 
separatist. 
Group grievances  
and motivations 
 
10. Groups that have enjoyed historical autonomy are more likely to be separatist. 
11. Groups that have kindred groups that are dominant in a nearby state are more 
likely to be separatist. 
12. The higher the number of segments of ethnic kin groups in other countries the 
more likely a group will be separatist.   
Group capacity and 
strategic power 
13. Separatism among ethnic kin groups in other countries increases the 
likelihood that a group will be separatist. 
 
2.3 State-level theories 
Whereas group identities, characteristics, motives, capabilities and strategies, all are important 
factors for explaining minority demands, one must also take into account the wider context 
within which these demands are raised. Although the effect of institutional arrangements on 
ethnic conflict, and the various conflict-solving measures utilized in multiethnic states have 
been tested in previous accounts (Brancati 2006; Coakley 1992; Cohen 1997; Ishiyama 2000; 
Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton 2002; Hale 2004; Lustick et al. 2004; McGarry 
and O'Leary 1994), the effect on separatism has not been assessed with the same frequency. 
To investigate the effects of institutional designs on ethnic mobilization and conflict is 
important in order to understand under which contextual circumstances these conflicts are 
more likely to occur. It may also provide policy-makers with clearer guidelines as to which 
options that is to be preferred for appeasing potential separatist movements.  
In the following part I discuss theories that focus on state-level institutions, such as 
modes of power sharing arrangements, regime type and regime durability. I also touch upon 
theories on state reputation with respect to previous behaviour towards internal challengers.  
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2.3.1 Power sharing arrangements  
In this part I discuss theories that focus on the impact of various forms of power-sharing 
arrangements. In general, decentralization of power is expected to dampen ethnic tensions by 
“bringing the government closer to the people, increasing opportunities to participate in 
government, and giving groups control over their political, social, and economic affairs” 
(Brancati 2006: 652). Power sharing arrangements are therefore often put forward as options 
available for states in order to contain conflict and protest in ethnically fractionalized 
societies. However, the theories and empirical tests discussing the merits of federal systems 
and autonomy regimes are at best mixed. Some scholars have found power sharing 
arrangements to have a neutralizing impact on ethnic conflict, while others have found 
support for the opposite.22 Nevertheless, there has been an increase in the adoption, or at least 
the consideration of adopting, federal political structures among ethnically divided countries 
over the last decades; Spain, Belgium and Ethiopia have adopted a federal structure, whereas 
there has been debates of doing the same both in Italy, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Burma, Uganda and Afghanistan (Bermeo 2002: 97; Amoretti 
2002).23  
There are a variety of definitions and typologies of federal systems. Riker (1964: 11) 
views federal systems as a result of a bargaining process and defines them by the existence of 
two levels of government that rule the same land and people, where each level has at least one 
area of action in which it is guaranteed autonomy. Stepan (1999: 20-22) criticizes this 
definition for being highly restricted to the U.S. model of federalism. He argues that we 
should separate between “coming-together” or symmetrical federations like the United States, 
Switzerland and Australia, “holding-together” or asymmetrical federations that were created 
in order to accommodate the ethnically divided populations of India, Spain and Belgium, and 
lastly “putting-together” federations that were created by coercion and force like the USSR.24 
A similar conceptualization with another wording, is the distinction between ethnofederations 
                                                 
22
 As Hechter and Okamoto (2001: 203-204) points out, an additional third group of scholars argues that these 
arrangements neither promotes nor neutralizes ethnic conflict. Bakke and Wibbels (2006) offer a relevant 
critique; they state that the question is not as much whether federal systems are more prone to peace or not than 
unitary systems, but more about under what conditions federal systems serve to dampen or escalate ethnic 
conflicts.  
23
 Federalism has even been suggested as a possible alternative for Iraq (Roeder 2009: 203).   
24
 There are clear implications that follow from choosing between different conceptualizations. Consider the case 
of Canada; according to the different theorists it can be classified both as a “coming-together” federation, an 
asymmetrical federation and an ethnofederal state. Despite similarities in the formation process of the U.S. and 
the Canadian federations as “coming-together”, there are nevertheless important differences. The Canadian 
federal system has an asymmetrical element as at least one of the federal units, Quebec, is based on nationality, 
whereas the U.S. federal units are regionally based (Kymlicka 1998: 128).  
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and federations (Hale 2004; Roeder 2009) For a state to be classified as ethnofederal, at least 
one constituent territorial governance unit is associated with an ethnic category (Hale 2004: 
167). I will restrict my classification of federal systems and the expectations to be derived 
from this, to the distinction between ethnofederations (in the meaning of ethnically defined 
federal units) and federations (in the meaning of regionally defined units), which is also most 
commonly used in the literature.25  
As the different types of federal systems have their own defining features, one may 
expect them to have different implications and impacts on separatist activity. According to 
Stepan (1999: 20), countries like Indonesia, Russia, Nigeria, China, and Burma, that have 
been plagued by separatist movements, have to create federal systems that are able to 
accommodate cultural diversity, in order to become viable democracies. Such a solution is 
needed, even if this entails an arrangement of special autonomy for a certain group. Efforts at 
crafting ethnofederations are thus seen by many scholars as the most likely choice for 
countries faced with ethnic diversity.  
Gurr (2000a: 55) sees the gradual decrease of ethnic conflicts in the last decades as a 
result of an increasing will to accommodate minorities’ collective demands through 
devolution of power. In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe has adopted standards to “endorse autonomy for 
minorities within existing states” (Gurr 2000a: 55). Reluctance to grant autonomy on the other 
hand may be motivated by fears that minorities, once their demands have been 
accommodated, will radicalize further. However, Gurr (2000a: 56-57) argues that these 
expectations are not well supported by the empirical realities. The successful establishments 
of federal arrangements or autonomous regimes for the Mizos in India, Gaguaz’ in Moldova 
and the Chakma tribe in Bangladesh in fact support the opposite outcome.26  
The success of such arrangements may be due to the reassuring effect such 
accommodating concessions have in deeply divided states, as demands for greater self-
determination often are driven by fears of insecurity (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999: 259). 
Furthermore, goods that are valued by one segment of a society, for instance the provision of 
education in a distinct language or state support for a specific religion, are best provided for 
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 The former label thus incorporates the asymmetrical or “holding-together” federal systems, whereas the latter 
refers to symmetrical or “coming-together” federal systems. 
26
 However, state concessions of special autonomy can also be fragile and reversible. McGibbon (2004: 3) argues 
that Aceh and Papua was granted autonomy under extraordinary circumstances when the Indonesian government 
was rendered weak by a number of crises. When the authority was rebuilt and the crises passed over the 
government loosened its commitment to the autonomy grants made in the post-Suharto era, fearing that such 
commitments would stimulate a domino-effect of regional demands.  
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locally. This is because the local provision of goods increases the likelihood that the goods 
produced are in line with the wants and identities of the particular segment. To devolve the 
provision of such goods to sub-national units in federal systems is therefore a way of handling 
this (Hechter 2000: 143).  
Federal systems also provide multiethnic societies with political flexibility and 
minority groups with alternative arenas in which they can operate (Brass 1991: 60). Rothchild 
and Hartzell (1999: 268) finds, although relatively limited, empirical support for the 
proposition that including arrangements of territorial autonomy when negotiating settlements 
of intrastate conflicts increases the likelihood of these settlements being stable. Bermeo 
(2002: 105) states that federalization and the granting of special or asymmetrical autonomy in 
Spain and Belgium has served to check the support for separatism. Furthermore, whereas the 
positive effects associated with decentralization have been supported by the stabilizing effects 
such features have had in Canada, Switzerland, India and Nigeria, failure to provide federalist 
concessions on the other hand has, according to Bermeo (2002: 105-107), often served to 
stimulate separatist movements.  
Similarly in Russia, despite threats of Tatar secessionism in the early 1990s, the 
negotiation over federalism and the power sharing agreement that was reached in February 
1994 between Moscow and Tatarstan, has served to preserve Russia’s territorial integrity 
rather than to disintegrate it (Walker 1998: 241, 244). This is supported by the findings of 
Lustick et al. (2004: 223): Increasing representation through autonomous power sharing 
arrangements significantly reduces secessionist activity.27  
 Whereas the assumed strengths of ethnofederations are their ability to target and 
accommodate aggrieved ethnic minorities, federations with ethnically heterogeneous regions, 
on the other hand, may prevent the formation and institutionalization of ethnic identities at the 
periphery, and stimulate inter-ethnic cooperation rather than conflict (Roeder 2009: 217). 
Based on the preceding discussion the following hypotheses are derived:   
 
Hypothesis 14a: Groups residing in federations are less likely to be separatist.   
 
Hypothesis 15a: Groups residing in ethnofederations are less likely to be separatist. 
 
                                                 
27
 Their analysis is based on a computer simulation program employed on a virtual country, Beita. The results 
suggest that repression may serve to contain ethnopolitical mobilization, but not secessionist activity (Lustick et 
al. 2004: 223-224).   
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Hypothesis 16a: Autonomous groups are less likely to be separatist.  
 
There is however a large group of scholars that suggests that decentralization of power 
does not reduce ethnic conflict, but quite the contrary serve to escalate such conflicts. 
Whereas some scholars have concluded that federalization and devolution of power may have 
had a stabilizing effect in many divided societies, it does not necessarily eliminate separatist 
sentiments. The breakdown of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia, followed by the massive ethnic disturbances that was revoked when the 
ethnic pressure cooker exploded, did much to fuel the debate on the potential damaging 
effects of ethnofederalism.  
The Soviet central leadership in Moscow created ethnically defined federal units led 
by ethnic cadres that were made dependent on and loyal to the centre. This strategy was 
initially aimed at neutralizing ethno-politics but as Roeder (1991: 199) puts it: “It was a 
strategy that achieved interethnic peace not so much by removing the root causes of ethnic 
grievances as by eliminating mobilizational opportunities for independent ethnic protest.” A 
similar assessment has been made by Slezkine (1994: 434) who in a metaphoric manner states 
that: “If the USSR was a communal apartment, then every family that inhabited it was entitled 
to a room of its own.” The Soviet communist state thus combined a simultaneous promotion 
of ethnic nationalism and union federalism based on a belief that by nurturing ethnic national 
autonomies, schools and languages, one would eventually eliminate distrust and discontent 
towards the federal centre (Slezkine 1994: 420).  
The somewhat unintended consequences of the federal systems in the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia (post-revolution) and Czechoslovakia (post-1968), was however the construction 
and recognition of national diversity within the states. These federal systems therefore served 
to develop and reinforce already existing ethnic identities, but also to create a “common 
enemy – which, in the federal context, was inevitably the center” (Bunce 1999: 47-48). 
Federalism may therefore serve to create nations on the sub-state level that are equipped with 
strong symbolic resources like borders and various economic, cultural or political institutions. 
These institutions are expected to fuel nationalist and separatist aspirations (Bunce 1999: 84-
85; Jenne et al. 2007: 542).28  
                                                 
28
 Dorff (1994: 102) stresses the distinction between federal structure (the institutions) and federal process 
(cooperation between the partners of the federation), claiming that neither of the three communist federations 
met both of these criteria, thus questioning whether we at all can brand these regimes as federal. To discredit 
federal systems as tools for conflict-management on the sole basis of the failure of these regimes thus may be 
immature. 
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The organization of federal systems along ethnic lines may pose serious challenges to 
the conduct of federal process as it potentially heightens the conflict between ethnic groups. 
There is also a risk that the centre will be occupied by a dominant group that may aim to 
centralize the system and thereby inhibiting the proper federal process. The experience of 
ethnic federalism in Ethiopia since 1991 lends some support for this reasoning. Here the 
failure to contain ethnic strife, to a large degree has been ascribed to the lack of real 
decentralization of power and the continued government dominance by the Tigreans 
(Mengisteab 2001: 24).  
Hale (2004: 167) points out that all the ethnofederations that have failed and broken up 
have had an ethnic core region, whereas this is not the case for those lacking a core region.29 
In Nigeria these problems became evident during the first Nigerian First Republic. The size 
and dominance of the northern region of the Hausa Fulani did much to bring about the 
collapse of the federal state structure (Suberu 1993: 40).  
With reference to the Canadian federation Kymlicka (1998: 128) questions the 
flexibility of federal systems when they are built on asymmetrical relationships, observing 
that whereas federal units based on nationality have a tendency to seek ever greater powers, 
regionally based units does not.30 This is illustrated by the fact that the regionally based 
federal system of the United States over time has become more centralized, while the 
ethnofederal Canadian system has become more decentralized (Kymlicka 1998: 128).31  
The accommodation of national minorities may also have an unwanted effect of 
reinforcing ethnic identities rather than depoliticizing them. As minorities become empowered 
with self-governing institutions they may gain confidence in their pursuit for even greater 
concessions (Kymlicka 1998: 139). This argument is echoed by Cornell (2002: 250), who 
points out that the granting of autonomy to specific groups as a form of positive 
discrimination raises both moral and practical challenges. He further argues: “The institution 
of autonomous regions is conducive to secessionism because institutionalizing and promoting 
the separate identity of a titular group increases that group’s cohesion and willingness to act, 
and establishing political institutions increases the capacity of that group to act” (Cornell 
2002: 252). Providing groups with borders, identities, institutions, leadership, control of mass 
media, and potential external support, Cornell (2002: 275) concludes that ethno-federal 
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 A core region is defined by Hale (2004: 169) as follows: “An ethnofederal region is a core ethnic region if it 
contains either an outright majority of the population or makes up at least 20 percent more of the whole 
country’s population than does the second largest region.” 
30
 Whereas Quebec is a federal unit based on nationality, the other nine provinces in Canada are regionally based 
units within the English-speaking majority (Kymlicka 1998: 128).  
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arrangements have been “a source rather than a solution” [emphasis added] to conflict in the 
Caucasian environment. The following alternative hypotheses are therefore proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 14b: Groups residing in federations are more likely to be separatist.  
 
Hypothesis 15b: Groups residing in ethnofederations are more likely to be separatist. 
 
Hypothesis 16b: Autonomous groups are more likely to be separatist.  
 
2.3.2 Regime type and durability 
Whereas the preceding section discussed the possible merits and pitfalls of accommodating 
ethnic mobilization through the adoption of various forms of power sharing arrangements, 
there is also a large scholarly debate that more broadly discuss what regime type that is best 
suited for handling ethnic conflicts in deeply divided societies.  
Some scholars maintain that it is a particular set of democratic institutional designs, 
rather than democracy in general, that are especially well-equipped for ethnically 
fractionalized countries. Lijphart (1977: 25) has for instance argued in favour of 
consociational democracy, grand coalition governments, “concurrent majority” rule, 
proportionality and segmental autonomy in order to make democracies stable in plural 
societies. Similarly, Cohen (1997: 628) has shown that among democracies, those that are 
built on proportional institutions are better at handling ethnic conflicts than those built on 
majoritarian institutions.  
Furthermore, democracies, as opposed to especially semi-autocracies, but also 
autocracies, have been found to be less vulnerable to extreme forms of ethnic mobilization, 
such as political violence, rebellions, civil wars and armed conflict (Ellingsen 2000; 
Mousseau 2001; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Scarritt, McMillan, and 
Mozaffar 2001).  
However, neither democratic nor autocratic regimes seem to be immune to ethnic 
separatism. In fact, building ethnically inclusive democratic governments with cross-cutting 
coalitions is not an easy task in severely divided societies. Some of the defining aspects of 
democratic systems may pose severe challenges to political stability in ethnically 
fractionalized states, and to the contrary make democracies more prone to separatism.  
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In democratic systems, the victorious political competitors are rewarded with inclusion 
in government. This inclusion is often accompanied with further rewards, such as access to, 
and distributive power over resources and other privileges. In divided societies, the 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion run the risk of coinciding with ethnic lines, which 
makes the potential rewards or losses associated with either inclusion or exclusion all the 
more serious. Exclusion from government may be synonymous with exclusion from society in 
general (Horowitz 1993: 18).  
Democratic institutions may in fact facilitate various electoral outputs that are 
undemocratic and that potentially fuel the salience of ethnic cleavages further. In divided 
societies it is quite likely that one, in one way or the other, either ends up with some sort of 
tyranny of the majority. This majority could be of either an absolute or a simple form. The 
latter would in practice mean a tyranny of the minority, as first-past-the-post electoral 
systems, such as the Westminster system, brings to power the party with the highest vote 
share, regardless of how large this vote share is of the total turnout (Horowitz 1993: 29-30).  
Competition between ethnic groups over access to political power may thus become a 
question of all or nothing. This creates a situation of uncertainty for the losers, as the losers 
cannot trust that the winners credibly intend to protect other than their own self-interest.  
When the impartiality of the state is at doubt, or when the state itself has collapsed, this 
creates what some theorists have labelled an ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993; Saideman 
and Ayres 2000; Saideman 1998; Saideman et al. 2002).32 Faced with uncertainty, ethnic 
groups may come to rely even more on their own identity and kinship ties, as a source of trust 
and protection against neglect and exclusion (Horowitz 1993: 32). Ultimately, what better 
way of protecting ones own interests and security is there than to form ones own political 
entity? Ethnic groups that are excluded from the rewards of the democratic systems would 
therefore be more likely to see the separatist option as a way of obtaining security (Ayres and 
Saideman 2000b: 97; Saideman and Ayres 2000).  
Furthermore, demands of ethnic separatism are not inherently associated with 
violence. Such goals may equally well be pursued through the democratic rules of the game.33 
The opportunities for non-violent ethnic mobilization are higher in democracies than in 
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 Security here refers to economic, political and physical security. While economic security is determined by 
issues such as income and employment; physical security concerns the more basal need of not feeling threatened 
physically by another group in the state. Political security is gained through some form of political control 
(Saideman 1998).    
33
 Some obvious examples of politically organized separatist are the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland; 
Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales; Euskadi in the Basque county; Parti Québecois (PQ) in Canada; and Lega Nord in 
Italy (Sorens 2005: 305).  
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autocracies, as democracies are more tolerant than autocracies. In that way democracies may 
provide ethnic separatists with both the relevant institutions and political channels, through 
which they can set forth their separatist demands in a legal way. This is opposed to 
autocracies which are insensitive to ethnic demands, unless the costs of repressing them 
outweigh the benefits (Gurr 1993: 177; Saideman and Ayres 2000: 1131; Gurr and Harff 
1994: 103).  
The act of putting forward separatist demands (which can be non-violent), should thus 
be more likely in democracies than in autocracies, as separatist demands are more likely to 
trigger large-scale conflict in autocracies, because the demands cannot be raised through 
political channels.  
Autocracies may also remove some of the competitive uncertainty that is found in 
democracies, as they can be quite stable regimes, notwithstanding which methods of coercion 
that are employed to reach this stability (Saideman et al. 2002: 107). One could also expect 
democracies where the dominant group enjoys relatively limited legitimacy, to be more prone 
to ethnic unrest and separatism, than say an autocratic regime with a narrowly legitimized 
military leadership, which does not have to rely on support from ethnic groups for their 
legitimacy. Based on this discussion the following hypothesis are to be tested:  
 
Hypothesis 17: Ethnic groups residing in democracies are more likely to be separatist. 
 
It is not just the character of the regime that is assumed to influence the likelihood of 
separatist activity. The stability and durability of regimes also are expected to matter. 
According to the ethnic security dilemma theory, the situations that occur following a regime 
collapse are likely to be characterized by uncertainty and anarchy (Posen 1993).  
The upsurge of separatist activism in the former post-communist world may thus be 
viewed as a consequence of a lack of state institutions that were able to handle ethnic 
mobilization once the beasts were released from their cages. In the wake of regime changes, 
ethnic groups are forced to rely on strategies that will maximize their self-interest and 
security. When no other alternative groups are viewed as credible, this would best be achieved 
through the creation of a state of their own. Regime change should therefore be positively 
correlated with increased ethnic unrest, independent of whether the direction of change is 
toward democracy or autocracy (Gurr 1993: 176-177; Hegre et al. 2001). Long established 
regimes, both democratic and authoritarian types, are more likely to have “worked things out, 
either satisfying the demands of competing groups or discouraging dissent through enduring 
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repressive institutions” (Saideman et al. 2002: 109). On the basis of these arguments, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
Hypothesis 18: The longer a regime has endured, the less likely an inhabiting group will be 
separatist.  
 
 Regime durability and stability is hypothesized to restrain ethnic mobilization, but 
how is this stability achieved? There is a large scholarly debate addressing what type of 
executive institutions, presidential or parliamentarian, that is most likely to produce political 
stability, and therefore most successful in ethnically divided societies.  
Some scholars argue that presidential systems have their strengths, first, in terms of 
accountability, as voters directly elect their executive, and may punish or reward the 
executive in the next election. Second, presidential systems provide higher levels of 
identifiability, in the meaning that presidential elections provides clearer cues to the voters in 
order for them to make a prospective choice and assuring that they know their alternatives. 
Third, presidential systems have a system of mutual checks, as executive and legislative 
power is separated. Fourth and last, encouraged by the separation of power, the president may 
function as an arbiter, placing himself above congressional party politics in order to ensure 
moderation (Shugart and Carey 1992: 44-49).  
In ethnically divided societies this arbitrary element may motivate groups to 
cooperate, and to muster support behind a joint candidate, as cooperation is preferable to 
being excluded from politics (Ishiyama 2000: 54) For ethnic groups facing security dilemmas, 
the presidential principles should make them more confident that undesired policies will be 
blocked in a system of mutual checks and balances (Saideman et al. 2002: 111). Hence, the 
following hypothesis is set forth: 
 
Hypothesis 19a: Groups in presidential systems are less likely to be separatist.  
 
  However, presidents are often elected in first-past-the-post procedures, creating zero-
sum games where the electoral winner takes all. In ethnically divided societies, this may serve 
to polarize ethnic cleavages, and lead to a hegemonic status for the largest ethnic group, thus 
enabling it to exercise a tyranny of the (simple) majority (Linz 1994: 44; 1990: 56). 
Alternatively, the following hypothesis is therefore proposed:  
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Hypothesis 19b: Groups in presidential systems are more likely to be separatist.  
 
2.3.3 State reputation building 
Yet another approach is offered by Walter (2006b: 109). She argues that the strategic 
interaction between ethnic groups and their central counterparts must be viewed in light of the 
uncertainty that surrounds a government’s willingness to accommodate a challenger. In other 
words, a government sits on private information about whether it will act in a conciliatory or 
repressive way when challenged.  
This means that this information is not available for potential challengers. Instead, the 
groups must evaluate and calculate the information that is readily available and based on this 
make a guess of how the government in fact will act. This can be done by reviewing previous 
government behaviour. However, what complicates the matter is that governments, also 
conciliatory ones, thus have an incentive to act in a strategic way, so as to repress early 
challengers in order to avoid future challengers (Walter 2006b: 110). Building on theories 
from economics, Walter (2003, 2006a) argues that the decisions to fight or accommodate a 
challenger can not be reduced to evaluations of the strategic value of the territory at stake. 
Rather, governments exercise a form of reputation-building in order to deter future 
challengers.  
Results from statistical analysis shows that states that face numerous future 
challengers will act more repressive towards early challengers, and states that repress early 
challengers will face fewer challengers in the future.  Because of imperfect information about 
how a government will respond to challenges, groups therefore will have to rely on 
information on earlier challenges and earlier government responses to these. Hence, the 
following hypothesis will be tested:  
 
Hypothesis 20: Groups that have observed state accommodation of earlier challengers are 
more likely to be separatist.  
 
2.3.4 Summary of the state-level theories and hypotheses 
In the preceding section I have presented three categories of state-level theories with eleven 
adhering hypotheses. The first theoretical perspective is that focusing on various forms of 
power sharing arrangements. The second focuses on the effect of democratic versus autocratic 
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regime types, presidential versus parliamentary systems and regime durability. Lastly, there is 
the theory that discusses the impact of past state behaviour as a source of reputation building. 
These theories and hypotheses are summarized in TABLE 2.2.  
 
TABLE 2.2: The state-level theories and hypotheses.  
 
State-level theories Hypotheses 
14a. Groups residing in federations are less likely to be separatist.   
15a. Groups residing in ethnofederations are less likely to be separatist. 
16a. Autonomous groups are less likely to be separatist. 
14b. Groups residing in federations are more likely to be separatist. 
15b. Groups residing in ethnofederations are more likely to be separatist. 
Power sharing 
arrangements 
 
16b. Autonomous groups are more likely to be separatist. 
17. Ethnic groups residing in democracies are more likely to be separatist. 
18. The longer a regime has endured, the less likely an inhabiting group will be 
separatist. 
19a. Groups in presidential systems are less likely to be separatist. 
Regime type  
and durability 
 
19b. Groups in presidential systems are more likely to be separatist.  
State reputation 20. Groups that have observed state accommodation of earlier challengers are more likely to be separatist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS, DATA AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the choice of a quantitative research design in this 
thesis. Then, I proceed by presenting the specific method of analysis, the multilevel linear 
growth curve model. I continue by discussing the data used in the empirical analysis. Finally, 
I present the operationalization of the dependent and the independent variables used in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
3.1 Research design: A quantitative approach  
Skocpol (2003: 409) argue that social scientists are involved in a “doubly engaged” enterprise 
as we simultaneously aim to answer real-world questions as well as being engaged in a 
discussion of causal theoretical hypotheses and choice of optimal methods of empirical 
investigation. It is the latter aspect that is targeted in this chapter: What is the ideal 
methodological approach for my research question?  
Traditionally, the methodological approaches available for political scientists have 
been dichotomized into a quantitative, variable-oriented approach with a large N and an aim 
of generalizing the results to a broad universe of cases, and a qualitative case-oriented 
approach focused on one or a smaller number of cases (King, Verba, and Keohane 1994: 3-4; 
Ragin 2004). This dichotomy has been, and still is accompanied with a high level of 
controversy between adherents to both approaches as to what techniques are best for causal 
inferences (King et al. 1994; Lijphart 1971; McKeown 1999; Skocpol 2003; Ragin 2004).  
Rather than to throw myself into a debate of whether one methodological approach in 
general is superior to another, I instead argue that a quantitative approach is best for my 
research question. Firstly, ethnic separatist movements are active in every corner of the world. 
With this in mind, I intend to track which factors are the most important for predicting 
separatist demands by testing it on a largest possible sample of ethnic groups, thus 
maximizing the ability to generalize the results of my analysis. The choice of a quantitative 
design is further grounded in the fact that previous studies of separatism often has been done 
in either qualitative analyses of one or a limited number of cases (Gourevitch 1979; Keating 
2001; Tiryakian and Rogowski 1985; Williams 1982), or on a higher number of cases, albeit 
restricted either to a specific geographic region or to separatist movements in democracies 
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(Emizet and Hesli 1995; Hale 2000; Ishiyama 2000; Treisman 1997; Sorens 2005). Although 
quantitative studies has been undertaken on a large N sample of ethnic groups, most of these 
have been concerned with explaining only the most radical forms of ethnic mobilization, 
especially which factors that are associated with strictly secessionist movements, or other 
types of ethnic conflicts like rebellion, protest or civil wars (Ayres and Saideman 2000a; 
Lustick et al. 2004; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Walter 2006b; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Thus, I argue that there is a need for a test of the rich theoretical resources 
accumulated in previous studies, both on a wide spectre of cases and with an inclusive 
operationalization of separatist demands (which I argued in favour of in chapter two, section 
2.1.1). I will now turn more specifically to the choice of a multilevel method of analysis.  
 
3.2 Method of analysis 
3.2.1 The need for a multilevel analysis of separatist demands: 
Theoretical and statistical motivations 
Often, political scientists aim to answer research questions that involve multilevel data 
structures, also called hierarchical data. In fact, these types of data structures exists whenever 
a group of units can be considered as a subset of other units (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 
219). However, though so many of the phenomena we intend to explain involves a multilevel 
structure, relatively few attempts to address these questions through the statistical methods 
that are available for handling such nested data structures have been made (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002)  
  The theoretical reasons for conducting multilevel analyses are numerous and 
convincing. As I have argued both in the introduction to this thesis and in the following theory 
chapter, I hypothesize ethnic separatism to be the outcome of both group-specific 
characteristics and factors associated with these groups’ host states.  
My argument is relatively straightforward, ethnic groups are subunits within their host 
states. Ethnic separatism is therefore clearly a phenomenon that is comprised of a multilevel 
data structure. Whenever a researcher employs a theoretical framework or hypotheses that 
“are composed of constructs operating and interacting at multiple levels, then the researcher 
should use multilevel statistical models” (Luke 2004: 23). However, more often than not 
multilevel theoretical frameworks are not tested in corresponding multilevel statistical 
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models. The study of ethnic separatism proves to be no exception to the rule in this respect. 34 
My choice of research design is therefore driven by theoretical considerations, as I aim to 
explain a phenomenon comprised of a hierarchical data structure by utilizing the most 
appropriate method for doing so.  
There are various risks associated with a lack of correspondence between theory and 
the method employed to test these theories. Often data on lower levels of analysis are 
analyzed at an aggregate level. This may lead to ecological fallacies, wrongly concluding that 
a relationship observed at an aggregate level of analysis also holds at a lower level of analysis. 
Alternatively one may be tempted to draw inferences about relationships at higher levels of 
analysis based on aggregated data, potentially causing atomistic fallacies (Luke 2004: 5-6; 
Hox 2002: 3-4). These classic examples of fallacies decrease our ability to construct correct 
theories and draw correct inferences. Multilevel models overcome these fallacies as they 
combine two or more levels of analysis into a single model where predictors are specified for 
each level (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).  
Additionally, multilevel models provide researchers with a tool to investigate causal 
heterogeneity, which is the possibility that causal patterns may vary between units at higher 
levels of analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219; Western 1998: 1233-1234). Within the 
literature of political science, it is often assumed that “political processes play out differently 
in different settings” (Western 1998: 1234). Conventional statistical methods like OLS 
regression analysis does not take into account the effect of context and provides us but with 
one set of regression coefficients that is assumed to hold across different contexts (Luke 2004: 
7). This assumption of causal homogeneity has been forcefully targeted by adherents to 
historical comparative analysis (Hall 2003; Goldstone 2003; Mahoney 2003). However, 
multilevel analyses make it possible to test whether the assumed relationships holds for 
different contexts. In other words we can more confidently judge the generalizability of our 
results (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).  
The statistical reasons for choosing multilevel models are also convincing. When 
faced with multilevel data political scientists often employ a set of dummy variables to 
capture the effect of contextual or subgroup differences within the framework of a single-level 
OLS regression analysis. However, these dummy variables does nothing more than to indicate 
differences, without explaining them (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 220). Moreover, standard 
statistical tests are based on an “independence of observations” assumption. However, 
                                                 
34
 Hale (2008) has employed this method in a recent book on separatism, but the analysis is relatively limited 
both in terms of the explanatory variables included as well as the study is limited to cases in Eurasia.  
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whenever there exists a multilevel data structure with clustered data, this assumption is 
violated. Statistical tests thus end up biasing estimates of standard errors towards zero and 
providing the researcher with significant, but spurious results, causing type I errors (Hox 
2002: 5; Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).35  
Additionally, by disaggregating information from a higher level of analysis to for 
instance the individual level, the contextual information that is not captured by the predictors 
in our model ends up in the same model error term. Consequently, clusters of individuals 
belonging to the same group leads to correlated error terms, thus violating one of the most 
basic assumptions to be met in the standard ANOVA or OLS regression analysis (Luke 2004: 
7; Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 220).  
Whereas the theoretical and statistical justifications for employing multilevel models 
provide me with relevant arguments for using a multilevel model to explain the roots of ethnic 
separatism, the most basic assumption must also hold: There has to be an actual link between 
the proposed multilevel nature of the theoretical hypotheses presented in chapter two and the 
actual empirical patterns to be analysed in chapter four. In the next chapter, which presents 
the results of the analysis, I will therefore begin with a preliminary look at my datasets to see 
if there is in fact a correspondence that justifies the use of a multilevel analysis to answer my 
research question. In order to do this, I first have to give an outline of the logics and 
construction of the specific method of analysis, the linear growth curve model. 
 
3.2.2 The multilevel linear growth curve model: Logics and construction 
As I aim to explain both separatist demands as well as changes over time in these demands the 
data structure in this thesis is not only multilevel, but also longitudinal. In multilevel models 
one can treat repeated measurements as nested within units. In my example this would be time 
periods nested within ethnic groups.36  
Multilevel growth curve modelling, because of its power and flexibility, is in fact one 
of the most suited methods for analysing longitudinal data as it can handle both missing data 
and designs where the observations occur at different times for different units (Luke 2008: 
545; Hox 2002: 93; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 161). This is exactly the case for the dataset 
                                                 
35
 Type I error means incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, by concluding that there is a correlation when it 
actually is not (Hair Jr., Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 2006).   
36
 As we may expect individuals belonging to a certain group, for example students belonging to a classroom, to 
be clustered and more alike than individuals belonging to separate groups, we could also expect repeated 
measurements within the same unit to be more alike than repeated measurements across units (Luke 2008: 548). 
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used in this thesis (as will be discussed more in detail in section 4.2). In TABLE 3.1 an 
overview of this unbalanced panel is shown.  
 
TABLE 3.1: Overview of observations across the three time periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the total of 283 groups, I have data for all three time periods for 219 of these 
groups. For 54 groups, I have data on the two latest periods (many of these groups are the 
found in the former Soviet republics and the post-communist states in Eastern Europe). For 
six groups I have data only for the two first periods. Lastly, for three groups I have data solely 
for 1990-1994, and for one group I have data only for 1995-1999. However, this poses no 
problems to my analysis. 
The multilevel way of modelling longitudinal data makes it possible to track within-
group change over time. This means that I can detect the individual growth trajectory of 
separatist demands for each ethnic group.37 This part of a growth curve model is called the 
intra-individual part (Luke 2008: 549). Have for instance the Kurds in Iraq or the Basques in 
Spain radicalized or de-radicalized their separatist demands throughout the 1990’s and early 
2000’s? This, I will be able to answer as I track the individual rates of change among each 
ethnic groups, by assessing repeated measurements as nested within these groups. Each group 
is then allowed to display their own growth curve (Luke 2008: 549).  
Additionally I can assess the intergroup differences in change by adding predictors at 
the level-2 (group characteristics) and level-3 (state characteristics) of the analysis (Singer 
and Willett 2003: 8) That is, why do ethnic groups display different growth trajectories in 
separatist demands and which factors can explain these differences? Are these differences the 
outcome of group characteristics, like for instance whether one group is concentrated in one 
region and another group is not? Alternatively, is it determined by one state being federal and 
the other not federal? In sum, these methodological opportunities make the multilevel method 
of analysis an ideal approach for my research question.  
                                                 
37
 Although the term “growth” seems to indicate an increase over time, the outcome may equally well be a 
decrease. Growth is thus just a substitute for the word “change” (Singer and Willett 2003: 4).  
Number of groups  Pattern of observations over time 
 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 
219 X X X 
54 - X X 
6 X X - 
3 X - - 
1 - X - 
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When the number of time observations per unit are few (one to three) as is the case in 
my dataset, growth curve model must be fitted in a linear model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 
163).38  To summarize then, my model consists of three levels of analysis. The first level is 
the repeated measurements, the second level is the ethnic groups in which the repeated 
measurements are nested within, and the third level is the host states in which the ethnic 
groups are nested within. 
  
3.2.3 The unconditional model 
When building multilevel models, it is common to start out from simple unconditional models 
(without predictors), and then step by step build conditional models by adding predictors at 
the various levels. In this thesis, I will build a three-level, linear, growth curve model with 
predictors at level-1, -2 and -3.39  
The only predictor that is included in the unconditional growth curve model is the 
linear time variable trend at level-1. Next, the parameters in the level-1 part of the model 
become outcomes at the level-2 part of the model and the level-2 parameters become 
outcomes at the level-3 part of the model (Luke 2008: 549). For my unconditional model, the 
following equation is estimated at level-1:  
 
tijtijij1ij0tij e)trend(Y +pi+pi=  
 
In my three-level model the indices t, i, and j respectively denote time, ethnic groups, and 
states where there are (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 229):  
 
t = 1,2, . . . , nij time observations within ethnic group i in state j; 
i = 1,2, . . . , Ij ethnic groups within state j; and 
j = 1,2, . . . , J states.  
 
In the level-1 equation, Y is the outcome at time t for group i within state j. (trend)tij is 
a time variable that is 0 at time period 1990-1994, 1 at time period 1995-1999, and 2 at time 
period 2000-2003. 
ij0pi  is the initial score on the separatism index for group i within state j, 
                                                 
38
 In order to assess the exact form of change, i.e. whether it is linear or non-linear, over time one need three or 
more waves of data (Singer and Willett 2003: 9).  
39
 In general, multilevel models can be denoted by separate equations for the models at each level. The equations 
for the level-1, -2 and -3 models may also be combined into a mixed model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 23). 
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that is, the expected outcome for group ij in 1990-1994. 
ij1pi is the rate of change in separatist 
demands for group i within state j. tije  is the random error at level-1. These effects are 
assumed normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance 2σ . The level-2 equation is 
denoted in the following way (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 238): 
 
ijjij r0000 += βpi  
ijjij r1101 += βpi  
 
Here, the initial score on the separatism index ij0pi  for group i within state j is 
predicted by the mean initial score on the separatism index j00β within state j, and a random 
level-2 effect ijr0 . The change rate in separatist demands ij1pi  for ethnic group ij is predicted 
by the mean change rate in separatist demands j10β within state j, and a random level-2 
effect ijr1 .  
At level-3 the following equation is denoted (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 239):   
 
jj u0000000 += γβ  
jj u1010010 += γβ  
 
Here, the mean initial score on the separatism index j00β for state j is predicted by the overall 
mean initial score on the separatism index 000γ and a random level-3 effect ju00 . The mean 
change rate in separatist demands j10β within state j is predicted by an overall mean change 
rate 100γ  and a random level-3 effect ju10 . The equations for level-1, -2 and -3 can be 
combined into a single mixed equation:  
 
tijjjijijtij etrenduutrendrrtrendSeparatismY ++++++= *** 100010100000 γγ  
 
Here, outcome Y on the separatism index at time t for group i within state j is predicted 
by the overall mean initial score on the separatism index 000γ  as well as the mean overall 
change in separatist demands 100γ . Whereas tije , ijr  and ju00  are the unmodelled variability 
respectively at level-1, -2 and -3 for the initial score on the separatism index, ijr1 and ju10 are 
the equivalent variability for the rate of change in separatist demands at level-2 and -3. From 
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this departure point, the unconditional model, one may add predictors at different levels in 
line with the theoretical expectations.  
However, before adding predictors at the different levels it is useful to take a 
preliminary look at the empirical patterns in my data by calculating the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC). This will give an indication of the appropriateness of using a multilevel 
analysis for my purpose (Luke 2004: 18). ICC can be calculated on the basis of the variance 
components that are obtained from running the unconditional model. The variance 
components 22
0
, re σσ and 
2
00u
σ are estimates of the variance at level-1, -2 and -3 respectively 
(Hox 2002: 32). The intraclass correlation coefficient ρ  measures the proportion of variance 
in the outcome that is between level-2 or level-3 units, that is, ethnic groups or states 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 36). I will give a more detailed presentation of the calculation 
and interpretation of the ICC at the start of the next chapter.  
 
3.2.4 Moving from an unconditional to a conditional model 
After having checked whether there is significant variance at both level-2 and -3, in my case 
with respect to initial score on the separatism index as well as the rates of change in separatist 
demands through examining the ICC, the next step in multilevel modelling is to add 
predictors at the different levels in order to explain this variance. Ethnic group predictors that 
are time-varying are added at level-1, whereas predictors that are fixed across time is added at 
level-2 (Luke 2004: 65). The level-1 equation is the same as the first one I presented, except 
for the addition of the pijpij api  part, which reflects the inclusion of time-varying predictors at 
level-1:  
 
tijpijpijtijijijtij eatrendY ++++= pipipi L)(10  
 
The level-2 equation with Qq ,,1 K=  level-2 predictors qijX  is notated in the following way 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 231-232):  
  
ijqijpqjijjjij r0101000 +Χ++Χ+= βββpi L  
ijqijpqjijjjij r1111101 +Χ++Χ+= βββpi L  
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Here, both the initial score on the separatism index and the change rates in separatist 
demands for ethnic group ij is predicted by the mean initial score and the mean change rate in 
state j, as well as the level-2 predictors qijX . For a model with Ss ,,1 K= level-3 predictors 
sjW , the level-3 equation is notated as follows: 
 
jsjpqsjj uWW 00100100000 ++++= γγγβ L  
jsjpqsjj uWW 10110110010 ++++= γγγβ L  
 
I have now provided a brief introduction to the logics behind and the composition of 
the multilevel model, as well as the procedure for moving from an unconditional to a 
conditional model via the calculation of the ICC.  
 
3.2.5 Model estimation, model fit and deviance 
The most typical form of estimation of multilevel models is some variant of Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimation (Luke 2004: 26; Luke 2008: 555). Maximum Likelihood 
estimation means “maximizing a likelihood function that assesses the joint probability of 
simultaneously observing all of the sample data, assuming a certain set of fixed and random 
effects” (Luke 2008: 555). The method is robust and generally produces consistent and 
efficient estimates (Hox 2002: 37). ML provides me with the likelihood statistics, which can 
be employed for checking the model fit to the data. This is done by transforming this 
likelihood to deviance by multiplying the natural log of the likelihood by minus two (-2LL) 
(Luke 2004: 34; Luke 2008: 555).  
Deviance, in turn, is a measure of the “discrepancy between the observed data and the 
fitted model” (Luke 2008: 556). This measure may be employed to contrast different models 
against each other, i.e. two models with unequal numbers of predictors, in order to see what 
model best fit the data. This is ideal for my purpose, as I will test different theoretical 
categories of variables, and evaluate if the inclusion of a new set of variables serve to improve 
the model fit.  The drawback with the deviance statistic is that takes a lower value (which is a 
sign of good model fit) with the inclusion of more variables. However, one may use a 
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different fit measure that incorporates a degree of freedom control, the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) (Luke 2008: 556).40  
Furthermore, there is an important distinction between Full Maximum Likelihood 
(FML) and Restricted Maximum Likelihood (RML). In FML both the fixed and the random 
part of the model is included in the likelihood function, whereas in RML only the random part 
is included. This causes the FML estimates to be more biased than the RML estimates, 
although these differences are usually not that large (Hox 2002: 38). Nevertheless, the 
computation of FML is easier. The inclusion of both the fixed and the random part of the 
model in the likelihood function makes it possible to employ a chi-square test, also called a 
likelihood-ratio test, in the comparison of two models that contain different predictors in the 
fixed part of the model (Hox 2002: 38). This means that through FML I can compare different 
theoretical models and see which of them performs best. Hence, I will use a FML estimation 
method in my analysis.  
 
3.3 The multilevel data 
3.3.1 The Minorities at Risk dataset 
In order to conduct a multilevel analysis of ethnic separatism, I have had to find data on both 
ethnic groups as well as their host states. The data on ethnic groups is exclusively based on 
the Minorities at Risk dataset which is available for download from the MAR project 
website.41 The MAR dataset provides information about a broad set of variables on 283 
currently politically active ethnic groups around the world, and is therefore one of very few 
resources available for research on ethnic groups. Furthermore it is probably one of the most 
widely used sources for large-N statistical analyses of ethnic groups, which can be seen as an 
indication of its validity for these purposes.  
                                                 
40
 These measures are not provided by the statistical software I use in this thesis, HLM, but can be calculated 
manually by the following equations. p denotes the number of parameters and N is the sample size (Luke 2004: 
34): AIC = -2LL + 2p.               
41
 The MAR project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 and is currently based at the University of 
Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM/MAR 2008). MARGene 
was used to generate the Minorities at Risk data on ethnic groups (Bennett and Davenport 2007). This program 
can be downloaded from the MAR website, and was produced with the intent of making the MAR data more 
easily available for various statistical software programs. The data was imported into SPSS where I created three 
separate data files, one for each level of analysis. These files were then imported into HLM 6, which is a 
specialized statistical software program developed by Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon (2004) intended for 
multilevel analyses.  
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 This analysis will be restricted to cover the years from 1990 to 2003, as these are the 
only years for which there is information available on all of the variables I require for my 
analysis. The dependent variable is coded for five-year periods, which means that there are 
three different time periods, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 2000-2003. In sum, this gives me an 
N of 781 time units at level-1. These time units are nested within ethnic groups.  
The units of analysis in the MAR dataset are ethno-political groups, which are non-
state communal groups that are politically important because of their status and political 
actions. These groups are included on the basis of fulfilling at least one of the following two 
criteria:  
 
The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other 
groups in a society; and/or the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in 
defence or promotion of its self-defined interests (MAR 2009).42   
 
According to Gurr (2000b: 6), the salience of ethnic identities depends on the extent to 
which this very identity determine a group’s security, status, well-being or access to power. 
This means that groups that are treated differently than other groups within a state tend to 
become more conscious about their identity, whereas groups that are not treated differently 
tend to deemphasize their identities. These defining criteria limit my empirical analysis to a 
total of 283 ethnic groups spread across 117 countries.  
To summarize then, my multilevel analysis will be undertaken on 781 time units 
(level-1 units) nested within 283 ethnic groups (level-2 units) nested within 117 states (level-3 
units).  
 
Limitations and reliability of the MAR data 
There are some problematic issues associated with the use of the MAR dataset that is worth 
mentioning. Firstly, I intend to track separatist demands over time and to discover which 
factors that is associated with a change in such demands. Ideally, one should therefore have 
                                                 
42
 There are also seven additional selection criteria (CIDCM/MAR 2008): 
1. Only groups in countries with at least 500.000 inhabitants.  
2. Only group that has a population of at least 100.000 or make up at least 1 percent of the country 
population. 
3. Groups are included separately if residing in different countries. 
4. Advantaged minorities are included but not advantaged majorities.  
5. Temporary refugee and immigrant groups are excluded.  
6. Groups are coded at the highest within-country level of aggregation (i.e. Hispanics is coded as one 
group in the United States). 
7. The widest demographic definition is used to estimate membership in a group.  
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information on the groups over a large time-span in order to get a grasp of long-term trends. 
However, the dataset has been developed over four phases with different time spans, 1945-
1990, 1990-1996, 1996-1999 and 1998-2003, each covering a varying number of ethnic 
groups and variables (CIDCM/MAR 2008). Because of the criteria for inclusion in the 
dataset, some groups were added as a new phase started, while others disappeared from the 
dataset depending on a shift in group status. The same goes for some of the variables, some 
were added in the newer phases as better information on the groups has become available and 
not all of the previous variables have been updated in newer versions. These factors 
complicate a longitudinal study of separatism using the MAR dataset.  
Secondly, the selection criteria employed in the MAR dataset are clearly not random, 
nor does it cover the complete universe of ethnic groups, and the dataset therefore has some 
potential problematic aspects. Though the minimum condition of variance in the dependent 
variable is satisfied in the dataset (King et al. 1994), the dataset include only ethnic groups 
that are politically mobilized and “at risk”. Groups that are not considered to be “at risk”, such 
as the Saami minority in the Nordic countries is thus omitted from this dataset. This might 
cause a selection bias.  
As Fearon (2003: 196) points out: “If we consider only oppressed or disadvantaged 
groups, we are truncating variation on the independent variable, and thus making it harder to 
detect a relationship between (say) discrimination and rebellion.” Economic or political 
discrimination is often hypothesized to have an impact also on separatism. Based on the 
selection criteria in the MAR dataset, one possibly runs the risk of biasing the coefficients of 
these predictors toward zero.  
However, if selection bias is unavoidable (as it is in this case), we should aim to 
ascertain the direction and magnitude of this bias (King et al. 1994: 133). At the least, one 
should therefore be cautious about rejecting discrimination predictors solely based on 
statistically insignificant coefficients, before control groups that are not “at risk” is included 
in the dataset.43 The selection criteria employed in the dataset thus limits the scope of 
generalizations to be made from the results of this analysis to groups that are defined to be “at 
risk”.  
On the other hand, for the purpose of studying ethnic separatism and specifically why 
ethnic groups radicalize or moderate such demands, I draw support from Jenne et al. (2007: 
                                                 
43
 In fact, work is being undertaken to solve the problems of selection bias by the MAR project coordinators. 
Unfortunately, at the moment of writing, this update is still not available for researchers to be employed in 
statistical analysis. 
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545). They argue that the dataset includes all politically relevant groups that plausibly can 
raise collective demands against their host states. Thus, I do not consider the bias to be 
harmful for the inferences that is drawn based on the analysis.   
In terms of reliability, there are two types, intra-observer and inter-observer. The first 
refers to the degree of consistency between measurements performed by different observers 
on the same units. The other type refers to the degree of consistency between repeated 
measurements on the same units performed by the same observers (Pennings, Keman, and 
Kleinnijenhuis 2006: 68).44 The coding is performed by well-trained students, and reviewed 
by senior staff. Despite minor adjustments, it is argued in the codebook that all in all, the 
reliability and validity of the variable coding should be satisfactory. Therefore, I consider 
these arguments as well as the extensive use of the dataset for quantitative studies (Ayres and 
Saideman 2000b; Brancati 2006; Fox 2000, 2004; Gurr 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997; 
Ishiyama 2000; Jenne et al. 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2000), as a sign of its quality and 
reliability.  
 
3.3.2 State-level data 
Data on host states has mainly been obtained from the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset 
(Teorell, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2008).45 A vast number of variables has been compiled 
from widely used datasets and then put together in two different QoG datasets; one is a cross-
sectional dataset for 2002, and the other is a time-series dataset covering the years from 1946 
to 2002. As I trace ethnic separatism over time I have used the latter. This dataset covers all 
the 192 nations that was recognized by the UN as of 2002, plus 13 historical nations that have 
ceased to exist during the interval, which gives a total of 205 nations (Teorell et al. 2008). I 
have data on all 117 states that is relevant for this thesis, i.e. the states that host one or more 
minorities at risk as defined in the MAR dataset during the years from 1990 to 2003. For a 
classification of federal systems I have used the categorization offered by Roeder (2009). 
                                                 
44
 Although neither inter-coder reliability nor the internal consistency of the MAR indicators has yet been 
screened systematically, this work is under progress. An external review of the internal consistency has been 
made and discovered some coding flaws that were adjusted immediately by the MAR project staff. 
45
 The QoG is a compilation of various cross-national data on a wide range of variables covering aspects such as 
democracy; human rights; forms of government; electoral systems; corruption; and ethno-linguistic or religious 
fractionalization, to mention some.  
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Upon request, I was also fortunate enough to get access to Barbara F. Walter’s (2006b) data 
on, amongst other aspects, state accommodation of ethnic groups.46 
In instances when states split up or two states merge into one, this always poses 
challenges for time-series analyses. In other words, how should one treat these states before 
and after a schism or merger, as continuous or separate units? In my dataset, the potentially 
problematic cases are the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia pre-1992, Czechoslovakia pre-
1993, the USSR, and Ethiopia pre-1993. However, with respect to Czechoslovakia and the 
USSR this problem becomes somehow irrelevant, as there is non-existent data in the MAR 
dataset on ethnic groups in these states for the years 1990-1994. I instead trace ethnic groups 
in the successor states of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the former Soviet Republics from 
1995 to 2003.  
Yugoslavia in my dataset refers to the remainder of the pre-1992 federation, Serbia 
and Montenegro. The secessionist republics of the former Yugoslav federation, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia are included from 1995 to 2003, as data is missing 
also for ethnic groups in these states in the MAR dataset from 1990 to 1994. Ethiopia pre and 
post 1993 (that is, before and after the secession of Eritrea) is treated as a continuation of the 
same state.  
 
3.4 Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables 
The operationalization of data is defined as the efforts to “obtain an acceptable operational 
definition, which renders a valid transformation that can be reliably measured” (Pennings et 
al. 2006: 62). In other words, the validity of data measurements concerns as to what degree 
there is a an actual link between what we actually measure empirically and the concepts we 
intend to measure (Pennings et al. 2006: 67; Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). I will now 
present the operationalization of the variables that will be used to test hypotheses that were 
proposed in chapter two, and discuss the measurement validity of these variables.  
 
                                                 
46
 These data were used in her article “Information, uncertainty and the decision to secede”. In order to measure 
data on state behavior in dealings with ethnic groups, Walter (2006b: 130) has collected data from sources like 
the Keesings Record of World Events, Encyclopedia Britannica, Lexis/Nexus, New York Times, The Economist, 
Agence France Presse, CNN, BBC, and group profiles from the MAR data project.   
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3.4.1 The dependent variable: the separatism index 
Notwithstanding the clearly related character of different separatist claims, quantitative 
studies of separatism most often have focused on either purely secessionist demands or other 
radical forms of ethnic mobilization like rebellion, protest or civil war. Studies with a narrow 
focus, however, runs the risk of presenting incomplete causal explanations. Moreover, 
predictors associated with secessionism or ethnic extremism also tend to be present at periods 
of relative moderation (Jenne et al. 2007: 540). Acknowledging the dynamic nature of 
different separatist demands is therefore essential to get a better understanding of the causal 
links. This thesis therefore adopts a continuum-based conceptualization of separatism.  
Efforts at quantifying separatist demands along a scale, using the Minorities at Risk 
dataset as well, is also present in the literature (Ishiyama 2000; Jenne et al. 2007). However, 
there are some differences between my approach and earlier contributions. By comparing my 
way of measuring separatism quantitatively with earlier contributions, my aim is solely to 
highlight potential problems with respect to measurement validity for the purpose of the 
present study and how I deal with these challenges.  
In a study on various institutional arrangements’ effects on separatist demands, 
Ishiyama (2000: 58) has constructed an index measuring what he calls political demands. The 
different indicator variables are weighted; each variable is recoded into dummy variables and 
then multiplied by one, two or three respectively according to how radical the demands are. 
Occasionally, however, some groups raise several claims simultaneously. Despite weighting 
the different indicator variables, by simply being an additive index, without controlling for the 
number of demands being raised at the same time, this index is, in my opinion, not that good 
at capturing either radicalization or moderation of separatist claims. I can offer an example 
with data from the MAR dataset to illustrate the potential problems this may cause. A group 
like the native Hawaiians in the USA would get the top score of six points. This means that 
this group raises all three forms of separatist demands. However, this does not necessarily 
make it more radical than a group like the Chechens in Russia that only claims political 
independence and gets a score of three points. Quite the contrary, I would argue that a group 
that raises several demands at the same time displays a certain will to compromise, whereas a 
group that sticks to the sole claim for independence is an uncompromising one. For the 
present study, aimed partly at tracking which factors that are associated with a radicalization 
or moderation of separatist claims, this operationalization is clearly not that suitable.  
 54 
The dependent variable used by Jenne et al. (2007: 545) is somewhat different, 
measuring whether a group seeks in ascending order: Affirmative action or protection from 
discrimination, cultural or linguistic autonomy, regional/territorial autonomy, or secession or 
irredentism. Only the most radical demand is reported at any time. Hence, this measure does 
not take into account the fact that some groups raise several demands at the same time. To use 
the same example as above, by employing this index, the native Hawaiians and the Chechens 
would get the same score of four points, as these groups both have raised the most radical 
demand, despite that the former group seems to be more compromising than the other. 
Separatism has also been quantified in alternative ways. In an analysis of secessionism 
in advanced democracies, Sorens (2005: 314) operationalizes his dependent variable as vote 
share for secessionist parties, arguing that the main advantage of this approach is its 
comparability. However, my main objection to measuring separatism with vote share is that 
not all separatist movements are represented by a political party. This would at first restrict 
the analysis to democracies, thus limiting the ability to generalize to a broad universe of 
ethnic groups. Furthermore, it runs the risk of biased results, as a group may potentially be 
separatist despite the absence of a political party voicing this sentiment. This point is also 
made by Hecther (1992: 268), who further argues that regional interests may also be promoted 
by national parties, which makes the vote share for regional secessionist parties an inadequate 
measure of this phenomenon. Finally, I aim to explain the presence of separatist demands in 
the first place, not the support for or success of political parties. 
On the basis of these observations, I will offer an alternative way to measure 
separatism that may compensate for potential weaknesses in the abovementioned alternatives 
for the purpose of the present study. I have constructed an index47 on the basis of four ordinal 
scale variables from the MAR dataset.48 These variables measure the salience of autonomy 
grievances with respect to whether a group has voiced demands for limited autonomy, greater 
regional autonomy, political independence (secessionism) or union with kindred groups 
(irredentism).49 According to the MAR codebook, the salience of such demands has been 
                                                 
47
 The separatism index used in this analysis is a new construct and should therefore not be confused with the 
separatism index (SEPX) that is listed in the MAR dataset. 
48
 This variable is thus not metric, like for instance an income variable is. Whereas the values in metric variables 
are actual numbers which may be exposed to all common mathematical operations, the values in ordinal 
variables are categories which may be ranked as bigger than or smaller than. However, they tell us nothing about 
the distance between the different categories of values. Nonetheless, some scholars argue that ordinal variables 
with six or more values may be treated as metric and therefore are applicable in analyses that presupposes metric 
variables (Midtbø 2007: 32-33).  
49
 Respectively these variables are named AUTGR5, AUTGR4, AUTGR3 and AUTGR2 in the original MAR 
dataset. For a more detailed description of these variables see the Codebook available at the MAR website.  
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coded “based on statements and actions in the period coded by group representatives, 
members, and outside observers who are knowledgeable about group objectives.”  
This index is based on the argument that a separatism index that is supposed to 
measure both radical and moderate demands must be weighted according to both how intense 
the demands are felt among the ethnic groups, and the number of demands raised by the group 
at any time. It is theoretically plausible to expect that a group that raises several demands 
simultaneously show certain will to meet half-way in their dealings with host state regimes. 
On the contrary, a group that claims nothing short of independence seems to be more radical 
and thus unwilling to settle for less than separate statehood.  
The separatism index employed in this thesis thus gives the groups scores based on 
how radical the demands are, and how intense they are supported. Then the score is divided 
by the number of demands that are raised. To once more use my example groups, in this index 
the native Hawaiians would get a score of three points (5 + 3 + 1 / 3), as all three types of 
demands are coded as issue significant. 
The Chechens on the other hand get a score of six, as they raise the most radical 
demand and at the same time it is coded as issue important for most. These points are given 
based on the scheme shown in TABLE 3.2.  
 
TABLE 3.2: Separatism index score sheet 
Indicator variables Issue important  
for most 
Issue significant Lesser salience/ 
Issue not important 
Secessionist /  
Irredentist demand  
 
6 5 0 
Demand for widespread  
regional autonomy  
 
4 3 0 
Demand for limited  
regional autonomy 
 
2 1 0 
    
 
 
On the basis of this discussion, I argue that my operationalization of the dependent 
variable provides me with a valid measurement of separatist demands for the purpose of this 
analysis.  
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3.4.2 Group-level variables 
All variables at level-1 and -2 are sampled from MAR. Level-1 variables are variables that 
display variation across time points, while level-2 variables are time-constant variables. What 
they have in common is that they measure characteristics that are specific to the groups.  
 
Group traits and characteristics 
To test hypothesis 1, whether it is the more ethnically distinct group that is the most likely 
separatists I will use the variable ethnic distinctiveness.50 This is a composite measure of 
various variables measuring difference with respect to language, religion, social customs and 
race. The variable has values from a low of 0 (no differentials) to 11. With respect to 
measurement validity, this variable should cover the theoretical concept in a highly 
satisfactory way, as it is a relatively direct measurement of group distinctiveness. This 
variable does not vary over time and is therefore included in the level-2 part of the analysis.  
To measure the effect of the relative population size for the ethnic groups (hypothesis 
2), the variable group population size is used.51 This variable measures the group proportion 
of the wider country population in 1990. This is the starting year of my analysis which should 
provide me with a fairly accurate measure of the population size. Although I do not have 
estimates for each year of analysis, population trends in general are relatively slow-moving, 
perhaps with the exception of the incidence of major population flows caused by wars or 
changes in international borders. As a consequence this variable will be added at level-2. I am 
also here highly confident with respect to the measurement validity of this variable.  
The ethnic group’s geographic or spatial distribution (hypothesis 3) is measured by 
using geographic concentration.52 This dichotomous variable measures if a group is 
concentrated in one region (1) or not (0). This variable will be included at level-2. As is the 
case with group population size, one should expect spatial distribution to be a relatively slow-
moving measure, unless extraordinary changes in habitant patterns occur as a cause of for 
instance war. I am also tracing a relatively limited range of years in my analysis which makes 
the possibility of large-scale changes in such patterns over these years less likely. Hence this 
variable should have high validity. The variable will be included at level-2 as a variable with 
time-constant effect.  
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 ETHDIFXX in MAR.  
51
 GPROP in MARDIS. MARDIS is an acronym for the Minorities at Risk Discrimination Dataset which also is 
available on the MAR project website (CIDCM/MAR 2008).   
52
 GROUPCON in MAR.  
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The effect of structural inequality on separatism (hypothesis 4a and 4b) is tested by 
using the variable economic differentials.53 This is a composite variable that measures socially 
significant inequalities (which means differences that is seen as a distinguishing factor among 
the minority as well as the majority group) with respect to income, land/property, higher 
education, presence in commerce, official positions and professions. The variable may take 
the following values: -2 = advantaged (the group has three or more checked advantages), -1 = 
some advantages (the group has one or two checked advantages), 0 = no socially significant 
differences, 1 = slight differentials (differences on one or two specified qualities), 2 = 
substantial differentials (differences with respect to two or three specified qualities), 3 = 
major differentials (differences with respect to four specified qualities) and finally 4 = 
extreme differentials (differences with respect to five or six specified qualities).  
This variable does not imply that the inequality that is measured is a result of direct 
discrimination, but rather an assessment of objective group differences as best as the MAR 
coders can judge. For that reason I argue that the variable should be highly valid for my 
investigation of the effect of structural inequality between minority and majority groups on 
separatist demands. This variable is coded for the period immediately preceding the inclusion 
of a group in the MAR dataset and is not updated. For that reason, I simply use the first 
available year in which a group has a value on this variable in order to give a score on this 
variable. Thus, this variable will be included at level-2 of the analysis.   
 
Group grievances and motivations  
In order to measure economic, cultural and political discrimination (respectively hypothesis 5, 
6 and 7) I will use a set of dichotomous variables.54 Economic discrimination is time-varying 
and will be included at level-1. The variable separates between no discrimination (0) and 
discrimination (1), and is a macro coding of the role of public policy and social practice in 
maintaining or redressing economic inequalities. In other words, this variable traces deliberate 
positive or negative discrimination as a contrast to the structural inequality variable economic 
differentials.  
 Cultural discrimination is measured by seven dichotomous variables: Restrictions on 
religion, restrictions on use of language, restrictions on language instruction, restrictions on 
ceremonies, restrictions on appearance, restrictions on family life and restrictions on cultural 
organizations. A value of 1 means that groups are discriminated, while 0 means no 
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 ECDIFXX in MAR.  
54
 These dummy variables are recoded versions of ECDIS, CULPO1-CULPO7 and POLIC1-POLIC8 in MAR.  
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discrimination. Also, these variables show some variation over time and are included at level-
1.  
To measure political discrimination, I use eight different dichotomous variables 
separating between no discrimination (0) and discrimination (1). These variables cover a 
broad set of aspects of political discrimination: Freedom of expression, freedom of movement¸ 
rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on organizing, restrictions on voting rights, 
police/military recruitment, civil service access and access to higher office.  All these 
variables display none or limited variation over time and are therefore included at level-2.  
 To measure the effect of poor health conditions (hypothesis 8) and access to land 
(hypothesis 9), I use two different ordinal scale variables, health conditions and land 
conditions.55 Health conditions is constructed by adding the values from two different 
variables, measuring the presence or absence of high birth-rates and poor public health 
conditions.56 Health conditions have a value range from 0 (condition not present) and 6 
(condition serious). Land conditions is constructed by adding three variables measuring the 
presence or absence of competition for vacant land, dispossession from land and forced 
internal resettlement.57 This gives the variable a value range from 0 (condition not present) 
and 9 (condition serious). The mean values for each of the three time periods are used, and the 
variables are included at level-2.  
In order to measure the effect of previous autonomy (hypothesis 10), the dummy 
variable historical autonomy is used. 58 Here, 0 means no previous experience of autonomy, 
while 1 indicates the opposite. This variable is included at level-2, as it does not show 
variation over time.  
I contend that the variables employed to measure economic, cultural and political 
discrimination, as well as the variables measuring health and land conditions are highly valid 
as they are relatively direct measures of the concepts that I intend to measure.  
 
Group capacity and strategic power  
Hypothesis 11 is tested by using the variable kindred groups in power.59 This is a dummy 
variable, where 1 means that kindred groups are a dominant political power in a neighbouring 
state, and 0 means that there are no kindred groups in power. Hypothesis 12 is tested with the 
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 DMBIRTH (high birth-rate) and DMSICK (poor public health conditions) in MAR. 
57
 DMCOMP (competition for vacant land), DMEVICT (dispossession from land) and DMRESET (forced 
internal resettlement) in MAR. 
58
 AUTON in MAR.  
59
 GC11 in MAR.  
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variable number of segments in adjoining countries.60 To measure separatist activity among 
ethnic kin groups (hypothesis 13), the dummy variable active separatism among kindred, is 
used, where 1 indicates that there is active separatism and 0 indicates no such activity. Each 
of these variables are highly valid with respect to what I intend to measure. All of these 
variables will be included at level-2 of the analysis.  
   
3.4.3 State-level variables 
The variables that are presented in this section are state-level variables to be included at level-
3 of the analysis. There is one exception, and that is group autonomy status. This will be 
explained more in detail in the succeeding section.  
 
Power sharing arrangements  
The test the effect of the various power sharing arrangements that were proposed in 
hypothesis 14a, 14b, 15a, 15b, 16a and 16b, three variables are used. The two variables that 
cover federal systems, federations and ethnofederations (hypothesis 14a, 14b, 15a and 15b) 
are coded on the basis of the very recent classification of federal systems offered by Roeder 
(2009). They are both dummy variables where 1 means that a state is either a federation or an 
ethnofederation, and 0 means they are not.61 These variables measure what is intended. 
Federations allow me to test the effect of territorially based federal systems, whereas 
ethnofederations tests federal systems in which the federal units are ethnically based.  
To address hypothesis 16a and 16b of the effect of territorial autonomy, I will use a 
variable called autonomy status.62 This dummy variable gives a score of 1 for groups that 
enjoyed an autonomous status during 1990-1995, and 0 for groups that did not enjoy such a 
status. This variable is well suited for targeting whether a group that already possesses an 
autonomous status is more prone to demand further separation than groups that does not enjoy 
this privilege. Although this variable measures a group-level phenomenon, and hence will be 
included at level-2 of the analysis, I have and will consistently present it together with the 
other power sharing variables, as it is theoretically related to this group of variables.  
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 NUMSEGX in MAR.  
61
 The present federations in my dataset are: USA, Switzerland, Argentina, Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, 
Australia, Mexico and Malaysia. The ethnofederations are: Canada, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Spain, 
Russia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and Bosnia & Herzegovina (Roeder 2009: 205).   
62
 AUTON2 in MAR.  
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Regime type and durability 
There are a variety of alternative measures available for testing the effect of regime types and 
democracy (hypothesis 17), and there is a heated debate as to which alternatives offer the best 
results in terms of conceptual validity and methodological reliability (for reviews and 
discussions of these matters see Bollen and Paxton (2000); Elkins (2000); Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) and Hadenius and Teorell (2004) ).  
The discussion centres on whether one should use dichotomous or graded measures. 
Both Elkins (2000) and Hadenius and Teorell (2004) argue that graded measurements of 
democracy like those of the Freedom House and Polity indices, despite that both of these 
indices have been shown to suffer from some methodological and conceptual flaws, 
nonetheless performs superior to dichotomous measurements with respect to both construct 
validity and measurement reliability.63 Arguably, this is so because dichotomous measures are 
sensitive to where cut points are set, as well as the potential loss of information ultimately 
decreases the reliability of such measures (Hadenius and Teorell 2004: 12-13; Elkins 2000).64 
I will therefore use this combined score of these variables which will be called regime type, 
which is a scale ranging with values ranging from democracy to authoritarian regimes.65 It is 
constructed as a composite measure of the average scores on the Freedom House variables of 
Civil liberties and Political rights, and the Revised Combined Polity Score. Both these 
components have been transformed to a scale ranging from 0 to 10, and then they are 
averaged into a new variable with values from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). I 
will use the mean score on regime type across all years of the analysis for each state. The 
validity of this variable should be regarded as high.  
 To test the effect of regime duration (hypothesis 18), the variable regime durability is 
used.66 This variable measures the number of years since the most recent regime change 
(understood as change of three or more points on the Polity score over three years or less) or 
the end of a transition period (which is defined by the lack of stable political institutions). The 
first year in which a new polity has been established is given a score of 0, and then for each 
consecutive year this new polity still remains one point is added to the score. I use the country 
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 Hadenius’ and Teorell’s (2004) conclusion is based on a test of the following five leading indices: Vanhanen, 
Freedom House, Polity, ACLP and Reich.   
64
 Having first concluded that Freedom House and Polity are the two best alternatives; Hadenius and Teorell 
(2004: 26) runs a test of the two indices over a selection of cases in which there is a large discrepancy between 
them. Although Polity performs slightly better than Freedom House in this test, the overall conclusion is that 
“the highest degree of credibility is provided by a combination of the Polity and Freedom House scores.” 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2004: 29) 
65
 In the QoG dataset this variable is called fh_ipolity2. 
66
 In the QoG dataset this variable is called p_durable.  
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scores in the year they are included in the analysis. Also this variable is consistent with the 
content of the theories and hypothesis.  
 The variable presidentialism is used to the effect of presidential systems on separatism 
(hypothesis 19a and 19b).67 The variable is originally found in the Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh 2001), and also available in the QoG 
dataset. A value of 0 means direct presidential, a value of 1 means strong president elected by 
assembly and 2 means parliamentary (Beck et al. 2001: 172).68 Then I have recoded the 
variable into a dummy variable by merging the scores of 0 and 1 into 1 (presidential), and 2 
into 0 (parliamentary).  
 
State reputation 
In order to test whether previous state accommodation of ethnic group demands has an 
influence on separatist activism (hypothesis 20), I will use a variable that has been compiled 
by Barbara F. Walter (2006b). Proportion of previous challenges accommodated, contains the 
number of previous accommodations divided by the number of groups that had challenged the 
government between 1940 and the year under observation. For this variable I use the values 
observed in 1990, which is the starting year of my analysis. The variable directly measure 
what was proposed in the hypothesis, and therefore should be regarded as highly valid.  
TABLE 3.3 provides a summary of the variables that are used to test the hypotheses in 
the next chapter. In total, there are ten level-1 variables, seventeen level-2 variables and six 
level-3 variables.  
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 This variable is called dpi_system in the QoG dataset.  
68
 According to the DPI codebook, in cases where there is both a prime minister and a president the following 
criteria defines presidentialism:  
a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to override the veto. 
b)Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and / or other ministers. 
c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 
d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this serves as an 
additional indicator to call the system presidential (Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Yugoslavia). 
The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If no information or ambiguous 
information on (a), (b), (c), then (d).  
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TABLE 3.3: Summary of the predictors at level-1, level-2 and level-3. 
 
Level-1 variables 
 
Level-2 variables 
 
Level-3 variables 
Economic discrimination Historical autonomy Ethnofederations 
Restrictions on religion Group autonomy status Federations 
Restrictions on use of language  Group population size Regime type 
Restrictions on language 
instruction 
Ethnic distinctiveness 
Economic differentials 
Regime  
durability 
Restrictions on ceremonies Geographic concentration Presidentialism  
Restrictions on appearance 
Restrictions on family life 
Number of segments in adjoining 
countries 
Proportions of previous challenges 
accommodated 
Restrictions on cultural 
organizations     
Active separatism among  
kindred 
 
Health conditions Kindred groups in power      
Land conditions Freedom of expression  
 Freedom of movement  
 Rights in judicial proceedings  
 Restrictions on organizing  
 Restrictions on voting rights  
 Police/military recruitment  
 Civil service access  
 Access to higher office  
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In this chapter I present the results from the empirical analysis of the thesis. Firstly, I 
comment briefly on the descriptive statistics for each variable included in the analysis. 
Secondly, the results from the unconditional model are presented. Based on these results, the 
ICC, which serves to justify empirically whether a multilevel model is appropriate in the first 
place, is calculated. This is followed by a series of tests of eight different explanatory models 
including different categories of predictors at level-1, -2 and -3, in line with the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses that were set forth in chapter two. After having tested the 
different theoretically anchored variables, the ultimate goal of the analysis is then to construct 
a model which includes the predictors at each level of analysis, that best accounts for both 
initial levels of separatism, as well as changes in separatist demands over time.  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this part, I will provide a brief presentation and some comments on the descriptive statistics 
for the dependent and independent variables. In TABLE 4.1, I have listed the minimum and 
maximum values, mean values, standard deviation (S.D.) and N for each variable.69  
Separatism index, obviously, is the dependent variable. As explained in chapter three, 
section 3.4.1, this variable is a construction based on four different ordinal level variables, 
which gives the variable a minimum score of 0 and a maximum score of 6. The mean for the 
separatism index is 1.68, which shows that the average score for the sum of time 
measurements is demands for limited regional autonomy. The standard deviation of 2.05 
indicates that there is considerable dispersion around the mean.  
                                                 
69
 Although mean and standard deviation are measures of respectively the central tendency and dispersion for 
metric variables, I have not included separate measures for ordinal variables, as all variables in the analysis are 
treated like metric variables. 
 64 
TABLE 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
 
N 
Dependent variable 
     
Separatism index 0 6 1.68 2.05 781 
      
Level-1 predictors       
Economic discrimination 0 1 .15 .35 781 
Restrictions on religion 0 1 .15 .36 781 
Restrictions on use of language  0 1 .18 .39 781 
Restrictions on language instruction 0 1 .25 .43 781 
Restrictions on ceremonies 0 1 .12 .32 781 
Restrictions on appearance 0 1 .12 .32 781 
Restrictions on family life 0 1 .04 .19 781 
Restrictions on cultural organizations     0 1 .19 .39 781 
Health conditions 0 6 1.14 1.57 781 
Land conditions 0 6 .94 1.47 781 
Trend variable 0 2 1.06 .80 781 
      
Level-2 predictors      
Historical autonomy 0 1 .20 .40 283 
Group autonomy status 0 1 .24 .43 283 
Group population size .00 .87 .12 .15 283 
Ethnic distinctiveness  0 11 5.77 2.65 283 
Economic differentials -2 4 1.75 1.91 283 
Geographic concentration 0 1 .51 .50 283 
Number of segments in adjoining countries 0 4 1.34 1.25 283 
Active separatism among kindred 0 1 .18 .39 283 
Kindred groups in power     0 1 .30 .46 283 
Freedom of expression 0 1 .27 .44 283 
Freedom of movement 0 1 .31 .46 283 
Rights in judicial proceedings 0 1 .28 .45 283 
Restrictions on organizing 0 1 .40 .49 283 
Restrictions on voting rights 0 1 .23 .42 283 
Police/military recruitment 0 1 .35 .48 283 
Civil service access 0 1 .38 .49 283 
Access to higher office 0 1 .46 .50 283 
      
Level-3 predictors       
Ethnofederations 0 1 .08 .27 117 
Federations 0 1 .08 .27 117 
Regime type .06 10.00 5.62 3.04 117 
Regime durability 0 181 20.80 30.13 117 
Presidentialism  0 1 .73 .45 117 
Proportions of previous challenges accommodated .00 1.00 .02 .12 117 
      
 
  
Economic discrimination and all the cultural restrictions variables (ranging from 
restrictions on religion to restrictions on cultural organizations) at level-1 are dummy 
variables. The mean value for dummy variables may intuitively be interpreted as the 
proportion of units that is assigned with the value 1 (Midtbø 2007: 44). This means that 15 
percent of the groups face economic discrimination, and meet restrictions on religious 
conduct, 18 percent on use of language, 25 percent on language instruction, 12 percent each 
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on ceremonies and appearance, 4 percent on family life, and finally, 19 percent on cultural 
organizations.   
Both health conditions and land conditions have a value range from 0 to 6, where the 
maximum score of 6 means that the sufferings on health conditions are serious relative to 
other groups. For land conditions this maximum value of 6 indicates that no group suffers 
from serious conditions on more than two of the three indicator variables (as this variable has 
a possible maximum score of 9). The mean values for both of these variables are quite small, 
respectively 1.14 and 0.94, indicating that on average, most groups do not suffer seriously 
from poor health or land conditions relative to other groups in society. However, the standard 
deviations of 1.57 and 1.47 are relatively large. That indicates that there is a substantial 
amount of dispersion in the data. The trend variable is a measure used to model change in 
separatist demands, and further comments are therefore needless. Lastly, all variables at level-
1 have an N of 781.  
 At level-2, historical autonomy, group autonomy status, geographic concentration, 
active separatism among kindred, kindred groups in power are all dummy variables. This 
means that 20 percent of the groups have had previous experience with autonomy, 24 percent 
enjoyed an autonomous status in 1990-1995, 51 percent are concentrated in one region, 18 
percent have kindred groups in other countries that are also separatist, and, 30 percent of the 
groups have kindred that are in power in other states. Also, the political discrimination 
variables (listed from freedom of expression to access to higher office) are dummy variables, 
which means that 27 percent of the groups have suffered from restrictions on their freedom of 
expression during the years from 1990 to 2003 (as the political discrimination variables are 
temporally aggregated for the whole period of analysis). Furthermore 31 percent have faced 
restrictions on freedom of movement, 28 percent on their rights in judicial proceedings, 40 
percent on restrictions on organizing, 23 percent on voting rights, 35 percent on 
police/military recruitment, 38 percent on access to civil service and 46 percent on access to 
higher office.   
Group population size enumerates the proportion a group population makes up of the 
larger state population, and thus has values between 0 and 1. As we can see from the 
maximum value, the largest group relative to the entire state population constitutes 87 percent 
(which is the Shi’is in Bahrain). However, the mean value is considerably lower at 12 percent, 
which suggests that most of the groups are quite small in relative numbers. Ethnic 
distinctiveness is a scale based on a set of ordinal variables with a minimum score of 0 and 
maximum score of 11. The mean here is 5.77 and the standard deviation is 2.65, which shows 
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that most groups are found in the middle range of the scale, with a relatively large amount of 
dispersion surrounding the mean. The economic differentials variable is a scale that has a 
value range from -2 to 4 (where the minus scores means that groups have an advantaged 
position, 0 means no differences, and 4 means extreme disadvantages). The mean value of 
1.75 suggests that most groups are moderately differentiated in a negative substantial way, 
while the standard deviation of 1.91 signifies a considerable amount of dispersion in the data. 
For all variables at level-2 there are 283 units.   
 The level-3 predictors have an N of 117 states on each variable. Ethnofederations, 
federations and presidentialism are all dummy variables. The mean values signals that there 
are 73 percent presidential systems and 8 percent each of the two types of federal systems 
among the 117 states. Regime type is a scale with a value range from 0 to 10. The minimum 
value here is .06 and the maximum value is 10. The mean value of 5.62 suggests that there is 
a small majority of democratic states, however with a relatively large amount of dispersion, as 
the standard deviation is 3.04. Regime durability lists consecutive years a regime has 
survived, and has a minimum value of 0, and a maximum score of 181 (which is the United 
States). The average age of regimes is 20.8 years, and the standard deviation is 30.13. 
Proportion of previous challenges accommodated, just like the group population size variable, 
varies between 0 and 1, where a score of 1 indicates that all previous challenges from 
separatist groups has been met by accommodation from their host states. The mean here is 
.02, which tells us that very few, only 2 percent of the states, in fact has accommodated a 
previous challenger. 
    
4.2 Exploratory analysis 
4.2.1 The unconditional model 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there are theoretical, statistical, as well as empirical 
justifications applicable for assessing whether a multilevel analysis is the appropriate tool for 
a specific research question (Luke 2004). I have argued heavily in favour of such a 
methodological tool based on the theoretical framework surrounding the study of ethnic 
separatism (see chapter three, section 3.2.1). Now, it is time to check whether these 
expectations also hold for the actual empirical patterns in my data. A common procedure to 
check this is by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), ρ  , which is obtained 
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through fitting an unconditional model in HLM (Luke 2004: 19).70 This means that I first 
have to run an analysis of a simple model without predictors at the various levels. The results 
from fitting this model are presented in TABLE 4.2. 
 
TABLE 4.2: The unconditional model of average initial separatism score and average trend rate.  
 
Fixed effect 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust SE 
 
P-value 
Average initial separatism score, γ000 (***) 1.634 .145 .000 
Average trend rate, γ100 .018 .052 .731 
    
 
Random effect Variance component 
 
d.f. 
 
Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation      
Temporal variation, etij .355    
Level-2 (groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 3.470 163 1754.46 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .209 163 316.25 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .634 115 160.14 .004 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***) .095 115 189.59 .000 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2587.85 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 9 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2605.85 N (level-3) = 117  
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 19 
 
The first part of the table shows the fixed effects, and the adhering standard errors for 
these effects. I have reported the robust standard errors, which compared to regular standard 
errors are better able to correct for heteroscedasticity, as well as handling non-normally 
distributed error terms (Hox 2002: 201).71 The intercept coefficient, γ000, of 1.63 is interpreted 
as the average score on the separatism index for all ethnic groups in the period 1990-1994. As 
we can see, the intercept is significant with a p-value well below the .01 level. The average 
score in 1990-1994 is thus demand for limited regional autonomy, somewhere in the midst 
                                                 
70
 For a presentation of the ICC, see chapter three, section 3.2.3.  
71
 An examination of the residuals from the final model revealed that they were neither perfectly normally 
distributed nor homoscedastic. Whenever the residuals do not follow a normal distribution, the asymptotic 
standard errors are inconsistent and inaccurate, compared to the robust standard errors. This means that 
inferences based on the robust standard errors relaxes the dependency on the normality assumption, however, at 
the expense of some statistical power (Cora and Hox 2004: 130). The robust standard errors also provide more 
accurate significance tests and confidence intervals than asymptotic standard errors, when heteroscedasiticity is 
present (Hox 2002: 201). In order to work well the robust standard errors need a relatively large sample size at 
the highest level of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 276) Long and Erwin (1998) (in Hox 2002: 201) have 
suggested at least 100. In my case this should not be a problem as there is an N of 117 states at level-3. 
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between issue important for most and issue significant. The score is low due to the fact that 
there is a majority of groups that in fact is not separatist at all.  
The second row shows the coefficient, γ100, for the trend variable. This tells us that for 
each new time period, i.e. moving from 1990-1994 to 1995-1999 and 1995-1999 to 2000-
2003, there is an average increase of .018 points on the separatism index for all groups.72 
However, with a p-value of .731, the coefficient is not significant. The effect is clearly both 
weak and insignificant, which indicates that there is not a clear developmental trend in 
separatist demands across the entire selection of ethnic groups from 1990 to 2003. This is not 
that surprising, one should expect that some ethnic groups radicalize their demands over time, 
whereas others de-radicalize their demands, and yet others maintain a status quo. In other 
words, groups pursue separate agendas, and there is no evidence of a global trend of 
relaxation or escalation of ethnic separatist sentiment.   
The next block of the table displays the random effects, respectively the level-1, -2 and 
-3 variance components. These components show us the amount of unmodelled variation at 
each level. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, these variance components may be used to 
calculate the ICC, which is a measure of the proportion of variance in the outcome that is 
found at the different levels of analysis. The level-2 unmodelled variance for the average 
initial separatism score is 3.47, and for the trend rate .21. There is thus a great deal of 
variation left to be explained with respect to average score in 1990-1994. The unmodelled 
variation on change is much lower. The equivalent values for the level-3 variance components 
are .63 and .10. This tells us that, there is considerably less variation to be explained at level-3 
than at level-2.  
The deviance statistic of 2587.8 provides me with a measure of the lack of fit between 
the observed data and the fitted model, and may be used as a baseline value with which to 
compare against different explanatory models (Hox 2002: 51). I also mentioned in the 
methods chapter that this provides me with an opportunity to test pairs of models against each 
other in a likelihood-ratio test (LR-test). This test compares the difference in deviance 
statistics of two different models, which has a chi-square distribution and degrees of freedom 
that equals the difference in the number of parameters in the models being estimated. Thus, it 
tests whether the inclusion of more predictors, moving from one model to another, is 
                                                 
72
 The trend variable has the values 0 = 1990-1994, 1 = 1995-1999 and 2 = 2000-2003, which means that the 
intercept shows the average separatism score in 1990-1994 (when the trend variable has the values of 0) because 
the trend variable is centred at 0. Alternatively, I could have substituted the values of 0 by -2, 1 by -1 and 2 by 0, 
and instead estimated the average separatism score in 2000-2003. However, I want to model the score in 1990-
1994 and the changes in separatist demands from this period. 
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associated with a significant decrease in the deviance statistics, which would imply a better 
explanatory performance. In the ensuing analyses, I will compare the various models both 
against the baseline unconditional model (that was presented in TABLE 4.2) and the 
immediately preceding models.  
The AIC value of 2605.85 is also a measure of model fit, but in contrast to the 
deviance, it is adjusted for number of parameters added. I have also reported the number of 
iterations needed in the Maximum Likelihood estimation of the model, which in this case are 
19. Basically, the fewer iterations needed to estimate a model, the better (Hox 2002: 39).73  
 
4.2.2 The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
Based on the following equation I can find the proportion of variance that lies between ethnic 
groups on initial score on the separatism index (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 239):  
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This gives an ICC of .84, which means that ethnic group accounts for about 84 percent of the 
variation in initial score on the separatism index (Luke 2004: 21). The same can be calculated 
for the level-3 variance: 
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This gives an ICC of .15, indicating that states account for about 15 percent of the variation in 
initial score on the separatism index. Clearly, most variance is accounted for by groups rather 
than states. What then about the rate of change in separatist demands? Based on the following 
equation we can find the percentage of variance that lies between ethnic groups on rate of 
change (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 239):  
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 Although the number of iterations is reported, I will not comment on this for the succeeding models, unless 
there were specific problems associated with the estimation process.  
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This gives an ICC of .67 for level-2, which is lower than the proportion of variance in initial 
separatism score at level-2. The same calculation may be applied to the level-3 variance: 
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This gives an ICC of .32 at level-3, which indicates that states accounts for a substantially 
higher proportion of the variation on rate of change, than they do for initial separatist 
demands in 1990-1994.  
These preliminary findings suggest that there are good empirical reasons for 
conducting a multilevel analysis of separatist demands; TABLE 4.2 shows that the variance 
components, both for initial score on the separatism index and for rate of change at both level-
2 and level-3 are significant in a chi-square test.74 Furthermore, the calculation of the ICC has 
shown that, while predictors associated with the ethnic groups seem to be substantially more 
important than state-level predictors in order to account for initial scores on the separatism 
index, this relative difference in proportion of variance decreases considerably with respect to 
change in separatist demands over time. Both group-level and state-level predictors are 
therefore needed to explain ethnic separatism.  
 
4.3 Explanatory analysis: The conditional models 
There is no single optimal way of extending a multilevel analysis from a simple unconditional 
model to more complex explanatory models. However, it is a common strategy to build the 
model stepwise, by adding predictors at the lowest level of analysis first, and then proceed by 
adding predictors at the higher levels of analysis (Luke 2004: 23). In an analysis that is as 
comprehensive as the present one, with respect to number of predictors to be included, I deem 
it necessary to remove insignificant variables as they appear underway in the analysis, and 
before moving to a new theoretical model. This will also make the analysis more 
parsimonious and easier to follow, as I proceed to test the different models. Furthermore, this 
enables me to construct a final combined model with the predictors that best explain ethnic 
                                                 
74
 It has been pointed out that one should be careful of putting too much weight on the fact that a variance 
component is significant, and what this actually tells us. The sizes of the variance components is more important 
than the p-values (Luke 2008: 551). 
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separatism. The analysis will therefore proceed in a series of steps, where the first step already 
has been performed through the examination of the unconditional model.  
Next, I will examine a model were I include all level-1 predictors, which in my growth 
curve analysis means the linear time variable trend, and the other variables that are time-
variant.75 Then I will add the level-2 predictors also belonging to the same group of 
theoretical variables. The analysis proceeds by stepwise extending the models with level-2 
predictors according to the theoretical categories of variables. After having tested the different 
variables at level-2, I will do the same with the level-3 predictors.  
In general, whereas the intercept is allowed to vary, it is common to, at least initially 
treat the predictor slopes as fixed. This is called an intercepts-as-outcome model (Luke 2004: 
23) or intercept-only model (Hox 2002: 51). It means that I expect an explanatory variable 
such as for example geographic concentration to have a similar effect across the entire 
sample of ethnic groups. However, in my model there is one exception in this application, and 
that is with respect to the time variable trend. As I aim to model not just level of separatism in 
1990-1994, but also change in separatist demands for each ethnic group, the trend slope must 
also be allowed to vary across groups. Therefore, I will estimate what is termed an intercepts-
and-slopes-as-outcomes model (Hox 2002: 53; Luke 2004: 14, 23), which means that I will 
add predictors at level-2 and -3 in order to predict both the intercept and the trend slope.76  
   
4.3.1 The level-1 predictors 
Model 1: Group grievances and motivations part I 
In this first explanatory model, I will include all predictors that are time-varying, which in my 
dataset is the variables measuring economic and cultural discrimination, and conditions of 
public health and access to land. Thus, in this first explanatory model, I will test hypothesis 5, 
6, 8 and 9. Hypothesis 5 postulates that groups facing economic discrimination are more 
likely to be separatist. Hypothesis 6 expected that cultural discrimination increases the 
likelihood of separatism. Hypothesis 8 set forth that groups that suffer from poor public health 
conditions are more eager separatists, and finally, hypothesis 9 proclaimed that severe 
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 These variables represent the theories on group grievances and motivations; presented in chapter two, section 
2.2.2. Although this group of variables is presented second to the theories on group traits in chapter two, I test 
this group of variables first in the analysis, as it is the only group of variables that includes time-variant 
predictors at level-1.  
76
 The trend slope (change in separatist demands) can not be modelled by predictors at the same level. When I 
include predictors at level-2 and -3 however, I will be able to model the change overt time. In the multilevel 
terminology, this means that I will model cross-level interaction between predictors at level-2 or -3 and the trend 
variable at level-1.  
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restrictions on access to land and resources increases the likelihood of separatism. The results 
from this first explanatory model are presented in TABLE 4.3.77  
 
TABLE 4.3: Model 1: Effects of level-1 predictors of group grievances and motivations on initial 
separatism score.   
 
Fixed effect  
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust SE 
 
P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) 1.621 .169 .000 
Trend slope, γ100 .030 .050 .550 
Economic discrimination, γ200 -.041 .224 .854 
Restrictions on religion, γ300 -.135 .129 .298 
Restrictions on language use, γ400 .057 .193 .766 
Restrictions on language instructions, γ500 -.025 .194 .898 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ600 (**) .448 .191 .020 
Restrictions on appearance, γ700 -.304 .242 .210 
Restrictions on family life, γ800 (**) -.703 .299 .019 
Restrictions on cultural organizations, γ900 (**) .321 .134 .017 
Health conditions, γ1000 -.036 .048 .447 
Land conditions, γ1100 .020 .043 .634 
    
 
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .338    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 3.348 163 1756.07 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .218 163 335.24 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .610 115 159.08 .004 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***)  .095 115 183.22 .000 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2565.60 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 19 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2603.60 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 18 
 
 Here, the intercept of 1.62 is the separatism score in 1990-1994 when all predictors at 
level-1 have the value of 0. Thus, the coefficient is interpreted as the score for an ethnic group 
that is not suffering from any kind of economic or cultural discrimination, poor public health 
conditions nor restrictions on access to land. The trend slope is still positive, with an increase 
of .03 points on the separatism index (a slight increase from the unconditional model) for 
each new time period, although not statistically significant. As can be seen from the p-values, 
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 The postscripts that follow each variable name (the γ’s) have different numbers attached to them, 100 (when the 
numerator 1, comes first) this means it is a level-1 predictor. When extending the analysis with predictors at 
level 2 and 3, 010 means it is a level-2 predictor and 001 means it is a level-3 predictor (respectively, the numerator 
1 comes second and third in the postscript).  
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three of the explanatory variables have a significant effect at the .05 level, and all three of 
them are measures of cultural discrimination. Whereas restrictions on ceremonies and 
restrictions on cultural organizations have a positive impact, in other words is associated with 
more radical separatist demands, restrictions on family life has an opposite effect. All these 
are dummy variables which separate between no restrictions and any level of restrictions. This 
means that groups that suffer from restrictions with respect to ceremonial activity have a .45 
points higher score on the separatism index in 1990-1994 than groups that do not suffer from 
these restrictions. Groups that suffer from restrictions on cultural organizational activity have 
a .32 points higher score. To the contrary, groups that face restrictions on family life have a 
.70 points lower initial score, compared to groups that do not face these restrictions. 
Comparatively, restrictions on family life have the most profound effect, followed by 
restrictions on ceremony and restrictions on cultural organizations. Neither economic 
discrimination, health conditions nor land conditions seems to have an impact on separatist 
demands. The same applies to restrictions on language use, restrictions on language 
instructions and restrictions on appearance. 
 A closer look at the random effects reveals that the unmodelled variation for average 
separatism score in 1990-1994 at level-2 has decreased from 3.47 in the unconditional model 
to 3.35 in the model with all level-1 predictors. This is the desired outcome, as it indicates that 
a higher portion of the variance is accounted for by the explanatory model than by the 
unconditional model. There is also a slight decrease in the level-3 variance component for the 
initial separatism score from .63 to .61. With respect to the variance components for the trend 
variable, this model does not perform better than the unconditional model. However, this is 
not unexpected, as I have not added predictors of this change variable yet.  
The results from the likelihood-ratio test of the difference in deviance (model fit) 
between this explanatory model and the baseline model is presented in TABLE 4.4.  
 
TABLE 4.4: Likelihood ratio-test of Model 1 and the  
unconditional model. 
Chi-square statistic (**) 22.24 
Degrees of freedom 10 
P-value .014 
  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01  
 
The chi-square statistic of 22.24 is significant at the .05 level, which tells us that Model 1 has 
a better model fit compared to the model without predictors. This is furthermore supported by 
the decrease in AIC from 2605.85 to 2603.60, despite the addition of ten new variables.  
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However, it should be noted that the reduction is quite small, and only three of the level-1 
predictors had a significant effect.  
 With respect to the hypotheses, this analysis finds no support for hypothesis 5; 
economic discrimination has no significant effect on separatist demands. For hypothesis 6, the 
results are mixed. Some predictors of cultural discrimination are significant whereas others 
are insignificant. Additionally, while restrictions on ceremonies and restrictions on cultural 
organizations perform in line with the hypothesis, restrictions on family life has an opposite 
effect. This may suggest that the predictors of cultural discrimination represent separate 
phenomena, rather than being indicators of a larger one-dimensional phenomenon. Neither 
hypothesis 8 nor hypothesis 9 is supported by this analysis; the effect of public health 
conditions and land access is not significant.  
 
4.3.2 The level-2 predictors 
Model 2: Group grievances and motivations part II 
In this model, I have kept the variables that turned out to be significant in Model 1 (the three 
variables measuring cultural discrimination) and then added the level-2 variables adhering to 
the same theoretical perspective of group grievances and motivations.78 In hypothesis 7, it 
was claimed that groups that suffer from political discrimination are more likely to be 
separatist. Hypothesis 10 suggested that groups that historically have enjoyed an autonomous 
status should be more disposed to separatism. The results from testing these hypotheses are 
presented in TABLE 4.5.  
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 Basically, the only reason for separating this large group of predictors into level-1 and level-2 predictors, was 
as I mentioned previously, that the variables at level-1 describes group-level characteristics that varies over time, 
whereas the predictors at level-2, which also taps group characteristics, show little or no variance over time. I 
have also run an analysis where I included all the group grievances and motivations variables at the same time, 
but it had no drastic effects on coefficients or p-values, and therefore no consequences for the inclusion or 
exclusion of significant or insignificant variables from the models.  
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TABLE 4.5: Model 2: Effects of level-2 predictors of group grievances and motivations on initial 
separatism score and change in separatist demands.  
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) 1.431 .208 .000 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ100 (*) .356 .200 .076 
Restrictions on family life, γ200 (**) -.680 .315 .031 
Restrictions on cultural organizations, γ300 .157 .153 .308 
Historical autonomy, γ010 (*) .532 .311 .088 
Freedom of expression, γ020 (*) .599 .322 .063 
Freedom of movement, γ030 .018 .358 .959 
Rights in judicial proceedings, γ040 -.374 .337 .270 
Restrictions on organizing, γ050 (***) 1.294 .275 .000 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ060 .422 .302 .164 
Police/military recruitment, γ070 .050 .154 .878 
Civil service access, γ080 -.563 .414 .175 
Access to higher office, γ090 (**) -.817 .348 .020 
    
Model for trend rate in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean trend rate within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 -.027 .070 .702 
Historical autonomy, γ110 .070 .091 .439 
Freedom of expression, γ120 .077 .117 .511 
Freedom of movement, γ130 -.020 .100 .840 
Rights in judicial proceedings, γ130 .164 .151 .280 
Restrictions on organizing, γ140 -.191 .120 .113 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ150 (**) -.249 .103 .016 
Police/military recruitment, γ160 -.142 .120 .237 
Civil service access, γ170 .225 .150 .135 
Access to higher office, γ180 .118 .113 .299 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .345    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.964 154 1637.16 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .205 154 328.09 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .424 115 145.07 .030 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***) .060 115 161.55 .003 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2515.88 N (level-1) = 781   
Number of estimated parameters = 30 N (level-2) = 283   
AIC = 2575.88 N (level-3) = 117   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 18 
 
The first block of the table presents the coefficients for the predictors of the mean 
initial separatism score. Again, the intercept of 1.43 is the expected separatism score in 1990-
1994 when all predictors has the value of 0. Notice that the level-1 predictor restrictions on 
cultural organizations has lost its significance after the inclusion of the new level-2 variables. 
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The other two cultural discrimination variables at level-1, restrictions on ceremonies and 
restrictions on family life, do still have respectively positive and negative effects at the .10 
and .05 level. However, with coefficients of .35 and -.68, both of these variables’ effects have 
lost some strength from the previous model. 
 
Historical autonomy has a significant positive effect at the .10 level. Groups that have 
experienced historical autonomy have a .53 points higher initial score on the separatism 
index.  Of the variables that measure various aspects of political discrimination, freedom of 
expression and restrictions on organizing have significant positive effects respectively at the 
.10, .001 level and access to higher office a significant negative effect at the .05 level. Each of 
these variables are dichotomous, which means that groups that suffer from a lack of freedom 
of expression have a .59 points higher initial score on the separatism index, while groups that 
face limited opportunities to organize politically have a 1.29 points higher score on the 
separatism index. Contrastingly, groups that are denied access to higher office have a .82 
points lower initial score. Freedom of movement, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions 
on voting rights, police/military recruitment and civil service access on the other hand do not 
have significant effects on the initial separatism score.  
The second block of the fixed effects part of the table present the coefficients, robust 
standard errors and significance levels of the level-2 predictors’ effect on the trend slope, that 
is, the rate of change in separatist demands over time. The trend slope has become negative, 
which means that on average, controlled for the predictors in Model 2, separatist demands 
decreases by .027 points for each new time period. However, this coefficient is still not 
significant. Of all the predictors at both level-1 and level-2, only restrictions on voting rights 
have a significant negative effect at the .05 level. For each increase in the trend variable, from 
1990-1994 to 1995-1999 and from 1995-1999 to 2000-2003, groups that face restrictions on 
voting rights have a .25 point higher decrease in separatist demands for each new time period 
than groups that does not face such restrictions. In other words, restricting voting rights has a 
de-radicalizing effect on separatist demands over time. It should be noted that restrictions on 
organizing and civil service access have p-values right above the .10 level, and must be 
further assessed before they can be rejected as predictors of changes in separatist demands.  
The next block of the table presents the unmodeled variance at the different levels. For 
the initial separatism score at level-2 this variance has now decreased from 3.35 in Model 1 to 
2.96 in Model 2, which is a relatively substantial decrease. With respect to the variance 
component of the trend slope at level-2 there is only a minimal decrease from .22 in Model 1 
to .205 in Model 2. This is only logical, as only one of the variables included in Model 2 had a 
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significant effect on the trend slope. In other words, other predictors are needed to decrease 
this unmodelled variance. The level-3 variance component for the initial score displays a 
decrease to .42 from .61. This is a bit surprising, as I have not included any level-3 predictors 
yet. One could therefore expect that this component should decrease even further in later 
models. Finally, the level-3 variance component for the trend slope has decreased to .05.  
The deviance statistics is reduced from Model 1, which is a sign of better model fit. 
The same goes for the AIC value of 2575.88, compared to 2603.60 in Model 1. The results 
from the likelihood-ratio tests presented in TABLE 4.6, shows that this model offers a 
significant improvement (with p-values well below the .01 level) from both the baseline 
unconditional model and Model 1.  
 
TABLE 4.6: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 2 versus  
the unconditional model and Model 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01  
 
When considering the results against the hypotheses, both hypothesis 7 and 10 reaches 
some support. With respect to the latter, the analysis shows that groups that have previously 
experienced an autonomous status are more likely to be separatist in 1990-1994. However, the 
support for hypothesis 7 is somewhat less clear-cut. This is due to the fact that freedom of 
expression and restrictions on organizing serve to increase the likelihood of separatism, while 
access to higher office, performs in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. 
Restrictions on voting rights similarly have a negative effect on rate of change in separatist 
demands. Just like the cultural discrimination variables it thus seems that these political 
discrimination variables are not one-dimensional.  
To summarize then, although some of the variables have performed differently than 
what was expected beforehand, the results from testing the first group of theoretical variables 
leave me with seven predictors to be included in the succeeding analyses: restrictions on 
ceremonies, restrictions on family life, historical autonomy, freedom of expression, 
restrictions on voting rights, access to higher office as predictors of the average separatism 
Chi-square statistic (***)  71.97 
Degrees of freedom 21 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value 0.000 
   
Chi-square statistic  (***) 49.72 
Degrees of freedom 11 Model 1  Comparison P-value 0.000 
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score in 1990-1994 and restrictions on voting rights as a predictor of change in separatist 
demands.  
 
Model 3: Group traits and characteristics 
In Model 3, the various defining aspects of group identities that were presented under the 
heading group traits in chapter two are tested.79 I will thus test hypothesis 1, 2, 3, 4a and 4b. 
In hypothesis 1 it was argued that ethnically distinct groups are more likely to be separatist. 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that separatist demands are more likely among groups that are large 
relative to other groups in a state. Hypothesis 3 proposed that groups that are geographically 
concentrated in one region are more prone to be separatist. While hypothesis 4a proclaimed 
that it is the economically disadvantaged groups (groups differentiated in a negative way) that 
are the most eager separatist, hypothesis 4b set forth an opposite assumption, that rather it is 
the wealthier groups that will have most valid incentives to opt for separatism. The results 
from this analysis are presented in TABLE 4.7.  
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 Presented in chapter two, section 2.2.1.  
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TABLE 4.7: Model 3: Effects of group traits and characteristics on initial separatism score and change in 
separatist demands. 
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) 1.003 .375 .009 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (**) .387 .190 .041 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.669 .294 .023 
Historical autonomy, γ010  .494 .311 .113 
Freedom of expression, γ020 (*) .557 .285 .052 
Restrictions on organizing, γ030 (***) 1.096 .249 .000 
Access to higher office, γ040 (***) -.843 .239 .001 
Group population size, γ050 -.923 .884 .298 
Ethnic distinctiveness, γ060 -.020 .052 .690 
Economic differentials, γ070 .064 .064 .315 
Geographic concentration,γ080 (***) .728 .228 .002 
    
Model for trend rate in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean trend rate within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 -.030 .111 .785 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ120 (*) -.180 .109 .099 
Group population size, γ120 -.369 .468 .431 
Ethnic distinctiveness, γ130 .010 .016 .548 
Economic differentials, γ140 .023 .023 .315 
Geographic concentration, γ150 -.026 .086 .763 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .346    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.683 155 1444.60 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .206 158 322.63 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .674 115 173.87 .000 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***) .077 115 172.92 .001 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2507.90 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 24 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2555.90 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 18 
 
The intercept coefficient has decreased further from Model 2 to 1.00 in Model 3, when 
all predictors, except for group population size, have the value of 0.80 The trend slope is now -
.03, suggesting that for each new time period there is a decrease of .03 points on the 
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 Group population size is grand mean centred, which means that is has been transformed by subtracting the 
grand mean of the variable. Centering can be useful for a number or reasons (Luke 2004: 52-53) as for instance 
when a variable has no meaningful zero-point. I have centred the population variable, because it makes little 
sense to interpret the intercept, when the population size is held at zero (which in practice would imply that the 
group does not exist at all). The coefficient for this variable is instead interpreted as the deviation from the grand 
mean (Luke 2004: 48).  
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separatism index, although its p-value is over the .10 level. With respect to explaining initial 
separatism score, the level-1 predictors of cultural discrimination do still have significant 
effects in the same direction and with roughly the same strength. All but one of the level-2 
predictors from the preceding model still has significant effects in the same directions. 
Historical autonomy has lost its statistical significance, with a p-value just above the .10 level. 
As this may be due to sensitivity with respect to the addition of new variables, it should be 
tested also in the next model. The other level-2 predictors’ effects are roughly the same as in 
Model 2. Restrictions on organizing has the most notable decrease in coefficient strength 
from 1.29 in Model 2 to 1.09 in Model 3. The only significant predictor of changes in 
separatist demands in Model 2, restrictions on voting rights, still has a significant negative 
effect, although this time at the .10 level. The coefficient has also decreased from -.25 to -
.18.81  
Of the four newly added variables, only one of them has a significant effect. Group 
population size, ethnic distinctiveness and economic differentials all fail to obtain significant 
effects on the initial separatism score. Geographic concentration, on the other hand, has a 
significant positive effect at the .01 level. Ethnic groups that are geographically concentrated 
in one region, thus have a .73 point higher score on the separatism index in 1990-1994, than 
groups that are more geographically dispersed. 
The level-2 variance component for the average initial score has decreased further 
from 2.96 in Model 2 to 2.68 in Model 3. This indicates that Model 3 better accounts for the 
variation at level-2 than Model 2. However, the level-2 variance component for the trend 
slope stays the same. As the model failed to add variables with predictive capacity on the rate 
of change, this is not unexpected. The level-3 variance component for the initial score has in 
fact increased from .42 to .67, whereas the variance component for the trend slope also has 
increased to .07. This suggests that level-3 variables are needed in order to decrease the 
unexplained variance at this level. 
 The results from the likelihood-ratio tests presented in TABLE 4.8 show that Model 3 
is significantly better than the baseline model, with a chi-square of 79.94. Although the 
deviance statistic has decreased from Model 2 to Model 3, the likelihood-ratio test shows that 
this decrease is not significant. However, one of the predictors that were added in Model 3 
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 Restrictions on organizing and civil service access (TABLE 4.5) had a p-value just above the .10 level in 
Model 2 as predictors of rate of change in separatist demands. I therefore reran Model 3 in a separate test with 
these predictors included, to see if the p-values changed from Model 2 to Model 3. While restrictions on 
organizing got a p-value of .455, and hence well above the .10 level, civil service access on the other hand had a 
p-value of .061 which is significant at the .10 level. This variable therefore needs further testing also in the next 
model.    
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had a significant effect on initial separatism score, and for that reason it is still justifiable to 
consider Model 3 a better model than Model 2. This is supported by the AIC value that has 
decreased from 2575.88 in Model 2 to 2555.90 in Model 3.  
 
TABLE 4.8: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 3 versus the  
unconditional model and Model 2. 
Chi-square statistic (***) 79.95 
Degrees of freedom 15 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic  7.97 
Degrees of freedom 6 Model 2  
comparison P-value .239 
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 
 
When considering the results against the hypotheses, it becomes clear that only 
hypothesis 3 is supported by the analysis: Groups that are geographically concentrated in one 
region are more likely to be separatist. Hypothesis 1, 2, 4a and 4b on the other hand, are not 
supported by the analysis.  
 
Model 4: Group capacity and strategic leverage 
In this part of the analysis, I will evaluate the impact of variables relating to group capacities 
as well as sources of strategic power, for predicting separatist demands. This means that I will 
add a new a group of variables at level-2: Number of segments in adjoining countries, active 
separatism among kin groups and kindred groups in power.  
Hypothesis 11 suggested that having ethnic kin dominance in a nearby state will lead 
to more radical separatist demands. Hypothesis 12 proposed that the higher the number of 
segments a group has in other countries the more likely it is itself will be separatist. Finally, 
hypothesis 13 proclaimed that separatism among ethnic kin groups in other countries is likely 
to lead to radical separatist demands. The results from this analysis are presented in TABLE 
4.9.  
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TABLE 4.9: Model 4: Effects of group capacity and strategic power on initial separatism score and 
change in separatist demands.  
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) .997 .224 .000 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (**) .404 .184 .029 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.675 .298 .024 
Freedom of expression, γ010 (*) .529 .277 .057 
Restrictions on organizing, γ020 (***) 1.029 .220 .000 
Access to higher office, γ030 (***) -.788 .240 .002 
Geographic concentration γ040 (***) .770 .203 .000 
Number of segments in adjoining countries, γ050 -.155 .096 .107 
Active separatism among kindred, γ060 (**) .889 .390 .023 
Kindred groups in power, γ070  .446 .290 .126 
    
Model for trend rate in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean trend rate within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 .063 .068 .360 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ110 -.143 .097 .143 
Number of segments in adjoining countries, γ120 .048 .031 .123 
Active separatism among kindred, γ130 -.052 .126 .680 
Kindred groups in power, γ140 (**) -.269 .111 .016 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .347    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.730 156 1538.77 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .201 159 321.39 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .506 115 158.14 .005 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***) .072 115 171.09 .001 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2504.21 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 22 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2548.21 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 18 
 
The intercept has decreased slightly from Model 3 to .99, when all the predictors have 
the value of 0. The trend slope has a positive effect of .06. However, the p-value is not below 
the .10 level. The level-1 predictors of cultural discrimination remain significant predictors of 
initial separatism score with roughly the same strength also when controlled for the group 
capacity variables. The same applies to the level-2 predictors of political discrimination on 
initial separatism score.82  
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 I also here ran a separate test of Model 4 including historical autonomy (which was just above the .10 level in 
Model 3) as a predictor of initial separatism score, and civil service access as a predictor of change in separatist 
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Among the newly added variables, active separatism among kindred has a significant 
positive effect at the .05 level on the initial separatism score. Groups that have kindred groups 
in other countries that also pursue a separatist agenda have a .89 points higher initial score on 
the separatism index. Neither kindred groups in power, nor number of segments in adjoining 
countries have a significant effect on initial separatism score. However, both of these 
variables’ coefficients have a p-value slightly above the .10 level. Further testing is therefore 
needed in order to decide whether they should be considered as important predictors of initial 
separatism score or not. 
The previously significant predictor of the trend slope, restrictions on voting rights, 
has lost some strength and also has reached a p-value over the .10 level. However, since it has 
already proven to be a relatively stable predictor of change in separatist demands in the 
preceding models, one should be cautious of eliminating it. I will therefore include it in the 
next model, in order to see if it still is insignificant. Of the group capacity variables, only 
kindred groups in power have a significant negative effect, which is in the opposite direction 
of what was hypothesized. For each increase in the trend variable, groups that have kindred in 
power in a neighbouring state relaxes their separatist demands by -.27 points, compared to an 
increase of .06 points for those groups that does not have kindred in power. The other two 
predictors are insignificant.  
The level-2 variance component for the intercept and the trend slope is relatively 
stable, although the former has in fact increased from 2.68 in Model 3 to 2.73 in Model 4. 
However, the level-3 variance component for the intercept has decreased from .67 to .50. 
Although both the deviance statistic and the AIC values have improved marginally, the results 
from the likelihood-ratio tests shown in TABLE 4.10, suggests that Model 4 is not 
significantly better than Model 3.  Nevertheless, both active separatism among kindred and 
kindred groups in power are both significant predictors of respectively level and change in 
separatist demands.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
demands, to see if there occurred a change in p-values. Both of them now turned out to be insignificant with p-
values of respectively .187 and .115, indicating that these variables perform inconsistent across various models.  
 84 
TABLE 4.10: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 4 versus  
the unconditional model and Model 3. 
Chi-square statistic (***) 83.64 
Degrees of freedom 13 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic 3.70 
Degrees of freedom 2 Model 3  Comparison P-value .155 
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 
 
Hypothesis 13 is supported by the results from the test of Model 4, having separatist 
kin groups in neighbouring states increases the likelihood of a group being separatist at the 
onset of the analysis. Hypothesis 11 on the hand is not supported, as kindred groups in power 
had a negative instead of a positive effect: Having kindred groups in power serve to de-
radicalize these separatist demands over time. Hypothesis 12 is neither supported by the 
analysis. I have now tested all the variables that are tied to group-level theories at level-1 and 
-2 of the analysis. Now, I will turn to the level-3 predictors associated with the host states.  
 
4.3.3 The level-3 predictors 
Model 5: Power sharing arrangements 
In this model, I will test the level-3 part of the theories on power sharing arrangements. In 
chapter two I set forth hypotheses that related to two different types of federal systems, 
ethnofederations and federations, and both will be tested here. I also discussed the effect of 
autonomy regimes, and although this effect is measured with a level-2 predictor, I have 
included in Model 5, as it is theoretically related to the other two types of power-sharing 
arrangements.83  
Whereas hypothesis 14a argued that federations, distinguished by symmetry and 
territorially based federal units, should have a neutralizing impact on separatism, hypothesis 
14b launched an opposite expectation. Hypothesis 15a proclaimed that ethnofederations, with 
federal units organized around ethnic identity, are more likely to temper separatism as they 
serve to accommodate ethnic demands, while hypothesis 15b instead expected such 
arrangements to have an inflammable effect on separatism. Lastly, hypothesis 16a proposed 
that the granting of autonomy would hamper ethnic separatism, while hypothesis 16b 
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 This was discussed more in detail in chapter two, section 2.3.1.   
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expected such granting to have the unwanted effect of stimulating further separatism. The 
results from testing Model 5 are presented in TABLE 4.11.  
 
TABLE 4.11: Model 5: Effects of power sharing arrangements on initial separatism score and change in 
separatist demands.  
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) .694 .231 .004 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (***) .516 .175 .004 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.671 .282 .018 
Freedom of expression, γ010 (*) .525 .269 .051 
Restrictions on organizing, γ020 (***) .885 .205 .000 
Access to higher office, γ030 (***) -.628 .235 .008 
Geographic concentration, γ040 (**) .526 .207 .012 
Active separatism among kindred, γ050 (**) .671 .303 .027 
Group autonomy status, γ060 (***) 1.884 .297 .000 
Ethnofederations, γ001 .027 .371 .942 
Federations, γ002 (**) -.635 .317 .047 
    
Model for trend rate in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean trend rate within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 (*) .070 .053 .191 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ110 (*) -.163 .089 .069 
Kindred groups in power, γ120 (*) -.193 .099 .051 
Group autonomy status, γ130 (**) -.269 .107 .013 
Ethnofederations, γ101 (**) .272 .112 .017 
Federations, γ102 (**) .615 .287 .034 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .353    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.321 157 1288.87 0.000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .177 160 296.79 0.000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .403 113 158.55 .003 
State mean trend rate, u10j (***) .052 113 165.00 .001 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2447.07 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 24 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2495.07 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 22 
 
When all the predictors in this model have the value of 0, the initial separatism score is 
.69. The trend rate is positive with a coefficient of .07. Compared to the results for Model 4, 
there are only minor changes in the coefficients for the level-1 and level-2 predictors that 
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were added in the previous models. The p-values show that all these variables still have 
significant effects, after including two predictors at level-3 and one predictor at level-2.84 
The three newly added variables, ethnofederations, federations and group autonomy 
status, display dissimilar directions with respect to their effect on initial separatism score; the 
first one has a positive effect, the second a negative effect, and the third a positive effect. 
However, only the latter two have statistically significant impacts. Groups residing in 
federations, have a .63 points lower initial score on the separatism index than groups residing 
in non-federations. Groups that enjoy an autonomous status on the other hand have a 1.88 
points higher score in 1990-1994 than groups not enjoying such a status.  
When it comes to predicting change in separatist demands, ethnofederations and 
federations both have positive effects that are significant at the .05 level, although the 
coefficients tells us that the federations predictor has a stronger impact on this trend over time 
than ethnofederations. For each increase in the trend variable, groups that reside in 
federations increase their separatist demands by .61 points more than groups residing in non-
federations, whereas groups residing in ethnofederations increase their demands by .26 points 
more. Groups that have an autonomous status display an opposite pattern, as they decrease 
their demands by .26 points more than groups that are not autonomous over time.  
The level-2 variance component for the intercept and trend slope has decreased from 
2.73 and .20 in Model 4 to 2.32 and .17 in Model 5, which indicates that group autonomy 
status has reduced the unmodelled variance at level-2. The level-3 variance components have 
also decreased from .50 to .40 and from .07 to .05 respectively for the state mean initial 
separatism score, and the state mean rate of change. In other words, in Model 5 the 
unmodelled variation at level-3 has been reduced after the inclusion of ethnofederations and 
federations.  
This is also reflected in a lower deviance statistic of 2447.07 compared to 2504.21 in 
Model 4. The AIC value has similarly decreased from 2548.21 in Model 4 to 2495.07 in 
Model 5. TABLE 4.12 presents the results from the likelihood-ratio tests of Model 5 versus 
the unconditional model and Model 4. The tests confirm that Model 5 offers a significant 
improvement compared to Model 4 without any level-3 predictors. 
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 Also here, I have performed a separate test of Model 5 which included variables that had p-values in the 
borderline of the .10 level in preceding models. Historical autonomy now got a p-value of .313 and therefore is 
eliminated from the rest of the analysis. Number of segments in adjoining countries similarly performs badly on 
explaining initial score, but is significant at the .10 level for explaining changes in demands (although the effect 
is relatively weak). Kindred groups in power now perform better, and turn out to be a significant predictor of 
both initial score and change in demands. This variable will therefore be included in the next model. Civil 
service access fails to become significant again, and therefore is given less attention in the succeeding analysis.  
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TABLE 4.12: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 5 versus  
the unconditional model and Model 4. 
Chi-square statistic (***) 140.77 
Degrees of freedom 15 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 57.14 
Degrees of freedom 2 Model 4  Comparison P-value .000 
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 
 
The results provide mixed and contradictory evidence rather than clear-cut support for 
any of the hypothesis. Hypothesis 14a is supported in that groups residing in federations 
display lower levels of separatism at the start of the analysis. However, hypothesis 14b is also 
supported as groups residing in federations radicalize their demands more than groups 
residing in non-federations. Hypothesis 15a is not supported by the analysis. To the contrary, 
hypothesis 15b finds support: Groups residing in ethnofederations are more likely to 
radicalize their demands over time. Hypothesis 16b is supported as autonomous groups are 
more separatist at the onset of the analysis. At the same time, hypothesis 16a is supported as 
autonomous groups de-radicalize their demands over time.  
Power sharing arrangements, especially federations and autonomy regimes, therefore 
seem to have oppositional effects: While groups residing in federations start out lower on the 
separatism index, they radicalize over time, autonomous groups to the contrary start out 
higher and instead de-radicalizes over time. This may have implications for which power-
sharing arrangement should be introduced as a conflict-management tool in countries 
challenged by ethnic separatism.  
 
Model 6: Regime type and durability 
Model 6 extends the preceding model with three variables that test the impact of regime type 
(democracy versus autocracy), regime durability and presidentialism on separatist demands. 
Hypothesis 17 argued that ethnic groups in democracies should be more prone to separatism 
as they face the threat of ethnic competition, security dilemmas and fear of exclusion.  
Hypothesis 18 proposed that the longer a regime has been consolidated, the less likely it will 
foster ethnic separatism. Finally, hypothesis 19a proclaimed that presidential systems are less 
likely to lead to separatism as they, whereas hypothesis 19b set forth the opposite expectation. 
The results from testing this model are shown in TABLE 4.13.   
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TABLE 4.13: Model 6: Effects of regime type, presidentialism and regime durability on initial 
separatism score and change in separatist demands. 
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE 
 
P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 .627 .431 .148 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (***) .546 .193 .005 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.673 .271 .013 
Freedom of expression, γ010 (**) .536 .265 .044 
Restrictions on organizing, γ020 (***) .875 .205 .000 
Access to higher office, γ030 (***) -.657 .233 .006 
Geographic concentration, γ040 (***) .572 .205 .006 
Active separatism among kindred, γ050 (**) .604 .301 .045 
Kindred groups in power, γ060 .451 .277 .104 
Group autonomy status, γ070 (***) 1.868 .265 .000 
Federations, γ001 (***) -.887 .256 .001 
Regime type, γ002 .010 .048 .832 
Regime durability, γ003 .004 .003 .175 
Presidentialism, γ004 -.290 .265 .276 
    
Model for rate of change in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean rate of change within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 -.223 .147 .132 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ110 -.137 .083 .100 
Kindred groups in power, γ120 (**) -.236 .109 .031 
Group autonomy status, γ130 (**) -.255 .104 .015 
Ethnofederations, γ101 (***) .346 .091 .000 
Federations, γ102 (***) .783 .249 .003 
Regime type, γ103 .024 .017 .167 
Regime durability, γ104 (***) -.005 .001 .002 
Presidentialism, γ105 (***) .340 .108 .003 
    
 
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .356    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.343 156 1269.41 0.000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .182 160 294.02 0.000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .269 111 150.40 0.008 
State mean trend rate, u10j  (***) .006 110 139.08 0.001 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations  
Deviance = 2424.29 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 30 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2484.29 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 23 
 
 The initial separatism score is now .62 when all predictors have the value of 0. 
However, the intercept has a p-value above the .10 level. The trend rate has now become 
negative with a coefficient of -.22, but also this coefficient has a p-value above the .10 level. 
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The level-1 and level-2 predictors that were significant in the previous analyses, remain 
significant and with relatively unchanged coefficients with respect to direction and strength. 
There are two exceptions: Firstly, the effect of kindred groups in power crosses the .10 
significance level slightly with a p-value of .104. Secondly restrictions on voting rights also 
reach the .10 level with a p-value of .100. However, both predictors has been influential when 
testing previous models, and I therefore argue that one should not rush to disclaim these 
variables’ effects altogether. It may be that they are just sensitive to the addition of the three 
new variables. Before excluding them from the analysis, it is therefore necessary to evaluate 
how the newly added variables perform.  
 When it comes to explaining initial separatism score, the new variables regime type, 
regime durability and presidentialism performs rather poor. Neither of these variables have a 
significant impact on separatist demands in 1990-1994. However, their performances are 
enhanced considerably with respect to explaining changes in separatist demands, although the 
effect of regime type is statistically insignificant also here. Regime durability and 
presidentialism on the other hand both obtain significant effects on change in separatist 
demands, the former in a negative direction and the latter in a positive. For each increase on 
the trend variable from 1990-1994 to 1995-1999 to 2000-2003, groups residing in presidential 
systems increases their separatist demands by .34 points more than groups that does not.  
Regime durability has a negative effect, which indicates that the higher the number of 
years a regime has survived, the lesser the score on the separatism index will be. The effect of 
a one year addition to regime durability is reflected in a .0045 points lower score on the 
separatism index. One should not be tempted to discard the effect based on the low value of 
the coefficient. To exemplify, for a group within a state with a regime that has endured for 50 
years, the separatism score decreases by 225.0045.50 =∗ points (for each increase in the 
trend variable) more than for a group in a regime that has endured 0 years. 
The level-2 variance components show that the unmodelled variance for both the 
group initial score and the rate of change has increased respectively from 2.32 to 2.34 and 
from .17 to .18 from Model 5 to Model 6, which basically can be explained by the fact that I 
have not added new predictors at level-2. More importantly, the decrease for the level-3 
variance components for the average state separatism score from Model 5 to Model 6 is over 
.1 from .40 to .27. Also, a similar decrease in unmodelled variance has occurred for the state 
mean rate of change from Model 5 to Model 6 from .05 to .006. This indicates that the 
inclusion of the regime durability and presidentialism variables at level-3 has enhanced the 
explanatory power of the model.  
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 The deviance statistic has also decreased from 2447.07 in the previous model to 2424. 
28 in Model 7. Furthermore, the AIC value has been reduced from 2495.07 to 2484.29. The 
results from the likelihood-ratio tests of Model 6 versus Model 5 and the unconditional model 
are shown in TABLE 4.14. These tests show that Model 6 clearly offers a significantly better 
model fit than both Model 5 and the unconditional model.  
 
TABLE 4.14: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 6 versus the  
unconditional model and Model 5. 
Chi-square statistic (***) 163.56 
Degrees of freedom 21 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value .000 
   
Chi-square statistic (***) 22.78 
Degrees of freedom 6 Model 5  Comparison P-value .001 
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 
 
 Hypothesis 17 is not supported by the analysis, whether a regime is democratic or 
autocratic does not seem to influence separatist demands. Regime durability does not explain 
level of separatism in 1990-1994, but the analysis has shown that the longer a regime stays 
alive the more the separatist demands will de-radicalize over time, thus lending support to 
hypothesis 18. Although presidentialism fails to explain level of separatism at the onset of 
analysis, hypothesis 19b nonetheless reaches some support by the present analysis, as groups 
residing in presidential systems become more separatist over time, than groups residing in 
parliamentary systems. This also means that hypothesis 19a is not supported by the results.  
 
Model 7: State reputation building 
The last level-3 predictor to be added is proportion of previous challenges accommodated. 
Hypothesis 20 proposed that ethnic groups that observe an accommodating behaviour by their 
host state regime towards previous separatist challengers are more likely to be separatist, as 
they have reason to believe that the state will be accommodating also in their dealings with 
future challengers. The results from testing this hypothesis are presented in TABLE 4.15.  
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TABLE 4.15: Model 7: Effect of state reputation building on initial separatism score and change 
in separatist demands. 
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) .594 .213 .007 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (***) .526 .185 .005 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.635 .270 .019 
Freedom of expression, γ010 (*) .461 .270 .088 
Restrictions on organizing, γ020 (***) .858 .200 .000 
Access to higher office, γ030 (***) -.698 .227 .003 
Geographic concentration, γ040 (***) .546 .203 .008 
Active separatism among kindred, γ050 (**) .607 .297 .042 
Kindred groups in power, γ060 (*) .482 .265 .069 
Group autonomy status, γ070 (***) 1.919 .274 .000 
Federations, γ001 (**) -.663 .277 .018 
Proportion of previous challenges accommodated, γ002 .111 .385 .774 
    
Model for rate of change in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean rate of change within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 -.050 .097 .606 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ110 (*) -.150 .088 .087 
Kindred groups in power, γ120 (**) -.248 .106 .020 
Group autonomy status, γ130 (**) -.266 .107 .014 
Ethnofederations, γ101 (***) .302 .105 .005 
Federations, γ102 (***) .805 .262 .003 
Regime durability, γ103 (**) -.004 .001 .010 
Presidentialism, γ104 (***) .257 .092 .006 
Proportion of previous challenges accommodated, γ105 .228 .305 .456 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .356    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.329 156 1277.00 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .181 160 293.68 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .322 113 153.73 .007 
State mean trend rate, u10j (**) .010 110 141.66 .022 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2428.98 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 28 N (level-2) = 283  
AIC = 2484.98 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 23 
 
 The initial separatism score when holding all predictors constant at 0 is .59, and the 
coefficient is significant at the .01 level. The trend rate is now -.05 and has a p-value way 
above the .10 level. The most obvious changes from Model 6 to Model 7 regarding the 
already included variables, is that the p-values for kindred groups in power as a predictor of 
initial separatism score, and for restrictions on voting rights as a predictor of rate of change in 
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separatist demands, have sunken below the .10 level again. For the other variables at level-1 
and level-2, the coefficients remain significant and with approximately the same strength. 85  
 The newly added variable proportion of previous challenges accommodated does not 
obtain a significant effect on neither initial separatism score nor changes in these demands.  
Hypothesis 20 is thus weakened by the analysis. This analysis suggests that the occurrence of 
separatist demands does not seem to be influenced by the proportion of previous challenges a 
state has accommodated. This is further confirmed by the lack of improvement in model fit 
illustrated by the variance components at level-2 or -3, and the deviance statistic which 
actually has increased from Model 6 to Model 7. Although the likelihood-ratio test presented 
in TABLE 4.16 suggests that there is a significant improvement from Model 6 to Model 7, 
this is due to the fact that there are fewer parameters estimated in Model 7 than in Model 6. 
The AIC of 2484.98 in Model 7 compared to 2484.29 in Model 6 underpins this observation. 
Nevertheless, the newly added variable, proportions of previous challenges accommodated, is 
not significant and therefore are not included in the final model.  
 
TABLE 4.16: Likelihood-ratio test of Model 7 versus the  
unconditional model and Model 6. 
Chi-square statistic (***) 158.86 
Degrees of freedom 19 
Unconditional  
model 
comparison P-value 0.000 
   
Chi-square statistic (*) 4.70 
Degrees of freedom 2 Model 7  Comparison P-value 0.093 
   
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 
 
4.3.4 The final model 
I have now tested and evaluated a large amount of variables related to all three levels of 
analysis. Based on these results, I have ended up with a final model that best accounts for 
variation both in initial separatism score and rate of change in separatist demands over time. 
This model consists of variables that represent the whole range of theories that were presented 
in chapter two. The group grievance and motivations theories are represented by variables 
measuring cultural and political discrimination. The group traits and characteristics theories 
                                                 
85
 I also ran Model 7 with a test of regime durability as predictor of initial score, and regime type as a predictor 
of change in demands, as both of these had p-values not that far above the .10 level in Model 6. However, none 
of them experienced a drastic improvement in the p-values in Model 7, with .157 for the former and .124 for the 
latter. 
 93 
are represented solely by geographic concentration. With respect to the capacity and strategic 
power variables both active separatism among kindred as well as kindred groups in power are 
included. Among the level-3 variables, the theories on power sharing are represented by 
federations, ethnofederations and group autonomy status. Furthermore, regime durability and 
presidentialism are included. The results from this final analysis are shown in TABLE 4.17.   
 
TABLE 4.17: Model 8: The final model.  
 
Fixed effect Coefficient Robust SE P-value 
Model for initial separatism score, π0ij     
Model for mean separatism score within state j, β00j     
Intercept, γ000 (***) .597 .210 .006 
Restrictions on ceremonies, γ200 (***) .525 .184 .005 
Restrictions on family life, γ300 (**) -.632 .274 .021 
Freedom of expression, γ010 (*) .469 .268 .080 
Restrictions on organizing, γ020 (***) .856 .200 .000 
Access to higher office, γ030 (***) -.703 .225 .002 
Geographic concentration, γ040 (***) .550 .203 .008 
Active separatism among kindred, γ050 (**) .600 .297 .044 
Kindred groups in power, γ060 (*) .481 .265 .070 
Group autonomy status, γ070 (***) 1.917 .271 .000 
Federations, γ001 (**) -.666 .274 .017 
    
Model for rate of change in separatist demands, π1ij    
Model for mean rate of change within state j, β10j    
Intercept, γ100 -.037 .093 .690 
Restrictions on voting rights, γ110 (*) -.147 .087 .091 
Kindred groups in power, γ120 (**) -.249 .106 .020 
Group autonomy status, γ130 (**) -.260 .107 .015 
Ethnofederations, γ101 (***) .344 .090 .000 
Federations, γ102 (***) .802 .263 .003 
Regime durability, γ103 (***) -.004 .001 .009 
Presidentialism, γ104 (***) .243 .087 .006 
    
Random effect Variance component d.f. Chi-square 
 
P-value 
Level-1 variation     
Temporal variation, etij .356    
Level-2 (Groups within states)     
Group initial score, r0ij (***) 2.328 156 1278.36 .000 
Group trend rate, r1ij (***) .182 160 294.11 .000 
Level-3 (between states)     
State mean score, u00j (***) .323 114 153.81 .008 
State mean trend rate, u10j (**) .011 111 142.14 .025 
     
 
Model fit 
 
Observations 
 
 
Deviance = 2429.63 N (level-1) = 781  
Number of estimated parameters = 26 N (level-2) = 283    
AIC = 2481.63 N (level-3) = 117  
Significance levels: (*) = p < .10, (**) = p < .05, (***) = p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
Number of iterations (Maximum Likelihood estimation) = 23 
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 The initial separatism score for a group with the value of 0 on all predictors is .59, and 
this coefficient has a p-value below the .01 level. The trend rate is now -.03, but not 
significant. Overall, there are no drastic changes in the coefficients or the p-values for any of 
the predictors at any level. Neither is there much change in the variance components.  
The deviance statistic has in fact increased from 2424.29 in Model 6 and 2428.98 in 
Model 7 to 2429.63 in the final model, thus a likelihood-ratio test of the final model versus 
both Model 6 and Model 7 would not represent a significant improvement. However, the 
deviance statistic does not punish models with a higher number of predictors added. The final 
model is more parsimonious than both Model 6 and Model 7, and this should also be taken 
into account. This is reflected in the AIC value of 2481.63, which is lower than both the AIC 
value in Model 6 and Model 7. Hence I conclude that this final model is the best model for 
explaining ethnic separatism. 86  
 
4.4 Summary of the analysis 
The aim of this empirical analysis has been twofold, by both assessing which factors can 
explain level of separatist demands at the onset of the analysis, in 1990-1994, and modelling 
change in these demands throughout the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s. Before adding 
explanatory variables, I performed an exploratory analysis of the data. This analysis showed 
that there is most variance to be found at the group-level both with respect to initial levels of 
separatism and change in these demands. Although the group-level variance are relatively 
more important than the state-level variance, the exploratory analysis also signalled that the 
state-level is proportionally more important for explaining change than it is for explaining 
initial separatism score. These patterns are reflected in the tests of the various group-level and 
state-level predictors. While group-level predictors have the most explanatory leverage for the 
initial level of separatism, state-level predictors gains added importance for explaining 
changes in separatist demands.  
 
                                                 
86
 I also tested the final model with some extra control variables included: GDP per capita, state population size 
(both of these are found in Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded data on trade and GDP, and which I downloaded 
through the Quality of Governance dataset); proportion of the country that is mountainous (a variable that was 
compiled by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and ethnic fractionalization (which was compiled by Fearon (2003)). 
However, neither of these had a significant effect on either initial separatism score or change in separatist 
demands.  
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4.4.1 Explaining initial separatism score 
The first group of theoretical variables was the one measuring group grievances and 
motivations. Two predictors of cultural discrimination (restrictions on ceremonies and 
restrictions on family life) and three predictors of political discrimination (freedom of 
expression, restrictions on organizing and access to higher office) had a significant effect on 
initial separatist demands. Among the variables measuring group traits, only geographic 
concentration had a significant effect. Of the capacity and strategic power variables both 
active separatism among kindred and kindred groups in power had a significant effect. 
Among the state-level theories, only federations and group autonomy status seemed relevant 
for explaining initial separatist demands. 
Although the coefficients presented in TABLE 4.17 are not standardized and therefore 
not readily comparable, it still possible to make some notes on their strength. All the cultural 
and political discrimination variables are dummy variables (0 = no discrimination, 1 = 
discrimination). Judging by the sizes of the coefficients, it thus seems that of the group 
grievances and motivations variables, restrictions on organizing (.85) is the most important 
predictor, followed by access to higher office (-.70), restrictions on family life (-.63), 
restrictions on ceremonies (.52) and freedom of expression (.46). The difference between 
being autonomous (plus 1.92 points on the separatism index all other variables held constant 
at 0) and not autonomous is perhaps the most striking effect. Active separatism among ethnic 
kindred (0 = no separatism, 1 = active separatism), kindred groups in power (0 = not in 
power, 1 = in power), and geographic concentration (0 = not concentrated, 1 = concentrated 
in one region) are also dummy variables, and have fairly even sizes on their coefficients, 
respectively with .60, .48 and .55. The federations variable is also dichotomous, and with a 
coefficient size (-.67) approximately the same as the three last variables.   
 TABLE 4.19 summarizes the significant predictors of initial separatist demands in 
1990-1994, the direction of their effects and if they performed in line with the theoretical 
expectations. 
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TABLE 4.18: Predictors of initial separatism score, direction of effects and evaluation of hypotheses.  
Theories Predictors  
 
Hypothesized effect 
 
Actual effect 
Evaluation of 
hypotheses 
Restrictions on 
ceremonies 
Hypothesis 6: Cultural 
discrimination associated with 
higher levels of separatism.  
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 6 
supported 
    
Restrictions on  
family life 
Hypothesis 6: Cultural 
discrimination associated with 
higher levels of separatism 
Associated with 
lower initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 6 not  
supported 
    
Freedom of  
expression 
Hypothesis 7: Political 
discrimination associated with 
higher levels of separatism 
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 7 
supported 
    
Restrictions on  
organizing 
Hypothesis 7: Political 
discrimination associated with 
higher levels of separatism 
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 7 
supported 
    
 
 
 
Group grievances 
and motivations 
 
Access to 
higher  
office 
Hypothesis 7: Political 
discrimination associated with 
higher levels of separatism 
Associated with 
lower initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 7 not 
supported 
Group traits 
and 
characteristics 
Geographic  
concentration 
Hypothesis 3: Geographic 
concentration associated with 
higher levels of separatism  
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 3 
supported 
Kindred groups  
in power 
 
Hypothesis 11: Kindred 
groups in power in nearby 
state associated with higher 
levels of separatism  
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 11 
supported 
    
Group capacity 
and strategic 
power Active 
separatism  
among kindred 
Hypothesis 13: Kin separatism 
associated with higher levels 
of separatism 
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 13 
supported 
Federations Hypothesis 14a: Federations 
associated with lower levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 14b: Federations 
associated with higher levels 
of separatism 
Leads to lower 
initial levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 14a 
supported 
 
Hypothesis 14b 
not supported 
    
Power sharing 
arrangements 
Group 
autonomy 
status 
Hypothesis 16a: Autonomy 
associated with lower levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 16b: Autonomy 
associated with higher levels 
of separatism  
Associated with 
higher initial 
levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 16a 
not supported 
 
Hypothesis16b 
supported 
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The testing of group-level theories yielded ambiguous results when evaluating the 
results against the hypotheses. Overall, the most surprising findings, perhaps, is that 
predictors assumed to have a similar effect, as they are supposed to represent indicators of the 
very same theoretical phenomenon, such as the various predictors of cultural and political 
discrimination, display dissimilar causal effects. The results from the analysis suggest that 
cultural or political discrimination in fact are not one-dimensional phenomena with unison 
and one-directional effects. This means that some of the hypotheses proposed in chapter two 
at the same time is supported and not supported by the results. For instance, while freedom of 
expression and restrictions on organizing have a positive effect in line with hypothesis 7, 
access to higher office, has a negative effect contrary to the hypothesis. 
 
4.4.2 Explaining change in separatist demands 
The group-level predictors fared worse in explaining changes in separatist demands. Only 
three predictors proved to be stable and significant predictors of the trend slope. The group 
grievances and motivations theories are represented by restrictions on voting rights. However, 
restrictions on voting rights have a negative effect on separatist demands over time, quite the 
opposite of what was expected in hypothesis 7. Among the group capacity and strategic 
power theories, kindred groups in power have an influence on change in separatist demands. 
This variable also performed in the opposite direction of what was expected in hypothesis 11. 
Within the state-level theories, all three variables measuring power sharing arrangements, 
federations, ethnofederations and group autonomy status, have a significant impact on change 
in separatist demands. Lastly, within the regime type theories, both regime durability and 
presidentialism had significant effects.  
Group autonomy status and kindred groups in power have relatively similarly sized 
negative coefficients of respectively -.26 and -.25. Restrictions on voting rights has a slightly 
smaller coefficient of -.15. Among the dichotomous state-level variables, federations (.80), 
ethnofederations (.34) and presidentialism (.24), the first one seems to be most influential 
followed by ethnofederations and presidentialism. Regime durability is not comparable to the 
three dichotomous variables, as of the differences in level of measurement. Nonetheless, the 
older a regime is, the more groups de-radicalize their demands over time. TABLE 4.20 
provides equivalent information as TABLE 4.19 with respect to the significant predictors of 
change of separatist demands.  
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TABLE 4.19: Predictors of change in separatist demands, direction of effects and evaluation of 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theories Predictors  Hypothesized effect Actual effect 
Evaluation of 
hypotheses 
Group grievances 
and motivations 
 
Restrictions on 
voting rights 
Hypothesis 7: Political 
discrimination associated 
with higher levels of 
separatism 
De-radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time 
Hypothesis 7 not 
supported 
Group capacity and 
strategic power 
Kindred groups in 
power     
Hypothesis 11: Kindred 
groups in power in nearby 
state associated with higher 
levels of separatism.  
De-radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time  
Hypothesis 11 
not supported 
Federations Hypothesis 14a: 
Federations associated with 
lower levels of separatism 
Hypothesis 14b: 
Federations associated with 
higher levels of separatism 
Radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time 
Hypothesis 14a 
not supported 
 
Hypothesis 14b 
supported 
    
Ethnofederations  Hypothesis 15a: 
Ethnofederations associated 
with lower levels of 
separatism 
Hypothesis 15b: 
Ethnofederations associated 
with higher levels of 
separatism 
Radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time 
Hypothesis 15a 
not supported 
 
 
Hypothesis 15b 
supported 
    
Power sharing 
arrangements 
Group autonomy 
status 
Hypothesis 16a: Autonomy 
associated with lower levels 
of separatism 
Hypothesis 16b: Autonomy 
associated with higher 
levels of separatism  
De-radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands overt 
time 
Hypothesis 16a 
supported 
 
Hypothesis16b 
not supported 
Regime durability Hypothesis 18: Established 
regimes associated with 
lower levels of separatism 
De-radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time 
Hypothesis 18 
supported  
Regime type, 
presidentialism and 
regime durability 
Presidentialism Hypothesis 19a: 
Presidential systems 
associated with lower levels 
of separatism 
Hypothesis 19b: 
Presidential systems 
associated with higher 
levels of separatism 
Radicalizing 
effect on 
separatist 
demands over 
time 
Hypothesis 19b 
supported  
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Answering the research question 
My aim for this thesis was to answer the following research question: Which factors make 
separatist demands among ethnic minorities more likely, and which factors are associated 
with either a moderation or radicalization of separatist demands over time?  
In order to investigate this topic, I first needed to define the content of ethnic 
separatism and who the ethnic claim-makers are. Thereafter, drawing on previous research, 
both qualitative and quantitative, I presented the theoretical framework to be employed in the 
empirical analysis. I have argued heavily that ethnic separatism is a complex phenomenon 
that cannot be understood unless one takes into account the wider context in which such 
activism takes place. In other words, separatism involves two set of actors, the claim-makers 
and the host states that is targeted by the claims. In chapter four, I ran a series of tests of 
different models with variables measuring group-level and state-level theories in a multilevel 
analysis.  
The findings offer clear-cut support for the theoretical point of departure. Firstly, 
factors associated with the groups, such as geographic concentration, political and cultural 
discrimination, and external bases of power are all important predictors for explaining why 
groups are disposed to separatism. Secondly, the institutional features of the host states, such 
as the use of federal systems, regime endurance, and presidential versus parliamentary 
systems also have major importance for explaining why groups become separatist. Through 
the use of a multilevel analysis, I have been able to detect this complexity. No set of 
theoretical explanations are sufficient on their own. Rather it is the combination of both 
group-level and state-level explanatory variables that best accounts for separatist demands. 
The method of analysis has also enabled me to discover that explaining initial levels and rates 
of change in separatist demands, involve a complex dynamic. It turned out that some of the 
variables performed in opposite directions, depending on whether they were set to predict 
initial demands as opposed to rate of change in these demands over time.  
Regarding initial demands, the results from the analysis have shown that separatism is 
more likely among ethnic minorities when the following conditions are present: Restrictions 
on cultural ceremonial activity, lack of freedom of expression and limited possibilities for 
organized activity. I have also shown that it is more likely when groups are geographically 
concentrated in one region, when their ethnic brethren have dominant political power in 
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neighbouring states, when their ethnic kin are separatist activists in neighbouring countries 
themselves, and, when a group already has been granted an autonomous status. To the 
contrary, I found that separatism is less likely if a group meet restrictions in its conduct of 
family life, is denied access to higher official positions, and when the group’s host state has a 
territorially based federal system.  
I found the following factors important for explaining change: Groups are more likely 
to radicalize their separatist demands from their initial demands in 1990-1994 if they reside in 
federal states, regardless of whether the federal units are territorially or ethnically organized, 
or when they reside in presidential regimes. Conversely, they are more likely to de-radicalize 
their initial demands if they have restricted access to voting rights, and have kindred groups in 
power in neighbouring states. This is also the case when they already have been 
accommodated through the granting of political autonomy. Finally, the longer a regime has 
survived, the more likely groups will de-radicalize their demands, regardless of whether the 
regimes are democratic or autocratic.  
 
5.2 Implications of my findings 
Grievance theories have achieved mixed results when it comes to explaining separatist claims 
in previous accounts. Whereas some studies have concluded that these grievances do not have 
a significant effect on separatist claims at all (Jenne et al. 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2000); 
others have found that frustration generated by lack of access to political positions, as well as 
a loss of historical autonomy, motivate ethnic groups to raise separatist demands (Gurr 1993); 
and yet others has demonstrated that restricted access to political participation is negatively 
correlated with separatism (Ayres and Saideman 2000b: 107).  
My findings show that some types of discrimination seem to “work”: Discrimination 
of ethnic minorities on areas such as family life, access to jobs in higher office or voting 
rights are effective measures to reduce ethnic separatism. However, it is hardly viable from a 
normative perspective to recommend such practice. That being said, restricting rights to 
perform ceremonial activities, to participate in organizational activity and the right to speak 
freely, on the other hand functions as a motivating factor behind separatist demands. Thus, my 
findings have shown that the causal link between discrimination and separatism are not of a 
one-dimensional character. The implications of these findings is that the actual content of 
whatever cultural or political restrictions employed is more important for predicting why 
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some groups are separatist, than the more general expectations that cultural or political 
discrimination leads to more separatism.  
 Geographic concentration has been found to be an important predictor of separatist 
demands also in earlier studies (Jenne et al. 2007; Saideman and Ayres 2000), and this is 
supported by my findings. A regional base gives groups a strong card, and makes it easier to 
credibly raise separatist claims.  
The importance of potential external sources of power, such as the presence of 
separatist or politically dominant kin groups in neighbouring states, have been found to 
increase the likelihood that a group is separatist in earlier studies. My findings mostly comply 
with these. However, I found that despite being associated with higher initial levels of 
separatism, having kindred in power in a neighbouring state has a de-radicalizing effect on 
separatism over time. This is the opposite of what was found in an earlier account (Jenne et al. 
2007). One possible interpretation could be that the presence of, and prospective military 
support from, politically dominant ethnic kindred groups in the immediate nearby, may 
function as a safeguard against harassing treatment from their host states, thereby removing 
potential motivation for separatism in the first place.  
Furthermore, the sometimes enthusiastic recommendation for adopting federal or 
ethnofederal power sharing arrangements in divided societies is not warranted by my findings 
(Bermeo 2002). Although groups in federations have lower levels of separatism in 1990-1994, 
they radicalize their demands over time. The results of the analysis therefore provide support 
to those who argue that federal systems are reinforcing mechanisms for institutionalizing 
ethnic identities at the sub-state level (Cornell 2002; Kymlicka 1998; Roeder 2009; Treisman 
1997; Hale 2000, 2004).  
However, I also found that groups that are autonomous at the onset of the analysis 
relax their demands over time. These somewhat contradictory findings concerning power 
sharing arrangements on a whole may indicate that power sharing accommodation targeted at 
one particular group, serve to make that specific group content, whereas both federal or 
ethnofederal systems serve to increase the aggregate levels of separatism in a state. First, 
ethnofederal systems are asymmetrical in the way that they provide some sort of special 
concessions to at least one specific ethnic group. However, when one group is accommodated, 
this will lead to intensified demands among those groups that have not been accommodated in 
the same way, as they will come to desire a similar privileged status, causing a domino effect 
of group demands. Second, assuming that some form of special concession is the desired 
outcome for an ethnic group, it becomes clear that neither federations are capable of 
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accommodating this desire, as these systems are based on principles of territoriality and 
symmetry. These principles per definition therefore provide no room to make special 
concessions to one group. The best way to accommodate separatism would thus be to grant all 
ethnic minorities some sort of autonomy.   
Lastly, that politically stable regimes, referring to those regimes that have survived for 
many consecutive years, are more likely to see a de-radicalization of ethnic separatism over 
time, contradicts earlier findings by Saideman et al. (2002: 124), who found that younger 
democracies are less likely to have problems with ethnic conflict, and even less so when 
political change is headed towards democratization. Based on my findings I instead argue that 
it is regime stability and durability, and not regime type (democracy versus autocracy) or the 
direction of political change per se, that is most important for either promoting or 
discouraging separatism.  
Furthermore, in ethnically divided societies, one should consider choosing 
parliamentary systems instead of presidential systems if one is to avoid a radicalization of 
separatist demands. This finding contradicts the effect of presidential systems on ethnic 
protest and conflict found in earlier studies (Ishiyama 2000; Saideman et al. 2002).  
 
5.3 Suggestions for future research 
Earlier studies has shown that parliamentary systems have a three times higher survival rate 
than presidential systems (Stepan and Skach 1993: 11). Keeping this in mind, I have shown 
that regime endurance is associated with a relaxation of separatist demands over time.  
However, perhaps another possible perception of the link between regime durability 
and separatism also should be considered. Turning the picture upside down: What are the 
expected effects of separatism on regime durability and stability? As I mentioned in the 
introduction, separatist movements undoubtedly have the potential to both brake and make 
states, and therefore separatist activism is directly linked to both regime stability and 
durability. Perhaps the most plausible way to assess this link is by viewing the causal 
relationship between separatism and regime durability as one that operates both ways. In other 
words, there is an interaction between separatist activism and regime endurance, where the 
two elements may influence each other. Explaining exactly how this interaction between 
separatism and regime durability operates would thus be an interesting task for future 
research. In order to do this there is first a need to build a theoretical framework that specifies 
how this two-way process operates.   
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